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ABSTRACT 
Samantha J. King 
Locating Moral Responsibility for War Crimes: 
the New Justiciability of `System Criminality' and its Implications for the 
Development of an International Polity 
This thesis examines the question of international responses to system criminality. It 
argues that the assignation of moral responsibility, expressed in the act of prosecuting 
individuals, expresses a fundamental conceptual shift towards an international polity. 
Although political rhetoric, the media and international legislation express the moral 
dimension of system criminality, the character of humanitarian law and the contingency 
of its operation is the most concrete indicator of such a development. The status of an 
embryonic international polity becomes particularly evident- with `individual 
responsibility' being a criminally liable offence, as set against `collective responsibility' 
which entails `civil', (non-penal) liabilities. However, the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility, and therefore the expression of a nascent international polity, is 
by no means as well developed as it may appear because the moral consensus necessary 
to fully support this shift is still undeveloped. A thoroughly radical re-orientation to a 
potential international polity had not fully arrived with the Nuremberg Principles and a 
paucity of individual prosecutions for system crimes indicates the limits of this 
development. Nevertheless, the contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies in its 
finding that with the radical developments of criminal tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court there has been a qualitative shift in the structure of international legal 
norms. 
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PREFACE 
Whilst reviewing information on the Vietnam War, I was struck by the wealth of debate 
and controversy the conflict had generated within traditional moral philosophy. The 
principle questions these philosophers addressed was the difficulty in locating moral 
responsibility for the loss of life in conflict. Yet, the constitution of the ICTY/ICTR raised 
few questions of this kind, although many of the issues and controversies that were so 
heated in the 1970's were as applicable to the assignation of responsibility as they were to 
its non-assignation. As a result, I became interested in exploring the whole notion of how 
and when we assign responsibility, particularly in cases where the crime is necessarily 
committed by a large number of people. 
This thesis is the culmination of several years postgraduate research undertaken at the 
University of Plymouth, generously funded by a Plymouth University studentship grant. 
My first debt of gratitude goes to my supervisors Dr Mike Pugh and Dr Neil Cooper who 
allowed me to explore whilst ensuring I did not get irretrievably lost. I would like to take 
this opportunity to express my large intellectual debt to both of them, for their inspiration, 
criticism and encouragement. 
In addition, the interviewees, as listed in the bibliography, and the staff from the Human 
Rights Centre in the University of Essex, The ICTY and ICJ in The Hague, Bindman and 
Co Solicitors, and the FCO in London, were both helpful and informative. As were the 
staff at the SOAS library, the Imperial War Museum and the Public Records Office. Of 
special mention in this respect is the late Robert Lenkiewicz, who kindly allowed me 
access to his personal collection of material, now held by the Lenkiewicz Foundation, 
Plymouth. I should also like to thank the librarians at Plymouth University and the Exeter 
Law Library. In addition, I was grateful for the correspondence with Terry Nardin and 
Captain S. Daneluk, which was particularly instructive. 
Thank you to my colleagues at the International Relations Study Centre for lively and 
stimulating debate, Lisa Ansean for helping me decode statistics where necessary, and 
Laurence Howard for computer support. Of course, my final thanks go to my family for 
their encouragement and patience, in particular, Lizzi, Mathew, Charlotte and Polly. 
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Introduction 
The twentieth century has been unprecedented for the scale and efficiency with which 
citizens have been exterminated. An empirical attempt to assess the scale of deaths in 
the twentieth century estimates `government democide', ' encompassing genocides, 
politicides and civilian deaths from bombing, at a startling 150,944,000 people, 4.1 
times the number of battle deaths. 2 The age of instant media communication and the 
accessibility of images of conflict from unofficial sources have meant that it is 
increasingly difficult for governments to control public knowledge of their actions. For 
instance, in the conflict in former Yugoslavia individuals were recording genocide on 
hand-held camcorders and transmitting the images to an international audience. 3 From 
this it seems clear that the relationship of violence between state and citizens is one of 
the most pressing considerations of our time and likely to become ever more important 
on the international agenda. 
The constitution of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (ICTY/ICTR) marked a watershed in the international response to 
violations of humanitarian law. This was the only time since the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
which addressed Nazi criminality post-World War II, that the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility for gross atrocities had been actively enforced. Yet, it seems 
clear that international public opinion seems likely to drive the issue further forward. 
Prosecutions for such criminality are, however, far more problematic than it would 
`Government democide' refers to the deaths of civilians at the hands of a public authority either its own 
citizens or civilians of another state. 
2 H. Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, London: SAGE, 1993, p. xiii. 
3 J. Gow, R. Paterson, A. Preston, Bosnia by Television, London: British Film Institute. 1996. p. 7. Also, 
D. E. Morrison and H. Turner, Journalists at lt ar: The D-naniics of 'News Reporting during the Falklands 
Conflict, London: SAGE. 1988. 
seem. They exist at the juncture between state and individual, illuminating the 
conceptual relationship between individual and community, government and citizen, 
nation and national. They also reside at the intersection of the legal regimes on the laws 
of war and human rights, and are a clearly circumscribed representation of the collision 
between legal, political and moral events. As such, they represent an unparalleled 
opportunity to analyse and describe the rapid developments in international law as 
moral and conceptual, as well as political, events. 
Definitions 
The issues become clearer when the focus is upon crimes which are committed within a 
pattern of widespread or systematic practice or `system criminality' 4 Using this class of 
crimes as the focus of this work admits consideration of the types of crime which most 
clearly represent a challenge to the traditional workings of the international system. 
System criminality can relate to both war crimes and crimes against humanity, given 
that its core feature is a pattern of criminality which: 
encompasses large-scale crimes perpetrated ... at the request 
of, or with the toleration of government authorities, as 
opposed to individual criminality, embracing crimes 
committed by combatants on their own initiative and often 
for reasons known only to themselves. 5 
System criminality is most often a term applied to genocide and crimes against 
humanity but Cassese highlights the fact that: 
Large scale and systematic war crimes may also form part of 
system criminality: consider for example the mass killing or 
' Prosecutor v Tadic, in the Appellate Chamber of the ICTY, VI. Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese. 
Available online, http: //www. un. org/icty/Tadic/appeals/judgement/tad-asojicas000126e. htm. Accessed 
13.08.00. 
5 B. V. A. Roling in A. Cassese, (ed), Current Problems of International Law: Essays on United Nations 
Law and on the Law ofArmed Conflict, Milan: Dott. A. Guiffre, 1975, p. 137. 
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ill treatment of prisoners of war. However, the reverse is not true: crimes against humanity always constitute a form of 
system criminality, while war crimes may constitute, (and indeed very often do constitute) a form of `individual 
criminality'. 6 
As we shall see, in cases where the issue of system crime is deliberately avoided, 
prosecutions for just such `narrow' war crimes are often undertaken. It is important to 
draw the distinction between `war crimes' and `violations of the laws of war'. Although 
war crimes are subsumed under the laws of war, their main feature is that they always 
carry individual responsibility whereas some violations of the laws of war do not. War 
crimes then `constitute grave offences against the laws of warfare, entailing penal 
responsibility of individuals'. ' 
Other aspects of the laws of war relate to provisions and repatriation of prisoners of war, 
for example, or the protocols on neutrality, a breach of which regulations could not 
properly be regarded as carrying penal responsibility. The classic definition of war 
crimes is given in Article 6 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
They are: 
Violations of the laws and customs of war. Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labour or for 
_any 
other purpose of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill- 
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing 
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity. 
Thus, we can see that the laws of war, encompassing war crimes, first introduced the 
6 Prosecutor v Tadic, in the Appellate Chamber of the ICTY, VI. Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese. 
Available online, http: //www. un. org/icty/Tadic/appeals/judgement/tad-asojicas000126e. htm. Accessed 
13.08.00. 
7 Y. Dinstein, and M. Tabory, (eds), War Crimes in International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1996, p. 3. 
8 Annex to the London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, PRO, Kew. See Chapter 3 below. 
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concept of individual responsibility, and first delineated the duty to protect civilians. 
From these basic ideas we can trace the heritage of modem humanitarian law, for the 
process since has been a process of enlarging the scope and application of the legislation 
away from the nexus of inter-state law. War crimes then, are the link between the most 
fundamental of inter-state relationships, conflict, and the most fundamental principles of 
individual responsibility. In this sense, the term `war crime' is uniquely flexible and 
given that the majority of humanitarian law has arisen from the laws of war, it remains a 
rich source of material for analysis. 
The term `justiciability' is a useful one in that it encompasses more of the legal process 
than simply trials and law. It is defined as something appropriate for or subject to court 
trial, an event liable to be brought before a court of law. Although this thesis focuses on 
the issue of prosecution, it does not confine itself to trials. It also assesses calls for 
proceedings, the legislation itself and accusations made with reference to legislation. In 
many cases, the fact that these calls have not resulted in prosecution is as illustrative of 
the condition of individual responsibility as those resulting in criminal proceedings. The 
concept of justiciability also allows consideration of the process by which actions are 
criminalised and the debate surrounding criminalisation. As such, it broadens the scope 
of the thesis to include some important issues within the assignment of individual 
criminal responsibility. 
Scope and Argument of the Thesis 
This thesis reviews and examines the new willingness to prosecute system criminality in 
terms of what it reveals about the moral response to these crimes and, consequently, 
4 
what can be concluded in terms of the condition of moral consensus between states. 
Fundamentally, it seeks to assess the implications of this new regard for system crimes 
as moral events, rather than political events, and argues that it must imply the existence 
of some form of international polity, however minimal and immature it may be. This 
international polity is logically entailed by the assignation of individual criminal 
responsibility. The assignation of criminal responsibility is key to assessing the 
condition of moral consensus, as it is expressive of a moral judgement in a way that 
non-criminal remedies are not. Traditionally, the international legal order directed 
sanctions for violations of international law towards states, not individuals. Thus the 
measures imposed were not penal or retributive, but rather compensatory or `civil'. This 
thesis therefore examines responses to system crime as an opposition between two 
principles. On the one hand, there is the imposition of `individual responsibility' 
entailing criminal responsibility. This is in contradiction to the operation of the 
traditional international norm of `collective responsibility' which is directed at states 
and entails non-penal liabilities. These could be described as `civil' in character. Thus 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility represents a fundamental conceptual 
shift, a reorientation that resides in contradiction with the customs, traditions and focus 
of the international system and which challenges norms fundamental to inter-state 
interaction. 
The criminalisation of offences, which employ the resources of the state, expresses a 
nascent international society. This is because, in the case of criminal offences, the 
victim is not in the essential sense an individual, aggregate of individuals or even a 
nation or ethnic group. The victim is, conceptually, a polity or social order. When 
individual criminal responsibility is enforced, it must imply the existence of a social 
order against which the crimes have been committed. Where offences are regarded as 
5 
civil in character, such as a boundary dispute for example, the dispute is between the 
participants only. The principle is one of equity between individual citizens. This is 
evident from the most basic principles of law: 
Crimes are offences against the state; in this ... they differ from breaches of contract or of trust and from torts, which 
are all either solely or primarily wrongs to individuals. The 
object of criminal proceedings is to punish the offender ... the object of civil proceedings is to satisfy the claim of the 
party injured. 9 
And as it is logically incoherent to distribute criminal guilt across a collective, 
complaints against states are civil in character. This is an abiding tradition of law for: 
Under the old common law, when a large number of crimes 
were punishable by death, it was generally accepted that 
corporations could not be held liable for crimes committed 
by their servants or agents; for as it was said, `You cannot 
hang the common seal'.... The artificial nature of 
corporations precludes their imprisonment just as much as 
the hanging of them- indeed they can only be punished by 
fine. Moreover it is unlikely that the intention to commit 
such crimes as rape or murder could ever be imputed to 
corporations. ' o 
Much of the theoretical work done on corporate responsibility can usefully be applied to 
the state, given that it shares many of the features of corporations particularly in the case 
of multi-national corporations. Donaldson's work on assigning moral responsibility to 
corporations is especially useful in this context, given that it discusses the issues with 
relation to assigning moral responsibility as well as imputing legal responsibility. " 
Keenan, one of the Judges at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) described individual responsibility as a concept which `pierces the veil of the 
9 P. Shears and G. Stephenson, James' Introduction to English Law, 13`h Edition, London: Butterworths, 
1996, p. 157. 
10 Ibid., p. 168. 
11 T. Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1982. Donaldson also 
applies his perspective specifically in T. Nardin, and D. Mapel, (eds), Traditions of International Ethics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. See also, M. Parker, (ed), Ethics and Organisations, 
London: SAGE, 1998. 
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corporate entity of nationality' and elsewhere refers to `the corporate entities of 
nations"' Resolutions come in the form of reparations or sanctions and remedies that 
are administered on a state-to-state basis. In these cases, there is an effective denial of 
international polity. 
Yet, the principle of individual criminal responsibility is by no means as dominant as 
developments such as the constitution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
proliferation of trials for system crime seem to suggest. The principle of individual 
criminal responsibility runs contrary to some of the most abiding principles of 
international interaction, such as the principles of sovereign immunity, non-intervention 
and indeed a legal and ethical tradition which regards states as `large individuals' or the 
monolithic bearers of individual legal personality. 13 On this issue Graham is of 
particular interest, discussing collective responsibility from the perspective of 
intervention. 14 This is of interest because war crimes prosecutions are a form of 
intervention. In addition, the principle of individual criminal responsibility challenges 
the structure of international diplomacy, particularly at the apex of responsibility 
assignment where the accused is a head-of-state. This issue is especially evident in the 
treatment of system criminality, necessarily committed with the resources of the state. 
When we look at the pattern of prosecutions (and failure to prosecute), international 
moral consensus is still relatively weak when set against the principles of sovereign 
immunity and non-intervention. 
12 J. B. Keenan and B. F. Brown, Crimes against International Latin, Washington D. C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1950, p. 128 and p. 123 respectively. 
13 C. Navari, The Condition of States, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991 makes some 
interesting observations about the legal personality and O. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on 
Poverty, Justice and Development, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986, examines the case for states to bear 
moral responsibility. 
14 G. Graham, Ethics and International Relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. See also, I. Forbes and M. 
Hoffman (eds), Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, London: 
Macmillan, 1993. 
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Political rhetoric and the media express the moral dimension of system criminality in 
varying degrees but rhetoric cannot be relied upon as concrete evidence of universal 
moral consensus. The impossibility of drawing incontrovertible empirical conclusions 
on the basis of a volume of cross-cultural material is clear. The character and growth of 
international humanitarian law is an alternative, and useful, approach to the question of 
international moral consensus. But although it has continued to be refined and enlarged 
post-Nuremberg, the existence of international legislation has had no bearing on the 
actual pattern of prosecutions for system crime. To designate something `criminal' 
through legislation implies a minimum level of moral consensus, whereas a system that 
delivers full and effective criminal liability through prosecution requires a firmer 
political consensus. The originality of this thesis lies in its contention that only the 
political willingness to commit to enforcement of the legislation is a secure indication of 
moral consensus. Further, the status of a potential international polity is indicated most 
clearly by the character and pattern of enforcement of humanitarian legislation. Yet, on 
examining the nature and context of prosecutions it is evident that this consensus is both 
narrow and restricted. 
International treatment of war criminals is far removed from the implied neutrality in 
the hostel sui generis status of indicted war criminals. They are enemies of all, and 
therefore technically stateless as offenders, in the same way as pirates, for instance. For 
war crimes prosecutions to succeed they must be as unproblematic as prosecutions for 
piracy. Yet, it is worth noting that prosecutions for piracy are only unproblematic in 
narrowly defined circumstances. When the crime, pursuit and the apprehension of the 
criminal all occur on the high seas, without impinging on territorial waters or 
jurisdiction, then the prosecution of piracy is relatively straightforward. However, these 
conditions occur so rarely that the operation of prosecutions 
for piracy is often as 
8 
politically fraught as that for other inter-state disputes. ' S In the same manner war crimes 
prosecutions only operate with any regularity in a similarly small and uncontroversial 
window of action. This thesis sets out to define and describe this window of action. 
Abandoning the traditional principles of inter-state relations to allow full moral 
responsibility to individuals would imply an obviously radical change in the way states 
and their populations relate to one another. That this thoroughly radical re-orientation to 
a potential international polity did not fully arrive with the Nuremberg Principles, ' 6 
despite both the legislation and political rhetoric that might suggest otherwise, is 
demonstrated by the paucity of prosecutions for system crimes until the present day. 
With the radical developments of the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), I argue that there has been a qualitative shift in the 
structure of international inter-action. Yet, the depth and extent to which this principle 
has become embedded should not be over-estimated, for despite several significant 
developments towards individual criminal responsibility, there have also been occasions 
when the collective approach has been prioritised. 
Methodology 
There are many potential methodological approaches to the problem of demonstrating 
shared cross-cultural moral values including empirical techniques, theoretical deduction 
15 See M. C. Pugh, `Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Problems and Remedies', Low Intensity Conflict 
und Lau Enforcement, Vol. 2: No. 
1, (summer 1993), pp. 1-18. 
1G International Legal Commission, `Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950, No. 
82. ' Adopted by the 
ILC, 1950. Available internet, http: //deoxy. org/wc/wc-nurem. htrn. Accessed 
23.10.00. 
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and jurisprudential scholarship. ' 7 Each approach has both strengths and weaknesses 
when applied to this subject area. Perhaps the greatest difficulties surround the attempt 
to provide empirical proof. 
The first methodological difficulty in providing empirical evidence is that found in the 
collation of statistical material. Using quantitative techniques is the issue often 
expressed as the `small n problem' and it is particularly relevant for this thesis. It refers 
to the significant lack of identical cases sufficiently similar to be classed as one 
population. Its importance is stressed by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff who describe a 
rough demarcation between the two methodologies: 
The former [scientific method] prefers to isolate a few 
variables and analyse a large number of cases to determine 
the relationships among these variables. The traditionalist, in 
contrast, will often wish to examine all the variables which 
could conceivably have a bearing on the outcome of a single 
case. ' 8 
Thus, in order for quantitative methods to be successful it is essential to manipulate a 
wide range of statistical material. This has proved to be a problem for international 
relations theorists even in its most general form. Within the field of war crimes 
prosecutions this is an acute problem. Even if all cases of crimes against humanity were 
to be admitted for analysis, including those which occurred in massively different 
societal and international structures, there are still too few cases to allow any statistical 
significance to findings. In addition, even were an analysis attempted, many of the cases 
occurred too far in the past, in such a radically different world system, for findings to 
shed any real light on current developments. 
i7 P. McNeill, Research Methods, London: Routledge, 1990. 
18 J. Dougherty and R. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: .4 
Compreheii iiv 
Siaivi", New York: Harper & Row, 1981, p. 37. 
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There are also problems with operationalising the emotive and intuitive subject matter 
involved in a study of moral discourse. It is extremely difficult to connect abstract 
theorising to likely observable phenomena, thus it would also be difficult to standardise 
the concepts to facilitate verification. In order to manipulate concepts in a quantifiable 
manner an `indicator' must be selected. This should be a readily identifiable 
phenomenon that points conclusively to the abstract notions that are under investigation, 
such as `occupation' as an indicator of `class'. Yet it is difficult to imagine what a 
measurable indicator of moral autonomy, for instance, might look like. 
Choosing to focus on the enforcement of system criminality brings a unique difficulty 
as well as a unique opportunity. The theoretical debate, covered in detail in chapter one, 
sets out radically opposing viewpoints on the possibility of universally held moral 
values. Yet, even within opposing theoretical positions on universal morality, there are 
few theorists prepared to allow that massive abuse should be endorsed by toleration, 
given the nature and sensitivity of the subject matter. ' 9 Yet, although moral 
philosophers might abandon an action having proved its ultimate logical intractability, 
political action is necessarily more pragmatic. 20 For instance, whilst philosophers might 
not be able to agree on a definition of `short' because of difficulties with the boundaries 
of the concept, 21 a pragmatic judgement is both possible and necessary in the majority 
of cases. Similarly, prosecutions are undertaken regardless of the availability of a 
definitive solution to this difficulty. 
Thus the growth of the principle of individual responsibility has the quality, classically 
'9 M. Walzer, Thick and Thin, London: Notre Dame, 1994; A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality, Chincago: 
Chicago University Press, 1978. 
20 I am indebted to my colleagues at the Plymouth International 
Studies Centre for the refinements of this 
idea, which a debate on this topic produced. 
21 This is known as the `Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle', in A. Flew, Vestern 
Philosophy: Ideas and 
Arguinent From Plato to Popper, London: Thames and Hudson, 1989, p. 21. 
amenable to historical analysis, in that it has grown within a legislation and institutions 
which are: `Like coral reefs, which have been erected without conscious design and 
grow by slow accretions'. 22 Thus, a methodological technique founded on a deep 
scrutiny of individual case studies is most appropriate. This comprises historical- 
diplomatic analysis and techniques such as interviewing to highlight the variables that 
may have had a bearing on each case. Primary source materials such as treaties, statutes 
and formal agreements were used to demonstrate the weight of the principle within 
legislation. UN documents from both the Security Council and General Assembly were 
examined and of particular use were the reports of Special Rapporteurs to the Economic 
and Social Council both thematic and country specific. These were useful in solving a 
particular potential difficulty in collecting official information and opinions in cases of 
non-prosecution. It could have been difficult to draw strong conclusions in the absence 
of action an essentially negative situation. This difficulty was also addressed by the use 
of some unofficial tribunal reports. These were held with respect to the massacre at the 
Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps, the Gulf War and the US conduct in Vietnam. These 
included primary source material on weaponry and civilian casualties and expert 
opinion on various aspects of the conflicts. In this way, material collected by the 
International Commission of Jurists contained detailed primary source material. Less 
useful were the NGO reports which tended to give summarised opinions on atrocities. 
Although I made use of the statistical information where it was presented, the opinion 
pieces have to be treated with caution given that they do not always comply with the 
technical legal definitions of system crime and war crimes. 
For discussions on the progress of the principle of state and individual criminal 
responsibility, the reports of the International Legal 
Commission are valuable in that 
22 D. Marsh, and G. Stoker, Theon-v and Methods in Political Science, 
London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
1995. 
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they represent an official international position on legal developments. Another valuable 
source in this respect is the publicly available trial records for actual prosecutions, both 
for evidence of how the issues of intent and proof were actually applied and for the 
statements of points of law often contained in the appeal judgements. 
In addition interviews were conducted with practitioners of international law, including 
experts at the FCO and the international lawyers, Nigel Rodley, Francoise Hampson and 
Geoffrey Bindman. In the Hague I interviewed Arthur Witteween of the International 
Court of Justice, and conducted numerous interviews at the ICTY, and attended the 
Milosevic trial. I also examined archived material at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies in London, which contains the only transcript in the UK of the Yamashita trial. 
The Public Records Office at Kew has a great deal of material on the deliberations on 
the treatment of Nazi criminals. The Imperial War Museum in London holds a vital 
transcript of the Tokyo Tribunal. The Exeter University law library was particularly 
useful in providing up-to-date legal materials. The Robert Lenkiewicz archive in 
Plymouth contained a valuable collection of newspaper articles on the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and its associated national prosecutions. Current newspaper articles were used 
where valuable to illustrate public opinion and for news updates. House of Commons 
Minutes and House of Lords Minutes gave insight into the UK debates on prosecutions. 
Internet material and secondary sources were also widely employed. 
Structure of the Thesis 
Underpinning this thesis is the originality of the argument that the willingness, or 
otherwise, to assign criminal responsibility 
is the only useful gauge of moral consensus. 
A judicial response to system crime, when exercised in the name of the 
international 
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community or as universal jurisdiction, shows real moral content. Of course, without the 
legislation which is a precursor to it, such moral events could not take place. But the 
legislation is of secondary importance to the process and context of actual punishments. 
Chapter one assesses this claim by reviewing some of the perspective and approaches 
taken with regard to universality in moral values. The case for either universality in 
values or particularism is an opposition so fundamental it reappears throughout the 
23 literature. Vincent tackles this issue in depth, 24 as does Nardin. 25 But within 
international ethics, there are three main approaches to this question. Firstly, there is the 
theoretical approach expressed as the debate between broadly cosmopolitan positions 
and communitarian theory. 26 Secondly, there is the use of empirical techniques to assess 
the potential or existence of universal moral consensus. 27 The third approach is the 
notion of law as expressive of moral values. 28 The central question here is whether or 
not individual prosecutions can be grounded in a notion of a universally accessible 
standard of moral judgement. If they can, this might imply that an acceleration of the 
principle of individual responsibility would be both possible and desirable. The key 
detail here is the normative aspects of these positions. 
23 Texts which assess this question are: D. Held, Political Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; 
Hutchings, K., International Political Theory, London: SAGE, 1999; C. Brown, (ed), Restructuring in 
Europe: Ethical Perspectives, London: Routledge, 1994; R. Falk, On Humane Governance, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995; R. Falk, On Humane Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; C. Brown, 
International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, New York: Columbia University Press; 
Luper-S. Foy, (ed). Problems of International Justice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988; T. Donaldson, in 
T. Nardin, and D. R. Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992; D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Kohler, (eds), Re-imagining Political Community, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998; M. Cochran, Normative Theory, in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; D. Morrice, `The Liberal-Communitarian Debate and its 
Significance for International Relations', Review of' International Studies, Vol. 26: No 2, pp. 233-251. 
24 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
25 T. Nardin, and D. R. Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992 
26 D. Bell, Comm unitarianism and its Critics, Oxford: Clarendon, 1993, and D. Archibugi and D. Held, 
(eds), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. 
27 O. F. Williams, (ed), Global Codes of Conduct, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000. 
)'S Exemplified in M. J. Detmold, The Unity ofLaw and Morality: A Refutation ofLegal Positivrsrn, 
London: Routledge, 1984, and K. Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1996. 
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This thesis seeks to be analytical rather than normative. By looking at the theoretical 
approach to the possibility of moral consensus, we can see that neither 
cosmopolitanism, nor communitarianism, with their normative accounts of moral 
structure can securely either prove or refute the notion of shared values. In fact, even 
where communitarian theorists have come close to refuting intervention in these 
circumstances, in the case of gross system crime, accommodations are made and system 
criminality is excluded from the particularist debate. 29 Beitz, for instance describes how: 
Conventional opinion in both international law and morality holds that intervention in 
the internal affairs of another state is almost always forbidden. I say almost, there are 
exceptions, which mainly involve intervention to defend against aggression and to put a 
stop to `crimes against humanity' such as genocide. " 
Yet, when morals are treated as factual propositions they fare no better. As well as the 
particular problems referred to in the methodology, the wider problems might seem to 
be insuperable. It is difficult to imagine a successful measure for cross-cultural moral 
values, the immensity of the project and the problems of quantifying such a fluid and 
emotive subject are insurmountable. 31 A common mode of regarding system crime is 
the content and scope of the legislation. 32 In part this is due to the influence of legal 
29 A. Black, `Nation and Community in the International Order', Review of International Studies, Vol. 19, 
1993. 
30 C. R. Beitz in S. Luper-Foy, (ed), Problems of International Justice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 
185. 
31 For instance A. D. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism vs. Relativism, London: SAGE. 
1990. 
32 This is an enormous field of study with a long heritage but some key texts include; G. Best, Humanity 
in Warfare, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980; P. Calvocoressi, Nuremberg: The Facts, the 
Law and the Consequences, London: Chatto and Windus, 1947; C. De Visscher, Theory and Reality in 
Public International Law, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959; Y. Dinstein, and M. Tabory. (eds), 
War Crimes in International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996; J. B. Keenan and B. F. Brown, 
Crimes Against International Law, Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1950; G. Lipsky, (ed). Law 
and Politics in the World Community, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952; and S. Luper-Foy, 
(ed). Problems of International Justice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 
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practitioners upon the discipline. Cassese, 33 Roling, 34 Bassiouni, 35 and Kalshoven36 are 
all judges at international level and all have contributed extensively to the study of 
international law. In addition some judges speculate as to the condition and future of 
developments in war crimes prosecutions, and the work of Goldstone37 and Taylor38 are 
especially interesting in this respect. Whilst the legislation is undoubtedly a precursor 
for prosecutions, and therefore of crucial importance, deductions about moral values on 
the basis of natural law or positivist perspectives on the legislation ultimately can prove 
no more helpful than those of the cosmopolitan and communitarian theorists. 
Ultimately, criminal responsibility assignation is the most effective gauge of moral 
consensus. The full realisation of the principle of individual criminal liability would 
allow for instant legal action against any offender in the world, enforced by an 
international judicial system, independent from states. This would indeed constitute a 
polity of some form, based upon the existence of a shared moral or social order. 
Chapter two examines the notion of moral responsibility in greater detail, looking at two 
main issues. Firstly, whether the notion of morality has any place at all in a 
consideration of international politics; and secondly, why individual criminal 
responsibility is more significant for moral consensus than the state collective 
responsibility that has been traditionally applied. The issue of moral scepticism in 
international relations is an important one manifesting in realist theory as both 
descriptive realism and prescriptive realism. 39 It also occurs in post-modernism, 
33 A. Cassese, (ed), Current Problems of International Law: Essays on United Nations Law and on the 
Law ofArmed Conflict, Milan: Dott. A. Guiffre, 1975. 
34 A. Cassese, and B. V. A. Roling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993. 
35 M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, The Hague: Martinnus 
Nijhoff, 1992. 
36 F. Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, Geneva: ICRC, 1987. 
37 R. Goldstone, Prosecuting War Criminals, London: The David Davies Memorial Institute, 1996. 
38 T. Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy , 
New York: Bantam Books Inc.. 1971. 
39 An example of descriptive realism is evident in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, London: 
Macmillan, 1946; J. H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of il orld Politics. New York: David 
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exemplified by the work of Vivienne Jabri. 40 Moral scepticism is also manifest in a 
significant trend of thought which focuses on the office of statesman and its 
examination of the limits and responsibilities attached to high office. 41 To refute these 
positions there is not only the observation that states can and do engage in moral 
dialogue but also the question of the nature of moral accountability. An examination of 
the nature of moral personality demonstrates the logical consequences of attempting to 
assign moral responsibility to a collective such as a state. In order for responsibility to 
be assigned, the conditions of autonomy, agency and intention must be satisfied. These 
are conditions that may be partly satisfied by states but are only fully united within 
individuals. States, or random collectives, 42 are in the unique position of bearing a legal 
personality within international law and therefore the temptation is to apply moral 
responsibility to them, to regard states as if they also bear a moral personality. But 
although collective blame can be assigned, its coherence is challenged at the moment 
when criminal guilt is applied. This is due to the nature of accountability, in assigning 
accountability; responsibility must be either distributed or divided. Divided 
responsibility apportions an amount of guilt according to participation whereas 
distributed responsibility allows the same amount of guilt to the group as a whole. The 
possibility of distributing guilt and its consequences are important for the issue of 
system. 
_ 
crime given that it requires the resources of the whole state. Ultimately the issue 
Mackay, 1976; H. Morganthau Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: 
Knopf, 1948. 
40 V. Jabri, `Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3,1998, pp. 591-611. (p. 610). See also J. Kristeva, Strangers to 
Ourselves, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Z. Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994. 
41 M. Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996; M. Walzer, `The Problem of Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1972-73, part 2, 
pp. 160-180; H. Butterfield, Christianity--, Diplomach and War, London: Epworth. 1953. 
42 A `random collective' is a collection of individuals grouped together randomly. A `collective' is a 
group of individuals who chose membership of the collective. Thus a state is a random collective, as its 
members are commonly constituted by birth, something over which they have no control. Alternatively, 
Hitler's SS was a collective for which members had to make a conscious commitment. For ease of 
reading I do not draw the distinction throughout this work, however. I specify in the particular cases when 
a collective is not random but chosen. 
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of assigning criminal responsibility for whole-state crimes exists at the intersection of 
individual and state. 
Having shown the importance of criminal prosecutions for a study of international 
moral consensus, chapters three, four and five examine the traditional international 
response to system crime and the principles upon which humanitarian law has been 
founded. Chapter three looks at the historical practice of states with regard to gross 
abuses. As humanitarian law has largely grown from the laws of war, it examines the 
historical context and characteristics of the laws of war. It also discerns a tendency 
towards state responsibility and collective punishments for violations. The common 
responses to such violations have included reciprocity and reprisals, or reparations and 
sanctions. 
Chapter four assesses the Nuremberg Tribunal and the trials of Nazi leaders. It argues 
that although this was a massive evolution in approach given the traditional norms of 
inter-state interaction, it was not a full expression of individual criminal responsibility. 
The accused were selected as representatives of various functions of the German war 
machine. In many senses, the accused were symbolically representative of the German 
nation as a whole. 
Chapter five continues this assessment post-Nuremberg, examining the later 
developments in the principle of individual criminal responsibility. This is principally in 
the expansion and reinforcement of legal principles and the creation of new legislation. 
This includes the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. There is also a 
significant strand of thinking which advocates the principle of state criminality, 43 for 
43 For a defence of state criminal responsibility see primarily H. Kelsen, `Collective and Individual 
Responsibility for Acts of State in International Law', Jewis11 Yearbook of International Lcni,, 1948, and 
H. Kelsen, `Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with particular Regard to the 
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instance the International Legal Commission has continued to debate this issue on 
behalf of the UN since the Nuremberg Tribunal. This is significant in that it is 
embedded into the structure of the state system, thus even where this principle is covert, 
action tends naturally to relate to states collectively rather than to individuals. 
The pre-eminence of state sovereignty and the tendency to collectivise blame for system 
crime is indicative of a much more limited and restricted moral consensus than the 
scope of the legislation might suggest. In chapter six the limits of this consensus are 
shown by examining the record of prosecutions. The character and context of system 
criminality is crucial in triggering moral consensus. Whilst political context obviously 
impacts upon the likelihood of prosecution, it is clear that the events in former 
Yugoslavia were far more resonant with Nazi criminality than others post-World War 
II. Looking at the cases at which accusations of genocide had been levelled, although 
not formally charged, we can see several common characteristics. Three of the most 
interesting were that of the US in Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and 
Indonesia in East Timor (during both the massacre at Santa Cruz on 12 November 1991, 
and the post-referendum massacres of 1999). In both East Timor and Cambodia there 
were junctures at which prosecution could have been possible as part of the 
administration of their domestic affairs but the opportunity was not taken. Similarly, in 
the prosecution for the My Lai massacre of 16 March 1968, in Vietnam, the issue of 
system crime was sidestepped in favour of courts martial for lower-ranking individuals. 
In all these cases the moral consensus around system crime was too limited to drive 
international prosecutions. 
Punishment of War Criminals', California Law Review, Vol. 31,1943, pp. 530-571. For later work see 
F. 
Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of States: A Study on the Evolution of State 
Responsibiliti' with Particular Emphasis on the Concept of Crime and Criminal Responsibilitti". 
Stockholm: Borgstroms Tryckeri AB, 1985. For an overview of these positions see, H. H. Weiler, 
International Crimes of State: A Critical Analisis of Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility, 1989 
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Therefore, the constitution of the ICTY/ICTR was all the more striking. It raised several 
important legal issues in terms of customary law, the blurring of internal and inter-state 
conflict and the development of individual criminal responsibility. In chapter 7, these 
developments and the indictment and arrest of Slobodan Milosevic are contrasted with 
the treatment of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. In particular, the implications of the 
sanctions regime and the implied collectivisation in responsibility assignation are 
reviewed. In this respect at least it would seem the developments in individual 
responsibility the ICTY/ICTR represent are mitigated by the tendency to collectivise 
blame. 
This uneven progress in the development of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility is reinforced in chapter eight where the developments since the 
constitution of the ICTY/ICTR are discussed. One development has been an increased 
willingness by domestic courts to enforce individual prosecutions on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction. The warrants issued by Belgium, including its arrest warrant of 
11 April 2000 for Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 44 illustrate this point, as was the extradition 
proceedings over Pinochet. Both of these cases, whilst they show the forward 
momentum of the principle of individual criminal responsibility, also demonstrate the 
structural constraints of the customs, traditions and protocols of inter-state interactions. 
This is also shown in the proliferation of truth commissions, for although there is no 
real reason why they could not be complementary to the notion of prosecutions; in 
practice they tend to replace them. The International Criminal Court displays similar 
44 The arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 was issued by Belgium through its domestic courts for Mr. 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he 
was charged with Grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, crimes against humanity and incitement to 
racial hatred. Belgium had enacted domestic legislation, the war crimes law 1993, which enables anyone 
to bring a war crimes case against any world leader and sought to try Ndombasi, in a Belgian court for 
allegedly urging the slaughter of minority Tutsi's in 1998. The International Court of Justice, ICJ. handed 
down the decision on March 6 2002, that Ndombasi enjoyed immunity as he was the then incumbent 
foreign minister for the Congo. In Findings on Arrest Warrant of I1 April 2000. (Democratic Republic of 
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ambiguities, for whilst its legitimacy is based upon the notion of universal jurisdiction 
founded on moral consensus, its treaty-based nature indicates internationality rather 
than universality. 
Thus, the application of the principle of individual criminal responsibility is partial, 
opportunistic and contingent. Where prosecutions occur they are founded on moral 
consensus but this consensus is episodic and limited. Individual criminal responsibility 
challenges the very structure and norms of international inter-action and where it occurs 
it is enormously significant. But the more natural focus for blame and coercion is the 
collective, in the form of the state and prosecutions where they occur are firmly 
subjugated to the notion of sovereignty. So, although the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility is indicative of some form of international polity based upon a 
shared moral order, that polity is barely in existence at present. 
This thesis identifies an admittedly narrow area of international action that is uniquely 
indicative of shared moral values. This consensus is limited to only the most extreme 
atrocities, and in addition, these atrocities must be characterised by a purity of intent 
that distinguishes them from domestic political or military considerations. Only in this 
narrow window of action will international prosecutions proceed. The originality of this 
thesis lies in its argument that the act of prosecution, however rarely it is unproblematic, 
must imply a nascent moral community. This thesis also identifies system crime as 
exceptional in representing a collision between state and individual and crucially this 
collision is covert until the moment of actual individual prosecution. The central 
contention here is that the notion of society is inherent in the act of criminalisation and 
the assignation of criminal responsibility must logically entail a social order against 
which the crime has been committed. 
the Congo v. Belgium) 14 February 2002, ICJ. 
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PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL 
Chapter 1 
The Case for an international Moral Consensus 
This thesis contends that the principle of individual criminal responsibility is both more 
significant and less well established than it might seem. It is significant in that the 
imposition of criminal responsibility implies an international moral consensus. It does 
this in a way that civil liabilities cannot. But it is less well established than the 
enthusiasm for individual prosecutions, discussed in chapters 7 and 8, might suggest, for 
it operates in direct contradiction to the traditional structure of state interaction. This 
leads ultimately to the conclusion that there is an international polity in formation based 
upon this shared, although basic, moral consensus. Yet the notion of universally held 
moral values is much disputed and although attempts have been made to identify such a 
development, it has never hitherto been satisfactorily demonstrated. I contend that it is 
only within the enforcement of humanitarian law that we can find evidence for such a 
position, and that it is within the new willingness to prosecute individuals for atrocities 
that analysis of universal moral values must be undertaken. A brief review of the theory 
and analysis undertaken thus far in this area serves to highlight both the importance of 
the subject matter and the impasse that has been reached. 
The idea of common cross-cultural moral values is a contentious one addressing as it 
does, one of the most fundamental questions within international ethics. Whether it is 
possible to assert the existence of moral values that are objectively constituted and 
accessible to all as a common ethical framework, or whether moral values are 
essentially culturally specific and constituted by communities in different and 
particularistic ways, is the most substantial and seemingly irresolvable conflict in 
international moral theory. This debate is repeated in various guises both throughout 
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and within many academic disciplines. But at the heart of this debate is the relationship 
between the individual and the international system. This thesis argues that the tensions 
between individual and community within the workings of the international system are 
played out at many levels. They are manifested legally, politically and theoretically. 
They are evident in the direction of the assignation of blame, the legal potentialities for 
assigning responsibility and possibilities for political action. Fundamental to these 
judgements, is the question of the universality of moral judgement which conditions all 
other possibilities, and which is the substance of the universalism/particularism debate. 
Put in its simplest and most encompassing form, the major theoretical positions seek to 
prioritise either the individual or the community to which the individual belongs. Within 
domestic political theory this debate is cast as political liberalism and set against 
political communitarianism, ` within moral philosophy it is universalism opposing 
collectivism, 2 and within international ethics it is debated as cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism. 3 It also features within social and cultural anthropology, ' social 
theory, 5 and cross-cultural psychology. ' Within international law it is replayed as the 
distinction between positivist and natural law. ' The extent of this debate is mirrored in 
its complexity, for it can be conducted from several fronts. Theorists may construct 
methodological arguments focusing on the relative merits of abstracting individuals or 
Wherever possible I have given in example a key collection of positions, or a central text, or an 
accomplished overview. C. F. Delaney, (ed), The Liberalism/Communitarianism Debate, Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1994. 
2 D. Rasmussen, (ed), Universalism vs. Comm unitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics, London: 
MIT press, 1995. 
3 C. Brown, International Relations Theory. New Normative approaches, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992. 
4 A. D. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism vs. Relativism, London: SAGE, 1990. 
5 S. Lukes, Essars in Social Theory, London: Macmillan, 1977. 
G U. Kim, et al., (eds. ), Individualism and Collectivism: Theo),, Method and Application, London: 
SAGE. 
1994. 
7 For a discussion of Natural law and its relation to international law see K. 
Haakonssen, Natural Laii, and 
Mop-al Philosoph', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. For an overview of Natural Law and 
Positivism see M. D. A. Freeman, 6 Edition, Lloyds Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1994. Chapters 3 and 4. 
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contextualising them. ' It can also be construed as an epistemological problem where 
foundational approaches are contrasted with anti-foundational positions. ' Within 
international ethics the focus is primarily on the normative aspects of the dispute. 
Centrally, does a focus on either the individual or alternatively, the community produce 
morally good or bad consequences? "° This dispute is particularly vibrant within theories 
of global redistribution, " and human rights. " These tensions are also evident on a 
practical level in discussion about the form and purpose of international financial 
institutions, and the role and status of state sovereignty and intervention. In this thesis, it 
is played out as the opposition between the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility and the collectivisation of blame. 
I have listed these examples to illustrate one of the most striking aspects of war crimes 
prosecutions, namely, that these tensions and types of debate are largely absent from 
analysis of such prosecutions. A traditional focus is instead on such matters as the legal 
implications of decisions, " the constitution of the legislation, " the political context of 
the crimes" and the practical difficulties of implementation'. The legal principle of 
individual responsibility was first established with the post-World War II International 
8 S. Lukes, Individualism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973. p. 73. 
9 S. Mendus, `Human Rights in Political Theory', Political Studies, Vol. XLIII, 1995, pp. 10-24. 
10 M. Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
11 O. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Povertly, Justice and Development, London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1986. 
12 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
13 S. R. Ratner, J. S Abrams, Accountability for Human Atrocities in International Law- Beyond the 
Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
14 T. Meron, War Crimes Law Comes ofAge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
15 G. Best, Humanity in Warfare, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. and more controversially 
in R. Clark, The Fire This Time: US War Crimes in the Gulf, New York: Thunders Mouth Press, 1992. 
16 A central contributor to this mode of analysis is A. Roberts in for example, The Laws of War: 
Problems of Implementation in Humanitarian Crises, How can Humanitarian Law be made more 
effective in armed conflicts?, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1955. Also Draper, G. I. A. D., `Implementation of International Law in Armed Conflicts'. 
International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, Jan 1972, pp. 
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Military Tribunals and has intensified in both its scope and application with the 
constitution of the ad Hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Yet although 
the Nuremberg Tribunal marked a watershed in the application of individual criminal 
responsibility, it did so in the face of significant opposition. In fact, it opposed, and still 
opposes, the whole legal edifice of the international system, founded on the Acts of 
State Doctrine. " As states are evidently non-corporeal, the imputation of the action of a 
state's representative to his or her state allows the international system its historic 
function as a society of (large) legal individuals. Yet even though post-World War II 
has seen radical innovation in the prosecution of war crimes with the introduction of the 
principle of individual responsibility, " the moral basis of prosecutions in this form is 
largely treated as a settled norm of international relations. Yet the claim of moral 
universality embedded in the legislation for war crimes prosecutions has never been 
demonstrated securely. " The legislation alone, lacking enforcement mechanisms, had 
never been tested in this regard. Indeed, a central thrust of the argument here is that the 
most vital and important moral aspects of criminality lie not in the creation of 
legislation, or the juristic constructions of such law, but in the political process of 
enforcing punishment. It is only at this stage that contradictions emerge and tangible 
evidence is produced. 
However, there have been some important attempts to address this question, although 
they have ultimately proved inconclusive. Within international ethics this question has 
17 The Acts of State Doctrine provides that any act of the organ of a state is imputed as the act of that 
state. For instance, if an officially constituted minister signs a treaty, it is imputed to 
his or her state as if 
the state itself had signed. See H. Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility 
for Acts of State in 
International Law", Jewish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 22,1948. This tension figured 
significantly in the Pinochet extradition when the Law Lords had to 
decide if it was legally possible to 
indict a former head of state for acts committed whilst a sovereign. For more 
details see Chapter 8. 
18 See Chapter 2. 
19 Indeed Francoise Hampson, the legal representative for the ICRC, claimed that prosecutions were, in 
practice, always justified from the 
basis of a'threat to international peace and security' rather than the 
alternate grounds of `shocking to the conscience of mankind'. 
Appeals to a universal morality justified b-,,! 
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been expressed as the debate between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, yet 
neither of these positions can satisfy in all contexts. There have also been attempts to 
conduct empirical research into cross-cultural moral values, 20 attempts which have 
foundered on methodological grounds. Even the traditional jurisprudential approaches 
to this question are inconclusive. This thesis argues that the only secure evidence we 
can present to demonstrate moral consensus lies within the willingness to enforce 
criminal prosecutions for gross atrocities. 
Theoretical Approaches to the Possibility of Moral Consensus 
As we have seen, one of the most crucial aspects of war crime prosecutions is the notion 
of a universal moral standard on which our judgement of what constitutes criminal 
behaviour is predicated. The acceptance or denial of such a common moral code is at 
the root of international ethics and, though clumsy, the broad theoretical opposition 
between universalism and particularism subsumes the work of most theorists. 
Whilst cosmopolitan theories attempt to address the formulation of universal criteria of 
moral behaviour starting from the construction of a rational abstracted individual, 
communitarian theory criticises this notion of morality. For here, the imposition of a 
universal morality amounts to cultural imperialism. As people are constituted by their 
communities, their beliefs and moral codes are particularistic, uniquely constituted by 
the social and cultural context of each community. As communities are of such 
the language of the legislation are demonstrably unsafe. Interview with Francoise Hampsop University 
of Essex, Colchester, 22 February 2002. 
20For instance, R. P. Claude, (ed), Comparative Human Rights, London: John Hopkins University Press. 
1976, and S. Schwab, and Pollis, (eds), Towards a Human Rights Framework, New 
York: Praeger, 1982. 
For commentary on these attempts see A. D. Renteln, International Human Rights: 
Universalism vs. 
Relativism, London: SAGE, 1990, R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, and W. K. Frankena, Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1973, 
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importance in the ethical life of the individual, individuals must have the inherent right 
to determine the national destination of their own community. Thus, intervention is 
highly illegitimate, and the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty is 
enshrined. The attempt to impose universalistic moral standards is actually an attempt to 
impose a uniform western conception of individualistic morality on radically different 
communities. 
As we have seen, this debate is manifested within international ethics as the debate 
between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. I shall show that cosmopolitanism 
and communitarianism are at present in irresolvable tension, notwithstanding some 
attempts to overcome this opposition. 
Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism in its most simple distillation is a position which, `refuses to accept 
that existing political structures are the source of ultimate value. 'Z' This broad definition 
does not distinguish between the moral and political, but it highlights the fundamental 
notion within cosmopolitanism, that the individual can be abstracted from their social 
context which is both superficial and mutable. Hutchings, in common with others, 
further subdivides both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as either `moral' or 
`political'. 22 Within moral and political cosmopolitanism the emphasis is laid in 
different directions. Moral cosmopolitanism can be described as `any moral theory 
21 D. Held, Political Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. p. 24. 
22 K. Hutchings, International Political Theory, London: SAGE, 1999, C. R Beitz, and T. W. Pogge, also 
draw this distinction in C. Brown, (ed), Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, 
London: 
Routledge, 1994. 
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which presumes universal validity and applicability of moral principles', whereas 
political cosmopolitanism `prescribes types of political practice and institution that 
operate over, above or across the boundaries of the nation-state'. 2' Hutchings goes on to 
refine the latter, rather wide definition, which seems to encompass most of the subject 
matter of international relations. After Falk, she describes it as premised on the 
importance of democratising already existing covert cosmopolitan decision-making. '4 
Naturally, a focus on the management of war crime prosecutions as an ethical activity 
narrows the field of enquiry towards moral cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. 
However, much of the literature crosses these boundaries, especially as political 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism often bases its critique of international 
institutions on the justifications of moral cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. For 
instance one of the best-known examples of this is Rawlsian political liberalism which 
shares several features with Kantian cosmopolitanism. 25 Frost also bases his constitutive 
theory on a reading of Hegel. 26 
The primary source of ethical justification for cosmopolitanism is Kant. His central 
ideas offer a universal standard for moral judgement, perhaps so durable in the West at 
least, because they offer an explanation that appeals to our intuitive moral sense. Kant 
offers the `categorical imperative' as a guide to distinguishing duty from interest and a 
test of the validity of moral principles. " That the imperative is `categorical' rather than 
23 Ibid., p. 154. 
24 R. Falk, On Humane Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. Quoted in K. Hutchings, 
International Political Theory, London: SAGE, 1999 p. 154. 
25 The work of Rawls is a case in point as he explicitly acknowledges 
his debt to Kantian deontology with 
regard to his conception of the liberal individual as a universally rational abstracted 
figure. 
26 M. Frost, Ethics in International Relations, A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. pp. 141-159. 
27 Kant is deontological in that he doesn't see moral values as dependant upon anything else. Thus 
discerning the moral course of action in a situation is not related to consequences or costs/benefits. 
For 
Kant duty is integrally connected to morality as an aspect of this deontological approach. 
It is worth 
noting that this concept of 
duty as fundamental to moral consideration is absent in the work of many later 
theorists notably J. Rawls, A Theoi of Justice, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 1971, p. 342. An 
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`hypothetical' indicates an exclusion of the consideration of consequences. It is an 
absolute injunction to act in a particular way, whereas a hypothetical imperative would 
simply say `Do this if you want to achieve that'. 28 Kant sustains this imperative by 
offering two main formulations laid out in the Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysics of'Ethics. [Also referred to as the `Groundwork'. ] 2" Firstly, he holds that 
maxims should be universalisable, or that one should `Act only on that maxim whereby 
thou canst at the same time will that it should become universal law'. 30 Secondly, he 
argues that human beings should always be treated as ends-in-themselves, as in `Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity [... ] never simply as a means, but always at 
the same time as an end. '3' The most important feature of these formulations for our 
purposes is that they are essentially and inevitably dependent upon a construction of a 
rational individual who can be clearly separated from the community to which he or she 
belongs. This is evident by examining the basis from which universalisability is 
advocated. For it is not simply advisable to formulate maxims which can be 
universalised, it is logically impossible to do otherwise with any coherence. For 
instance, it could not be logical to argue that promises can be broken, because if this 
was a universal law the institution of promising would cease to exist. 32 There are, 
however, some serious difficulties inherent in this version of universality. Primarily it 
requires particular assumptions about the nature of the individual. For instance, it 
requires that the character of the individual is cautious. It has been pointed out that 
rational individuals may well endorse a system in which there is great inequality on the 
exception to this is the work of O. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essa1v on 
Poverty, Justice and 
Development, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986, who revives the notion of duty in relation to issues of 
global redistribution. 
28 C. Brown, Op Cit. n. 3, p. 30. 
29 I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, trans. Abbott, T. K., London: Longmans, 
1959. 
30 Ibid., p. 46. 
11 H. J. Paton, The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics c; Aloiu1. x, London: Hutchinson, 
1948, p. 91. 
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grounds that if one rules out rewards for others they are also ruled out for oneself. As 
Ward puts it: 
Although one would not like to be cheated and lied to, 
one may still be prepared to opt for a system in which 
someone had to be lied to and cheated to make great 
personal rewards possible for some; and to gamble on 
one's chance of being successful in that system. 33 
But this example also shows that maxim-universalisability, as well as assuming 
particular individual characteristics, may also be criticised on the grounds that it may 
endorse counter-intuitive moral positions. This apparent difficulty is connected with the 
level of specificity of maxims, should they be framed in extremely general or narrowly 
specific terms? Thus `repay any debt' is too general, whereas `John Smith may borrow 
without intending to repay' is too specific. It has led some theorists such as Luper-Foy 
to argue that Kant is inconsistent at the international level as using a maxim which is 
universalisable, the people of poorer nations may favour a change in the distribution of 
wealth whereas those in richer nations may not. j4 Yet Kant resolves this apparent 
tension by specifying that everyone should be able to follow the maxim under morally 
relevant similar conditions. 35 For Kant the relevantly similar is never more specific than 
the rational being. This may allow the flexibility to make sophisticated moral 
judgements, such as `it may be permissible not to repay a debt if you will starve if you 
do repay it' but it also requires an assumption of the rationality of individuals akin to 
the assumptions inherent in liberalism and manifested most clearly in western political 
thought. Thus there is still reason to question cosmopolitanism's claim to universality. 
32 K. Ward, The Development of Kant's View of Ethics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972, p. 107. 
33 Ibid., p. 116. 
34 S. Luper-Foy, (ed), Problems of International Justice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 
1 1. 
35 T. Donaldson. in T. Nardin, and D. R. Mapel Traditions of International Ethics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. 140. 
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However, the second formulation of the imperative holds more weight for a 
consideration of war crimes prosecutions and in tandem with the first has provided 
much of the justification for the protection of human rights and the acceleration of the 
principle of individual responsibility. Beetham argues that human rights are more 
consistently universalist and more readily identifiable with global politics, and hence 
cosmopolitanism, because they proceed from the international to national and local 
levels rather than vice versa and ascribe to human beings everywhere. 36 The notion of 
human worth and dignity is key to Kant's moral scheme as it is this that provides 
content to the first formulation as well as giving Kant's theory its distinctive rule-based 
approach to morality. It is this notion, so similar to the content of natural law, that 
informs much humanitarian law. Again this formulation is closely linked to the 
assumption of rationality and also to the idea that happiness is one of the essential ends 
of humanity. It would be irrational to deprive any human of the autonomy and freedom 
necessary to seek their own ends, because as Ward puts it 
To take `humanity' as an end, in a positive sense, is to 
cultivate one's natural perfection, as a pre-condition of 
all autonomous willing, and of fully rational action. ;' 
However, this justification of moral content only stands if we are willing to accept 
Kant's portrait of the rational abstracted individual, and it is to this vision of the 
abstracted individual that communitarianism objects. 
Of course, cosmopolitan theory has not stopped with Kant and some useful attempts to 
build on this basic justification for universality in ethics have been made. One of the 
more famous of these is Rawls' Theory of Justice. " Rawls proposes a conceptual 
36 D. Beetham, in D. Archibugi, D. Held, and M. Kohler, (eds), Re-imagining Political Community, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, p. 59. 
" Ward, Op Cit. n. 32, p. 120. 
38 Rawls, J., A Theo/T- of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
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device known as the `original position', for adjudicating between moral claims and 
particularly for assessing the inherent justice of different institutions. 39 This argues that 
when individuals are assessing the fairness of institutions they should do so as if they 
had no knowledge of their own position in relation to the institution. The individual is 
required to set aside considerations of what would be personally beneficial and by 
removing awareness of personal roles either within or in relation to the relevant 
institution. By using this rational device, termed the `veil of ignorance', Rawls claims 
that individuals will always choose systems based on a basic personal liberty and 
toleration. 4° The parallels with Kant are obvious and Rawls has explicitly acknowledged 
his debt here, however, his later work acknowledges the difficulties inherent in claims 
about the rational unsituated nature of the individual. ' Thus much of Rawls' later work 
has withdrawn its claims for universalisability and narrows its focus to liberal 
democratic systems only. 2 But later theorists have sought to defend his original 
insights. In addition there have been attempts to ground universal morality in notions of 
obligations rather than rights. " Beitz adds to Hutching's version of moral 
cosmopolitanism by extending Rawlsian liberalism to the international sphere. He 
includes the idea that choice of institutions and policies should be based on an 
`impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected by our 
choices'. 44 This normative account of moral cosmopolitanism is a direct descendant of 
Rawlsian political liberalism in its inclusion of `impartial'. 
;9 Ibid. 
40 Rawls, Op Cit. n. 37. 
41 Cochran, Op Cit. n. 10. p. 30. 
42 Rawls, Op Cit. n. 42. 
43 Cochran, Op Cit. n. i 0. 
44 Brown, Op Cit. n. 22, p. 124. 
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This tendency toward universalism is also shared by utilitarianism. Although a less 
important tradition it shares a focus upon the individual as a source of ultimate value 
and a view of the state as contingent, temporary and of value only insofar as it furthers 
the aggregated aims of individuals. 
Comm unitarianism: 
The failure of cosmopolitanism to demonstrate its claims to universality in moral 
judgement with any security is due in part to the convincing critique that has been 
directed at it by communitarian writers. I have set these positions in opposition through 
a consideration of war crimes prosecutions based on the observation that communitarian 
theory must inevitably lead to a relativistic tolerance of gross abuses provided they are 
perpetrated intra-state. It is through a consideration of war crimes prosecutions that this 
becomes apparent. I deviate from the intuitive use of the term `war crime' here but take 
it to include such instances on the grounds that action by the international community is 
based on the legal precedents and customs originating in the body of law that addresses 
violations of the laws of war. ' It is of course the cases concerning intra-state conduct 
and the form of intervention they represent, that are interesting from a theoretical 
viewpoint. These cases are `pure' in the sense that they cannot be justified by reference 
to other principles. In contrast, prohibitions on the motivations and conduct of war 
between states can be justified in terms of security, economics and convenience as well 
as by reference to moral principles. This is not to say that other bodies of legislation are 
devoid of moral content, for instance there is a clear moral dimension to other aspects of 
the laws of war, most notably Grotius. 4G Whilst we should not exclude morality as an 
'A prime example of this extension of the laws on war crimes 
is that of the creation of the Genocide 
Convention 1948 and the willingness to regard widespread atrocities as a form of armed conflict covered 
by the protocols to the Geneva Conventions. The 
latter is evidenced in the ICTR's mandate to prosecute 
just such crimes against humanity 
in the context of conflict within Rwanda. 
46 H. Bull. B. Kingsbury, and A. Roberts, Hugo Grotius and International Relations, 
Oxford: Clarendon, 
1990, and D. Luban, `Just War and Human 
Rights'. Philosophv and Public 4/fairs, Vol. 9: No.?. 1980. 
pp. 160-181. 
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aspect of such legislation, we cannot rely on it either. Thus it is within the `pure' 
interventions for crimes against humanity that the impasse between cosmopolitanism 
and communitarianism is revealed, and in turn this impasse, once demonstrated, 
provides an explanation for the hesitant and contradictory manner in which prosecutions 
have been made. 
Of course, communitarian theorists are as reluctant to accept this charge, as 
cosmopolitanism theorists are reluctant to accept the charge of cultural imperialism and 
at both ends of the spectrum, accommodations have been made. But just as 
cosmopolitan theorists are ultimately unable to sustain a rigorous universalism without 
falling prey to the charge of cultural imperialism, ultimately the several key 
observations which taken together constitute communitarianism, justify the 
characterisation of communitarian thought as ultimately particularist. Frazer identifies 
three key aspects of communitarianism comprising an ontological thesis, an ethical 
thesis and a methodological thesis. Ontologically, communitarianism argues for the 
non-reducibility and significance of collectives. Ethically communitarians place the 
locus of value upon the social individual or the individual's society itself. 
Methodologically, there is a rejection of the project of attempting to secure moral 
certainty by the deduction of universally valid fundamental principles. 
7 The 
fundamental structures of communitarian thought rest upon the twin pillars of social 
constructivism and particularism. 48 What is the significance of these characteristics for 
war crimes prosecutions? 
47 E. Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unit>> and Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, p. 21. 
48 Ibid., p. 19. 
33 
Primarily, the social constructivist element of communitarianism stresses the 
significance of the fact that humans live in communities not only as an empirical 
observation, but also as a normative proposition. Morrice describes this as the idea that 
humans achieve fulfilment of their nature only in the context of social and political 
life. 49 The genus of this approach is commonly credited to Hegel, due to his focus on 
political community. 50 In opposition to Kant, who sees the individual as a moral agent 
existing prior to society and driven by the categorical imperative, Hegel denies that it is 
possible to envisage individuals in isolation from the community which shapes them 
and constitutes them as individuals. 51 The impossibility for the communitarian of 
separating the individual from their society is illustrated by Moody who compares this 
enterprise to the attempt to separate fish from water. 52 A natural corollary to this way of 
thinking is a defence of the legitimacy and moral significance of the nation/state; 
examples of this are Miller and Walzer. 53 Miller deals with ethical nationalism and 
Walzer with non-intervention and Just War theory. 54 This leads to a form of 
particularism in that values must be inculcated and are therefore peculiar to each 
community. There is no neutral ground from which to make objective moral 
judgements. When the intervention is grounded in morality, as are prosecutions for 
crimes against humanity, we run the risk of ethical imperialism. Yet in avoiding this, 
49 D. Morrice, `The Liberal-Communitarian Debate and its Significance for International Relations', 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 26: No 2, pp. 233-25 1, p. 240. 
50 See for example: R. Plant, Hegel: An Introduction, (2nd Ed), Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. Z. Pelczynski, 
Hegel 's Political Writings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. 
51 Brown, Op Cit. n. 3, p. 62. 
52 T. Moody, `Liberalism and an Eccentric Communitarianism', in C. F. Delaney, (ed), The Liberalism- 
Communitarianism Debate, Boston: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994, p. 98. 
5; Morrice, Op Cit. n. 49., p. 238. 
sa D. Miller, On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995. and M. Walzer, Just and 
Unjust 
Was: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic Books, 
2nd ed. 1977. NI. Walzer, 
Spheres of Justice: _4 
Defense of'Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books Inc, 1983. 
34 
communitarianism cannot guarantee and may even threaten, individual rights and 
55 liberties and also poses the problem of relativism. 
In terms of ontology, the most successful communitarians argue for the significance and 
non-reducibility of the nation-state, although this mode of analysis is not strictly 
necessary to communitarian thought. " However, failure to focus on a particular unit as 
representative of `community' leads to difficulties in analysis. For instance, if the idea 
of community is left as a mutable one it is difficult to see from where analysis can 
proceed. Individuals exist in a multiplicity of social relations comprising family, work, 
religious, local, ethnic and national communities. It is difficult to see which 
communities could be significant in which circumstances whilst still saying something 
useful about moral principles. Walzer avoids these criticisms by focusing upon the 
nation-state as the bearer of community rights. As such he reconstitutes the legalist 
paradigm to extend the rights of self-protection and survival of nation-states. 57 It is 
worth noting at this juncture that this argument is distinct from the realist approach to 
state centrality in international relations because Walzer constructs a moral/ethical 
defence of the nation-state, unlike the prudential anti-moral arguments of realist 
writers. 58 In addition he accepts the potential for pre-nascent communities to exist 
within states. However, this approach leaves us with some difficult moral problems 
particularly in the prosecution of war crimes. The tendency to view the nation-state in 
such a monolithic way can tend towards a covert ascription of collective guilt. As we 
will see in chapter two, such an ascription is not logically sustainable. By 
justifying 
non-intervention he unconsciously diverts responsibility from individuals towards 
ss Morrice, Op Cit. n. 49, p. 246. 
56 Morrice, Op Cit. n. 49. 
57 Hutchings, Op Cit. n. 22., p. 45. 
See Chapter 2. 
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collectives. '`' It also diverts from the idea that within `crimes against humanity' 
prosecutions there are not only aggressors but also individual victims. 
Communitarianism has difficulty justifying the protection of individuals, Rawls argues 
that `it leads to the systematic denial of basic liberties and may allow the oppressive use 
of the government's monopoly of (legal) force'. 60 Black addresses this difficulty by 
admitting that cultures where civil rights were not respected pose a `special problem'. 1 6 
Thus communitarians are criticised for being conservative and failing to offer grounds 
to challenge the values of society. 62 
War crimes prosecutions are regarded as a `hard case' in that they pose special moral 
dilemmas. The extreme nature of war crimes violations, particularly systematic 
violations, makes them an issue which requires special consideration. To prioritise the 
rights and responsibilities of individuals is to universalise both crimes and criminals, 
thereby removing the state from consideration. Where the criminal is an organ of state 
and the crime requires state resources in its commission there are conceptual as well as 
practical difficulties with this course. The reverse approach holds that the rights of 
communities should be respected and state-sovereignty should be held as a supreme 
principle, on the grounds that morality is particular to communities rather than 
universal, or it is held that communities have a moral right to self-determination in order 
to ensure the ethical growth of its members. Yet in circumstances of gross atrocities it is 
evidently difficult to endorse this position and accommodations have been made. 
6j 
Walzer, for instance, endorses a notion of `thick' and `thin' versions of human rights, 
59 See Chapter 2. 
60 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Bantam Books , 
1993, p. 146. 
G' A. Black, `Nation and Community in the International Order', Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 19, 
1993. 
62 S. Avineri, and A. De-Shalit, (eds), Commiinitarianism and Individualism, 
Oxford: Oxford Uni\ ersity 
Press. 1992, p. 10. 
63 A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality, London: Chicago University Press, 
1978. 
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with the thin, minimalist morality being found in all societies. ý4 The difficulty with this 
assertion is that it looks very much like an empirical assertion of fact. Yet even if such 
an assertion were to be investigated empirically, there are grave doubts as to whether 
this could conclusively demonstrate shared moral values. 
Morals as Factual Propositions 
There are several substantive methodological issues when it comes to verifying 
empirically the existence of a moral code, however basic, that is valid throughout all 
cultures and for all times. There are both practical obstacles and theoretical objections to 
this approach that are of such magnitude that within ethical theory to require empirical 
justification for a position is to abandon the position. However, the most concerted and 
thorough attempts to provide comparative data have been made by social and cultural 
anthropologists, and this is a project that has proved to be of great interest to human 
rights theorists. 65 
The first problem with an empirical approach is a methodological one. How far might it 
be possible to establish quantifiably such emotive and embedded values? Who might 
decide which are the appropriate values to investigate and should such a massive project 
be carried out simultaneously in every culture of the world, how long might we presume 
the data would be valid? This problem is complicated by the observation that practices 
within cultures may be disputed and it may be that a minority share a moral outlook that 
is similar to that of different cultures. There is therefore a basic fallacy in assuming that 
consensus indicates truth. We cannot rule out the possibility that a 
large number of 
64 A Walzer, Thick and Thin, London: Notre Dame, 1994. 
Gs Such as A. D. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism vs. 
Relativism, London: SAGE. 
1990, and R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. 
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people may be incorrect in their beliefs. Renteln attempts to solve this problem by 
centralising the idea of `enculturation', coupled with a transitory portrait of moral 
beliefs. 66 Whatever is believed to be true is true for the purpose of establishing common 
moral criteria. The difficulty is that this gives little opportunity for criticism of different 
moral beliefs. Renteln notes the divergence between descriptive and normative ethics 
but does not solve it. Instead she suggests that it cannot be that other cultures lack moral 
insight and `if it turns out that most other cultures do not believe in a moral principle 
which the western world embraces, it might be that they are right'. " Yet this does not 
address the problem of finding a secure foundation for ethical judgement. When faced 
with the baseline ethical judgements involved in war crimes prosecutions she must still 
simply hope that a majority might share the same moral instinct. If they do not she 
cannot impose an alternative moral vision upon them. 
Isaacs addresses this problem in a manner particularly relevant for war crimes 
prosecutions, by focusing on the ascription of responsibility in a society where wrongs 
`fit into schemes of culturally accepted practice, especially those practices that keep 
some groups in disadvantaged positions'. 68 She argues that allowing cultural context to 
operate as a mitigating factor fails to make sense of the mechanisms of progress 
whereby moral beliefs are modified by conflict, as in the abolition of slavery 69 Isaacs 
suggests that individuals are still responsible for their actions even if their wrongdoing 
is approved of by the majority. Although Isaacs does not address the issue of 
demonstrating moral truth, her argument that opposing moral positions are always 
represented in any given society and therefore that each individual has the opportunity 
v' Renteln, Op Cit. n. 4., p. 74. 
67 Ibid., p. 90. 
68 T. Isaacs, `Cultural Context and Moral Responsibility', Ethics: An International Journal of 
Social, 
Political and Legal Philosophv, Vol. 107, No. 4, July 1997, pp. 670-684. p. 
670. 
`'`' Ibid., p. 671 
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for moral autonomy is a valuable one. It provides a pathway for justifying the ascription 
of individual criminal responsibility even in circumstances where cultural practices 
sanction the atrocity. 
The idea that rights vary according to culture is `an anthropological commonplace' 
indeed this assumption comprises the business of anthropology. " But in its most 
extreme variant it is described as ethical relativism. " Although in its most consensual 
form it is difficult to argue with the notion that values vary according to culture, there 
have nevertheless been some serious attempts to seek `cross-cultural universals', values 
and moral beliefs which transcend the boundaries of community or culture. 72 However, 
it is not enough to claim that because such broad principles might be universally 
acceptable, consensus on all ethical issues is implied. By universality in ethics we must 
mean agreement on the practical implications that holding such principles implies. To 
allow that murder is forbidden in all cultures, and then to describe how some practices, 
such as infanticide or patricide for example, are acceptable in different cultures is to 
have said nothing concrete about a moral consensus on the ethics of killing. The word 
murder suggests wrongfulness. " Such cross-cultural comparisons can reduce ultimately 
to the observation that wrongfulness is regarded as bad in all cultures, and this is just a 
truism. This has led theorists such as Vincent to describe such modes of enquiry as 
being possessed of a `wishful character'. 74 So far such enquiries have failed to offer 
70 Vincent, Op Cit. n. 12., p. 48. 
71 However, it is discussion of the topic within social theory which contains the most extreme statement 
of relativist thought. It is here the notion that even criteria of rationality are relative 
to culture is found. 
An example of this is the debate between Lyotard and Habermas. 
Representative samples of their work 
are J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984. And J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: 
Polity 
Press, 1987. 
72 For instance, Claude, Op Cit. n. 20. and Schwab, Op Cit. n. 20. 
7; Frankena, Op Cit. n. 20, p. 55. 
74 Vincent. Op Cit. n. 12, p. 49. 
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either definitive proof of cross-cultural universals, or to resolve their inherent 
methodological problems. 
International Law as an Expression of Morality 
To rely simply on the existence of international legislation as evidence of universal 
moral codes and norms would offer both clarity and comfort to the pragmatist who 
wished to show that a universal moral consensus existed. If the international laws of war 
proscribe particular behaviours, and this proscription is justified by customary 
practice, 75 the matter might seem to be resolved. However, there are several 
fundamental objections to such a simplistic formulation. Firstly, the relationship 
between law and morality is the subject of intense debate primarily between positivist 
and natural law theorists. 
A significant strain of thought regards the very existence of law as indicative of shared 
moral values, commonly known as natural law. Yet there are reasons for doubting that 
this position rests securely given that it opposed by a dominant tradition in law, 
positivism. These arguments are even more contentious when applied to international 
law, given its lack of independent coercive capacity and the immaturity of its legislative 
functions. In its simplest distillation natural law represents the notion that there are 
objective universal standards of morality which law should seek to express. Originally 
based upon religious ideals, it asserts the interrelationship between law and morality. 
Conversely, positivism regards law as a self-contained system of rules; as such there are 
no objective standards by which to dispute the legitimacy of particular 
laws. " 
75 See Chapter two. 
7" For a detailed discussion of these positions see 
M. D. A. Freeman, 6"' Edition, Lloyds Introduction to 
1ll'i. sprildeiwe, London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1994. n. 7 
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According to this view law is not subject to moral evaluation, rather morality and law 
are logically discrete disciplines. These arguments raise sufficient problems to doubt 
both the clarity and the comfort of the pragmatist. 
Also, there are difficulties in asserting that international law is truly universally 
representative, either because it is negotiated and agreed upon by states which we 
cannot securely demonstrate are representative of their own populations; or it could be 
argued that, rather than representing morality, the function of such prosecutions is to 
legitimise traditionally accepted forms of warfare, by delegitimising particular parts of 
it. International law could also be portrayed as occurring within a western structure of 
legal discourse and priorities. Undoubtedly, much humanitarian law reflects the strong 
influence of western states and scholars upon its development. " Yet to dismiss it on 
these grounds is to ignore both its coverage and recognition. As we shall see, since the 
Nuremberg Tribunal there has been an enormous amount of substantive humanitarian 
legislation concluded, but more importantly some of this law has achieved near 
universal recognition. For instance, by 1991,137 states had ratified the Genocide 
Convention, 78 these included states from every continent and cultural group in the 
world. However, even this does not indicate full moral consensus because there are no 
enforcement organs provided for in the offence. We cannot exclude the possibility that 
states may have ratified such agreements whether they endorsed the moral sentiments it 
expressed or not. A simple reliance on the existence of legislation cannot conclusively 
demonstrate moral consensus, thus the only dependable indication of moral consensus 
must be willingness to enforce this legislation. This 
forms the central observation of this 
77 Ratner, Op Cit. n. 13, p. 22. 
78 A. Roberts, and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of Har, 3rd Ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2000, pp. 184-188. 
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thesis, and also raises the problem explored throughout, that prosecutions have a unique 
moral bearing on the condition of universally held moral values. 
Conclusion 
There have been many attempts to explore and ground the notion of universality in 
moral discourse, either theoretically, through empirical research or through 
jurisprudential enquiry, but all have ultimately proved inconclusive with regard to gross 
atrocities. These represent what is known as a `hard case' in ethical discourse for 
regardless of the possibility of demonstrating analytical security; we are intuitively 
uncomfortable with the conclusion that they should not be addressed. Thus within 
communitarianism, there have been accommodations made to exclude them from the 
particularistic description of normal moral discourse. Yet it is impossible to show 
through empirical research that different cultures share common moral values with 
regard to even the most basic of moral values. International legislation is a good starting 
point for demonstrating the coverage and recognition of humanitarian principles but 
ultimately it is only from the criminalisation of these offences that shared moral values 
can be inferred. Yet this does not imply that this process is complete for this would be 
overstating the case. Rather, the imposition of individual criminal responsibility and, 
more importantly, the beginning of penal sanctions for this offence represents the very 
first steps in this direction. Even the constitution of the ICTY may not be a full 
expression of this principle for it was convened under Security Council 
Resolution. 79 
Thus the tribunal exercises its jurisdiction as Fenrick points out, on the basis of 
79 The competence of the Tribunal is set out in Article 1 of the Tribunal 
Statute; `The International 
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 
in accordance with the 
provisions of the present statute. 
' Thus the content of humanitarian law is indicated by customary practice 
but its jurisdiction is constituted only by the statute, established by Resolution 
808. 
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`internationality and not universality'. " This marks another distinction between the 
content and the enforcement of international humanitarian law. Customary practice, as a 
well-established guiding principle to the content of humanitarian law, does not extend to 
jurisdiction. This must be established by the international community. 
The simplest theoretical solution to this difficulty of moral particularism would be 
abandonment of the principle of individual responsibility and punishment of the whole 
state for systematic, or wide, war crimes (although not, of course, for crimes against its 
own citizens) yet this breaches the fundamental precepts of moral responsibility, (within 
legal discourse as well as moral discourse). To criminalise these offences without 
applying individual responsibility for them would bring us no closer to showing moral 
consensus. For the assumption of moral universality is embedded within the legislative 
principle of individual responsibility. As we shall see in chapter two, when 
responsibility is assigned to collectives, such as states, it is inevitably divorced from the 
end-step of ascribing guilt; it can go no further than the encouragement of collective 
shame. In the prosecutions of war crimes this has serious implications for the 
application of criminal sanctions. When responsibility has been applied to whole states 
it has been, and must be, civil in its character. The fact that international humanitarian 
law has progressively become focused towards individual criminal responsibility, 
culminating in prosecutions in the name of the international community, must imply 
awareness of the violation of some form of moral order. 
When assessing the potentials for, and maturity of, a nascent shared morality, it is 
essential to contextualise such a development. When setting the 
development of 
individual criminal responsibility against the traditional patterns of state interaction 
it 
s° W. J. Fenrick, `Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions 
Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia', Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Lau', Vol. 6: 
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becomes evident just how radical is its imposition. The principle resides in contradiction 
to the whole edifice of the state system and the traditional structures of interaction 
conditioned by protocol, custom and diplomatic convention. 
No. 1, Fall 1995. p. 104. 
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Chapter 2 
Moral Principles in International Relations 
The last chapter has shown the difficulty in assessing claims to moral universality. As 
we shall see in the next three chapters there is an overwhelming historical dominance of 
states and the structures which condition their interaction. Set against this backdrop the 
truly radical nature of the Nuremberg Tribunal and its imposition of individual criminal 
responsibility can be fully appreciated. Further to this, a substantive body of 
humanitarian law has been created outlining the form and nature of the state's 
responsibility to its citizens (see chapter 5). More pertinently, the abrogation of these 
responsibilities is a criminal offence, carrying penal sanctions, however unevenly, or 
reluctantly, they have been enforced. Yet, the legislation providing for individual 
criminal responsibility continues to be challenged not only by the difficulty of its 
imposition in the face of traditional structures but also by the theoretical positions that 
justify those structures. The most dominant of those positions is the realist argument 
that there should be no moral dimension to international legislation, that such 
considerations are illogical, impractical or inappropriate. 
But there are also alternative conceptions of accountability which allow that these 
offences should be criminalised, but which target accountability at the state rather than 
the individual. This strand of thinking is expressed legislatively as state criminal 
responsibility. At first sight, a simple focus upon the state or collective, particularly 
where the offence is system crime, would seem to solve many of the 
difficulties with 
the application of individual criminal responsibility. Yet, close examination of 
the 
nature of moral accountability reveals 
irresolvable problems with this approach. The full 
45 
and legitimate ascription of criminal responsibility requires satisfaction of several 
conditions, conditions which collectives cannot meet. 
An investigation of prosecutions for system criminality as a moral activity 
demonstrating shared international values implies several assumptions about the nature 
of international society, which ultimately underpin this thesis. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to examine and defend several of the most important. The first is that moral 
theory holds relevance for the study of International Relations contra classical and 
modern realism and other structural accounts of international relations. Also, we will 
examine assumptions about the nature of ascribing moral blame and the suppositions 
about intention, agency and autonomy which underlie common moral judgements. From 
this, I shall propose a moral individualism, expressed as individual criminal 
responsibility, as being the only theoretically coherent position. 
Study of the classic texts of political philosophy and the thinkers who generated the 
insights they reveal inevitably raise problematic issues when applied to the modem 
international political landscape. However, this should not disguise the benefits of such 
texts and the importance of the thinkers behind them, in their role as landmarks in the 
conceptual understanding of modern political problems. Although the categories of 
Hobbesian or Kantian, for instance, are inevitably not inclusive, such modes of thinking 
about the international system all contain valid insights into the mode of relationship 
between state and individuals, and of states with each other. Furthermore, such texts 
have become integral aspects of specific conceptions of international politics within 
which they are relied upon as legitimation for current analyses and prescription 
for 
future developments. 
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This thesis applies traditional modes of analysis to a particular problem of the modern 
age, the notion of ascribing responsibility for state-sponsored crimes to 
individuals through the application of criminal penal sanctions. This is a specific aspect 
of international humanitarian law which has been largely neglected within the study of 
moral responsibility, often quite deliberately. ' This problem has been chosen because it 
represents the interface of the relationship between the individual and state, and I argue 
that this interface is most clearly evident at the point of punishment. As such it is 
illustrative of the `hard cases' of moral philosophy and offers the potential to explore 
the main categories of political thought in both their normative and prescriptive aspects, 
and in their substantive, practical applications. This thesis offers, however, less of a 
nonnative position on the prosecution and punishment of violations of humanitarian 
law, than a descriptive assessment of the actual trends evident in the confrontation of 
such crimes. 
Moral Scepticism and Normative Theory 
International ethics manifest that rare characteristic of being one of the few branches of 
ethical enquiry that contain a radical anti-ethical position. This anti-ethic is found 
primarily within the work of classical and modem realism. Modem structuralist 
positions reject the project of normative theory altogether whilst classical theorists 
engage closely with moral philosophy, producing theoretical explanations of why ethics 
should not intrude into International Relations. So the spectrum of realist approaches 
embody not only a descriptive critique of International Relations that notes that morality 
in practice does not intrude upon relations between states, but also a nonnative approach 
1 See for instance P. A. French, Individual and Collective Responsibility, 2nd Ed, 
Rochester Vermont: 
Schenkman Books, 1972. Who argues that `It must be remembered that moral 
blame is to hold 
responsible, to deem blameworthy. 
It is not to punish. ' p. 29. 
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which argues that it ought not to do so. Were we to accept either of these arguments the 
question of how and when responsibility for war crimes is assigned would be a 
redundant one. Instead the focus would be upon how such ascriptions impact upon the 
national interest of the states concerned. Yet this would leave the whole dimension of 
the nature of the relationship between individual and state unexplored, reducing the 
ambit of any enquiry to a positivist approach to the legal framework coupled with 
political context. It is precisely this which engenders confusion and incoherence within 
the application of the law. The realist/structural insistence on excluding morality denies 
an integral aspect of inter-state relations and ignores more questions than it solves. 
From the perspective of the ethicist, it is possible to characterise the exclusion of 
normative theory by structural theorists as something of a counsel of despair. For on this 
view, the nature of international interaction is determined by the structural conditions 
within which states operate, and as a corollary to this, people's perceptions of these 
interactions are also structurally determined by the social and political reality within 
which they find themselves. Thus moral theory is, at best, redundant. This is combined 
with an underlying notion that the political structures are autonomous in some sense. 
2 
Normative theorising is pejoratively dismissed as either utopian or idealism. 3 Instead, 
central to structural (or neo) realist analysis is the pursuit and use of power. Herz 
describes realism as `A recognition of the inevitabilities of power politics in an age of 
sovereign states'. ' The classic definition of realism was formulated by Morgenthau in 
his work Politics among Nations, and describes the dynamic of state behaviour in terms 
of the protection of national interests, manifested by a disregard for either 
declared 
2 M. Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, pp. 52-55. 
3 An example of this type of distinction is evident 
in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, London: 
Macmillan, 1946. 
J. H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, New York: 
David Mackay. 1976. p. 79. 
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moral sentiments, or the moral sentiments of its own and other citizens. 5 Here 
prescriptive moral theorising is not just disregarded but specifically excluded from 
consideration (unless it is by default). Ultimately realism, purporting to reveal the true 
and actual character of state interaction is instinctively allied to scientific practices. 
Nonnative theory, by contrast is linked to the tradition of moral philosophy and as such 
assumes both independent human volition in the structure of international institutions, 
and also that such structures can be changed. This assumption must be made or 
normative theory, with its focus on prescriptive conceptions of international relations, 
would have no purpose. Although realists may escape such theorising in less emotive 
areas of international relations, to deny the normative dimension of war crimes 
prosecutions is patently unsatisfactory. 
However, whilst political realism focuses on the structure of political power, other 
structural accounts of international relations also deny the applicability of morality. 
Interdependence theorists present the international economic system as the basis of 
world politics whilst Marxists, of course, focus on class as the determinate feature. 6 All 
of these positions share a common assumption that an objective social reality shapes 
and determines the nature of interactions, independent of normative propositions about 
what the world ought to be like. 7 However, I follow Frost in disputing such a rigid 
emphasis on structural constraints. The obvious objection is that human beings are 
5 H. Morganthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York : Knopf, 1948, 
p. 5. 
6 M. Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, p-53- 
7 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, London: Macmillan, 1946; R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral 
Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932; and H. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed, New York: Knopf, 1954, are the three 
main proponents of modern realism. However, an 
important neo-realist is K. N. Waltz, Theoly of 
International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979. For a good summary of the realist positionsee 
T. Nardin and D. Mapel, (eds), Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University 
Press, 1996 or for a discussion of Waltz see R. O. Keohane, Neo-Realism and 
Its Critics, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986. 
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reflexive and adaptive in their nature and change evidently can and does occur. To deny 
that this is the task of individuals is to endorse the status quo. But leaving such a 
simplistic criticism to one side, Frost points out that: 
Wherever reference is made to a structure ... which is said to force people to act and think in certain ways, 
this structure cannot be identified without reference to 
some social practice which consists of people bound 
together by some set of constitutive ideas which guides 
the actions of those participating in it. 8 
States then are constituted by people who recognise each other as bound by certain sets 
of rules. Even if they would rather choose not to play the game, given that they must 
play, the rules of that game are recognised by those participants. If normative theory is 
evaluation of those rules it is then, not only possible, but also essential. This perspective 
however, mounts something of a challenge to the portrait of international relations as 
the relations between states. In its emphasis on the practitioners and policy-makers of 
the international system, and also the populations that such people represent, Frost's 
position could be interpreted as an individualistic one. This sort of orientation marks a 
major difference in orientation between realists and communitarians on one hand, and 
moral individualism and cosmopolitanism on the other. 
9 The conception of the state as 
an organic unit with volition, desires and agendas unrelated to the desires of the 
individual participants in that system makes a serious assumption about the nature of 
collective morality, an assumption which is too far-reaching in its implications to 
simply allow. Whilst communitarians at least mount a serious theoretical defence of this 
orientation, all too often in realist perspectives it is taken as a given. 
Frost, Op Cit. n. 2., p. 59. 
9 This dichotomy subsumes many categories of thought many of which, such as realism and 
communitarianism, have 
little else in common. This thesis will highlight this opposition as being of 
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Of course, the label `realist' disguises many differences even as it highlights 
similarities. It is perhaps best understood as a continuum from radical realism to a 
variant that is extensively qualified, "' and this is particularly true of debate about the 
role of morality within international affairs. Yet, there is a fundamental agreement, for 
even `weak' conceptions of realism embody some notion of a constraining structure. ' 
However, here normative conceptions of morality are admitted into the discourse, even 
if the purpose is thereby to dispute their applicability to the international scene. 
There are several objections to morality in international affairs. Firstly, there is the 
practitioner-theorist approach, which argues that morality should not enter into 
international discourse, although it is possible for it to do so. This ties in with the 
second approach, broadly construed as classical, which denies the possibility of moral 
considerations in an anarchical system. Finally, there is the notion of morality as a 
private not public concern, inappropriate as a policy option for holders of office. These 
can be broadly classified as either descriptive or prescriptive accounts of the absence of 
morality in international relations. ' 2 
Descriptive Realism 
The descriptive objections to morality rest on a conception of the nature of international 
interaction. These arguments are fairly well trodden, so only their broad shape is 
indicated here, in order to demonstrate that these perspectives fail to allow an 
crucial importance for any conception of international moral 
justice, a preposition we will examine via 
the assignment of moral blame in situations of state violence. 
10 In fact, most theorists offer qualifications of some kind. Both Walzer (1977) and Donnelly 
(1996) point 
to Thucydides' account of the Athenian attack ofMelos as an example of radical or pure realism. 
Whereas G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of International Society. New York: Frederic 
A. 
Praeger, 1951, p. 158; and J. H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in 
Theories and 
Realities, 1976, p. I l; as well as Can have to a greater or lesser extent qualified their versions of realism. 
" J. Donelly, in T. Nardin, and D. Mapel, (eds), Traditions of International 
Ethics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p87. 
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intellectual space to consider real phenomena, variations in the ascription of criminal 
accountability for actions which violate a moral consensus. The classic descriptive 
account of international interaction is at root a Hobbesian one, based upon his 
conception of a state of nature, later applied to the international sphere by Bull who 
characterised it as `an anarchical society' ." However, the notion of an anarchical 
system has also been recast as a question, not of abstract principles of relations between 
states, but as a question of methodology. International relations deals with a peculiar 
area of politics. Detennining how to analyse morality in international relations requires 
consideration of that peculiarity. Hollis and Smith outline it thus: 
whereas domestic politics occur within a political 
system which includes a government to make and 
enforce laws, the international system is anarchic. By 
this we mean not that it is chaotic but simply that there 
is no government above the states which comprise it. ' 4 
The "level of analysis" problem deals with the relationship between units and system. 15 
To produce any coherent account of international affairs it is necessary to draw the 
distinction between elements that belong to the overarching "system" and the units that 
comprise them. For the international theorist this task is fundamentally complicated by 
the disagreement over the relationship between the national and international. For 
realists, analysis should take place on a state-to-state level, for, methodologically 
speaking, states are the individuals of the international system. Systemic investigations 
are confined to the international community and the units of analysis are states. But 
for 
12 G. Graham, Ethics and International Relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, Chapter 2. 
13 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in iti'orld politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2°d edn. 
1995 
14 M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 
New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991, p. 7. 
15 J. D. Singer, `The level of Analysis Problem in International Relations', 
in K. E. Knorr and S. Verba 
(eds. ) The International Sti, stemn: Theoretical Essays, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 77- 
92. 
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the individualist the problem is more complex, for a theoretical perspective to take 
account of the wishes or motivations of the citizens of those states a different level of 
analysis must be used, and that may well encapsulate intermediate levels such as 
bureaucratic. From both perspectives the dilemma is clear: do we account for the 
behaviour of states in terms of the system or is the system conditioned by the wishes of 
states and the individuals who comprise them? ' 6 Also, if states do condition the 
international system, is their contribution an individual one based on a unique 
combination of interests? If, as the realists claim, it is, then how do the constituent parts 
of that state affect its participation in international society? Given that individual 
responsibility is ascribed for war crimes and that it is the international community 
which decides how and when action is taken, it is immediately apparent that state level 
analysis will prove inadequate. This is obviously a new category of relationship 
between individual and state, and the consequent interactions demand a conceptual 
framework that can accommodate them. 
Let us return to the theoretical roots of such a question and re-examine the issues it 
raises in the light of Hobbesian theory. Hobbes' description of a society without 
sovereign authority is at the root of the realist conception of international relations, for: 
During the time men live without a common Power to 
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is 
called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, 17 
against every man. 
16 B. Buzan, `The Level of Analysis problem in International Relations Reconsidered' 
in K. Booth and S. 
Smith , 
(eds), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp. 198-216. 
17 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, London: Penguin, 1988, p. 185. 
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Under such conditions, with states coexisting in what Slomp terms `equality of 
dangerousness', civilisation, and therefore morality cannot flourish. 18 From a Hobbesian 
perspective, the issue is not with the structure of morality, 19 but instead with the 
conditions under which morality is likely to apply. 20 Yet there are several difficulties 
with this reading of Hobbes, for Hobbes was exclusively concerned with the atomistic 
asocial individual. In common with many theorists, 21 his `state of nature' is a 
philosophic device which allows us to consider individuals decontextualised from their 
social surroundings. Hobbes then, could be read as the ultimate moral subjectivist. 22 
Ultimately, characterisation of the international realm as a state of nature rests upon an 
analogy which treats states as large individuals. I argue that this way of regarding states 
is fundamentally flawed, as it is only individuals who have a unified moral personality. 
Treating states as large individuals is a conceptual device that is revealed as inadequate 
only when we examine the process of ascribing responsibility. But it is by no means 
clear that this analogy could hold under other circumstances. For instance, it cannot 
18 G. Slomp, `Hobbes and the equality of Women', Political Studies, Vol. 42: No 3,1994, p. 445. 
Although Slomp is not referring to inter-state relations here. 
19 Although Hobbes' nominalism does have profound implications for his conception of morality, as for 
him moral codes have no objective reality, instead they are a function of our communal understandings of 
terms like `good' and `evil'. (see Ch. 5, Leviathan). However, it could be argued that the right Hobbes 
provides to resist a sovereign who threatens a subject's life could be seen as a basic defence of human 
rights. This interesting point is made by M. C. Murphy, 'Was Hobbes a Legal Positivist?, Ethics: An 
International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 105, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 846-873. 
20 M. Cohen, `Moral Scepticism and International Relations', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 13, 
1984, pp. 299-346. 
2' Rawls uses this device with his `veil of ignorance', Hume and J. S. Mill also employ a `state of nature', 
to explore a mythic pre-social individual. 
22 Hobbes' focus upon scientific method conditioned the nature of his thought producing a highly 
individualistic account of human nature and interaction. He adopted the `resolutive-compositive' method 
of Gallileo. The resolutive element of Gallileo's method consisted of an exercise 
in intuition as the 
theorist searched for factors which would logically combine to produce an explanation of the observed 
phenomena. This phenomena, in Hobbes case, was of course society. 
Once found, these factors, or 
postulates, could then be shown to lead inevitably to the 
initial observed phenomena. The main feature of 
such postulates is that they are immediately evident to any reasonable enquirer, or 
that they should be so 
simple as to be indisputable. It is from this point, the compositive stage, 
that Hobbes begins to set out his 
argument. Naturally, the most simple or self-evident 
factors determining society were to be found in the 
nature of the individual. This has 
lead to some of the most serious flaws in Hobbes' thought for he fails to 
account for collectives within society such as social classes, or 
for the impact of social context and how it 
may determine the nature of the 
individual. Given these problems on the societal scale it is difficult to see 
how they can be avoided in the international arena. New research on cultural context might suggest 
that 
such difficulties would be worsened. 
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accommodate domestic pressure put upon states by their national populations and the 
impact this may have on foreign policy. It is also arguable whether states can be 
accorded the same motivational bases as individuals, or whether they suffer the same 
degree of peril in the international system as a true state of nature might offer the 
individual. 23 For Cohen, these sorts of doubts are enough to dismiss any claim that 
states are freed from moral restraint, for unless conditions of the same severity as those 
which apply to the individual in a state of nature are demonstrated, then states have 
room to pursue a moral course of action. 24 
Prescriptive Realism 
In contrast, prescriptive debarrals of morality in international relations approach the 
problem from a different angle. States could incorporate moral positions but normal 
moral codes should not be applied, either because the inter-state system is an unsuitable 
arena for morality, or because statesmen have no right to apply it. On these views, war 
crimes prosecutions, seen as moral actions undertaken by states, are illegitimate and an 
area in which the international community should not intrude. The first line of argument 
casts doubt on our ability to formulate universally applicable moral truths is 
23 Hobbes' hypothesis about motion provides the basis for his suppositions about human nature and 
motivation. This is clearly shown in Chapter 6 of the Leviathan in which he describes " theinteriour 
Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the Passions". These motions can be classed as 
appetite and aversion and are endeavours either away from, or towards that which caused them. The 
movement towards something is experienced as pleasure, and away from something as pain, thus we 
desire that which we move towards and hate that which threatens us. Hobbes takes anominalist position, 
the concepts of `good' and `evil' are merely names which ýluralise several instances'. These names refer 
only to something which particular entities have in common, that is, whether they inspire appetite or 
aversion. So for Hobbes, natural man is neither good nor evil, he cannot avoid repellingdeath, therefore 
his attempts to do so are a natural right. Is this analogous to the state? Certainly states 
do not survive in 
constant fear of total violent destruction or `death' for they cannot 
be vulnerable to destruction in the 
same way as a lone individual in an anarchic situation. Also, 
it is hard to make the case that all states are 
equally vulnerable in the same way as individuals. They 
do not sleep and they cannot get old or diseased, 
therefore it is hard to accord them the same motivational bases of appetite and aversion as 
individuals, 
and consequently hard to allow them the same pre-emptive rights asHobbesian man. 
24 M. Cohen, Op Cit. n. 20, p. 326. 
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questionable and that attempts to do so are a form of `cultural imperialism'. 25 
Although, the most extreme result of such arguments is the charge of relativism, 26 this is 
avoidable when refined by qualifications. 27 Broadly, these theorists can be classed as 
communitarians, and there is a strong concern with national identity and sovereignty. 
Such a line of argument is not easily dismissed as we have seen in the last chapter when 
the contrast between cosmopolitan claims to universal conceptions of morality, an 
essential precondition when attempting to impose moral standards through legal action, 
were set against communitarian arguments. A more extreme critique along 
communitarian lines is that of post-modernism. Halliday sums up this position most 
succinctly, albeit rather sarcastically: 
According to this approach, we must reject the 
pretensions of the enlightenment, towards any rational 
or universalizable codes or grand narratives, and accept 
an inevitable profusion of values, meanings, codes, a 
discursive plurality that is both inevitable and 
desirable. 28 
Postmodernism posits a relationship between power and knowledge with consequences 
for the exclusion or marginalisation of the 'other' in social life. As Steve Smith points 
out: 
25 Fred Halliday addresses this argument in B. McSweeney, Moral Issues in International Affairs, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, although this is certainly not his view. 
26 See Nardin for an in depth discussion of the impact of relativism on ethics. Nardin takes a sophisticated 
and unusual position in that he is not unsympathetic to some 
form of relativist thought. T. Nardin, `The 
Problem of Relativism in International Ethics', Millennium Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 18, 
No. 2, Summer 1989, pp. 149-161. 
27 Such as, for instance, Walzer's conception of `thick' and `thin' versions of 
human rights. M. Walzer, 
Thick and Thin, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994. 
28 F. Halliday, in B. McSweeney, Moral Issues in International Affairs, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998, p. 
27. Again this is not Halliday's view. 
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The key process at work is that of domination. In this 
sense history is a series of dominations, and discourses 
a central mechanism of these dominations. 29 
Thus, the focus of any research procedure is to reveal the hidden relationships of 
domination and exclusion within social life. This occurs through a historical survey 
(genealogy), textual analysis (discourse analysis) and uncovering logo-centric pairings 
(deconstruction). However, a key assumption here is the perspectival nature of claims to 
truth. Such claims do not correspond to objective reality; rather they are generated by 
powerful societal forces in an attempt to impose domination. From this alone it is clear 
that this critique rejects the project of imposing, or even encouraging, respect for ethical 
principles and it is at this point that post-modernism becomes counter-intuitive. An 
example of this is the work done by theorists such as Kristeva and Jabri on the 
development of the individuated self. Calling for a recognition of how subjectivity 
conditions the exclusionary practices that create the need for ethical discourse, Jabri for 
instance, ultimately admits that when question is posed as to how such a critique 
translates into politics and institution-building, `the answer ... must 
by necessity, 
remain inconclusive'. 30 However convincing such a critique may be when it comes to 
art or culture, when applied to the international scene it inevitably ends in an intellectual 
`cul-de-sac' such as this, as a result it fails to satisfy either as a portrait of moral values 
or as a framework for considering international war crimes prosecutions. 
A further objection to the consideration of morality within international relations is that 
most commonly raised by practitioners. Broadly, statesmen have a 
duty to avoid 
29 K. Booth and S. Smith, (eds), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995, p. 
5. 
30 V. Jabri, `Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations', Millennium: 
Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3,1998, pp. 591-611 (p. 610). See also 
J. Kristeva, Strangers to 
Ourselves, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, and Z. Bauman, 
Postmodern Ethics, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994. 
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incorporating a moral dimension to foreign policy for either of two reasons. Either 
because, somewhat circularly, it is their moral duty to seek the national interest of the 
state they represent to the exclusion of all else, or because morality is essentially a 
personal matter and the introduction of a moral dimension to policy is therefore akin to 
introducing a personal financial interest to policy discussion. The first point represents a 
tradition of thought about the nature of political life that stretches back to Machiavelli. 
Croce encapsulates this way of thinking when he says that in the realm of international 
politics, murders are not murders, nor lies lies. 31 
When we consider the crimes under review in this thesis, it is evidently unacceptable to 
regard them as part of the normal business of self-interested states. For instance, in the 
case of the Holocaust it is evident that Germany diverted considerable resources away 
from the practice of ensuring international security in order to pursue the extermination 
of Jews and other minorities. Kennan and Kissinger, both practitioner-theorists who 
represented the US internationally, personify this tradition. Kennan draws a distinction 
between interest and `sensibilities' and argues that there is: 
No room in such a policy for international benevolence, 
for lofty pretensions, or for the assumption of any 
attitude either of moral superiority or moral inferiority 
to any other nation. 32 
For Kennan the role of foreign policy is essentially constrained by the primary 
requirement to protect the physical intactness of national life and the interests of citizens 
insofar as they spill over borders. Kissinger also subordinates morality to national 
interest. This was evident when he praised the Carter administration's human rights 
policy for its effect on Americans because it gave a `renewed sense of the basic decency 
31 B. Croce, Politics and Morals, trans. S. J. Castilione, New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. p. 3. 
32 G. F. Kennan, Realities ofAmerican Foreign Policy, London: Oxford University Press, 1954. p. 12. 
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of this country, so that they may continue to have the pride and self-confidence to 
remain actively involved in the world. '33 This is a classically realist view of the role of 
morality, but a somewhat ironic defence of it. However, none of these arguments 
demonstrate that morality should be excluded; only that national interests should take 
logical priority. 
The special office of the statesman is also cited as evidence that morality should not 
intrude upon international relations. On this view the statesman must act immorally if 
s/he is to participate in international affairs, there is an inevitable tension between 
politics and morality. 34 Walzer put this most clearly as `The Problem of Dirty Hands'. 35 
Walzer's conclusion is that it is impossible for statesmen to govern innocently, but that 
that does not stop them being subject to some moral restraint and guilty of immoral 
conduct, although this may be mitigated by the circumstances of the decisions they have 
made. This is technically an accomplished point, for Walzer avoids the fallacy that there 
is a type of `international morality' based on different criteria of judgement. For if we 
allow a morality based not on common moral principles but on the exigencies of power 
relations, this is as good as abandoning morality altogether, `international morality' is 
simply a linguistic fiat. Walzer's account, though pessimistic, at least employs a sense 
of moral tragedy. In terms of war crimes prosecutions, Walzer's account also opens the 
door to some form of accountability, although it is not clear what form this could take. 
In other works, however, Walzer specifically excludes the possibility of legal action. 3G 
33 H. A. Kissinger, cited in A. A Said, (ed), Human Rights and World Order, New York: Praeder, 1978, 
p. 160. 
34 M. Frost, Op Cit. n. 2, p. 71. 
35 M. Walzer, `The Problem of Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1972-73, part 2, pp. 160-180. 
36 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument 't'ith Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic 
Books, 1977, p. 121. 
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Finally, the `office of statesman' line of argument can include the critique that as 
morality is an individual affair; the statesman has no right to impose his or her views on 
the policy process. This is minor in terms of the criticisms we have been viewing, but it 
is especially relevant for the line I take in terms of moral individualism. If, as we shall 
see, only individuals have the capacity to be morally responsible, how can we expect 
moral consideration from states? Butterfield conducts his argument from this logical 
basis when he argues that: 
If an individual consents to make self-sacrifice - even 
to face martyrdom before a foreign invader - it is not 
clear that he has a socially recognizable right to offer 
the same sacrifice on behalf of all his fellow-citizens or 
to impose such self-abnegation on the rest of his 
society. 37 
Donnelly disputes this on essentially practical grounds when he asks what right 
statesmen have to demand sacrifice on any basis if this is the case; the same is true of 
economic objectives. 38 Cohen also disputes it on the grounds that a democratic people 
may wish its affairs to be conducted in a morally acceptable fashion. 39 
This can be disputed on different grounds. Although I am about to make the case that 
moral blame can only be ascribed to individuals this does not preclude moral judgement 
on the conduct of states. Just as the legal personality of states allows them to act as if 
they were fully autonomous, and in this sense they can conclude treaties or make 
promises, the conception of a society of states allows us to judge them as if they were 
morally autonomous, for instance in giving aid or imposing sanctions. The point is not 
that this is difficult, but rather that it is too easy; it is only at the point when `as if no 
37 H. Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, London: Epworth. 1953, p. 11. 
38 C. Donnelly in T. Nardin, and D. Mapel, (eds. ), Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 105. 
39 M. Cohen, Op Cit. n. 20, p. 300. 
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longer applies, that is the point of punishment and blame, that incoherence and 
contradiction emerge. If, as argued here, applying judgement to the moral conduct of 
states is simply a function of each and every individual's personal moral judgement, 
criticisms and comments on state behaviour would be essentially lacking in moral 
potency, they would become only an exercise in finger-pointing and comment. It could 
be argued that this is precisely the case within the international human rights movement. 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, for instance, can only name and 
shame. This serves an important function in that it may delegitimise the regimes of 
those states, but this is most effective within the eyes of the citizens of that and other 
states. Other than this it has little bearing on the state concerned. Yet this in no way 
implies that judgements on morality cannot be applied to the international system as if 
they were morally capable, for such judgements are perfectly intelligible even if they 
cannot be literally true. It is enough to point out that the ascription of blame in these 
circumstances is radically different to applying blame to individuals, in its nature and 
outcomes. The precise nature of this difference and the impact this has on the ascription 
of responsibility is the core argument of this thesis. It is important to add along these 
lines, that whilst only individuals have the necessary capacity of moral responsibility, 
they have a duty to that sense of responsibility not to undertake immoral actions. For 
instance, although I have a moral duty to help my child at school, this does not extend to 
a duty to exterminate any likely opposition to him in a school test. This example may be 
far-fetched but it is analogous to the practitioner who is charged with the duty of 
protecting national interests. Such a duty does not sanction complete lack of restraint. 
Just as my child has no right to expect me to exterminate his opposition, so the citizens 
of a state have no right to expect their representatives to follow an immoral course of 
action. Ultimately, it is individuals who participate in the international system, and 
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where morality is engaged they may not defray their individual responsibility. Let us 
examine this notion of moral personality in greater depth. 
The Nature of Moral Personality 
The argument to address in the light of war crimes prosecutions is whether moral 
responsibility should be assigned to individuals or to nation-states. This problem is 
particularly acute in the case of systematic humanitarian crimes such as genocide. By 
definition, no single individual can carry out genocide, it requires that the resources of 
the whole state be mobilised. So would the inconsistencies and failures in approaching 
such atrocities be avoided by simply addressing responsibility to the states concerned? 
Indeed, is it possible to speak of a `criminal' state? This dilemma is best expressed 
within moral philosophy as the debate about collective responsibility. Can collective 
entities be held morally responsible? " It is evident within domestic law that they cannot, 
the penal sanctions attached to criminal conduct mitigate against prosecution for anyone 
except individuals. Yet the tendency towards the treatment of states as moral entities is 
evident through the application of collective measures against them. For instance, at the 
Treaty of Versailles 1919, reparations exacted from Germany were the true retributive 
measures whilst the -mooted war crimes trials for individuals collapsed in indifference 
and non-cooperation. " It is the traditional manner of viewing states as monoliths, with a 
fully constituted legal personality which can lead to the misapprehension of states as 
having an equally unambiguous moral personality. In fact, when we inspect collective 
entities more closely, we can see that the type of responsibility assignation made to 
collectives is significantly different from that made to individuals. Were this not the 
40 The central elements of this debate are summarised in the debate between Cooper andDownie. 
" See Chapter 3. 
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case, the grounds for claiming that the introduction of individual criminal responsibility 
is a radical and deeply momentous development would be negated. 
To assign moral or criminal responsibility to an entity with any validity, certain criteria 
must be met. The entity must have a moral personality comprising the minimum 
conditions of autonomy, intention and agency. Several issues arise from this, as well as 
considering whether collectives can satisfy these criteria, we must also assess whether 
the nation-state can be considered a collective, and if so what type of collective it is. 
The difficulty with categorising the state in this way is that it is peculiar as a random 
collective as it necessarily maintains a decision-making structure. Yet, it cannot be 
considered an ordinary collective either, as its members do not voluntarily participate in 
it. Thus it requires a special category of analysis, that of an institution. 
As a result, this thesis takes a particular line of argument with respect to moral 
responsibility, that of a qualified moral individualism. From this position, it will be 
shown that in terms of war crimes prosecutions, especially with regard to systematic 
humanitarian abuses, the application of individual criminal responsibility is the only 
coherent perspective in relation to blame and its necessary corollary, punishment. 
However, the international community is further behind in adopting this approach than 
the legal framework, and new developments in the constitution of the International 
Criminal Court and the use of ad Hoc tribunals might suggest. 
In order to assess the validity of this claim I shall examine the components of moral 
accountability, here defined as autonomy and agency. The relevant components of 
autonomy, such that an entity may be described as a moral agent are, ability to act, 
intention and voluntariness. In addition to these minimum conditions common to all 
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conceptions of agency there are various additional requirements according to the 
perspective adopted. Amongst others, Donaldson requires that morally autonomous 
entities have the capacity to alter their conception and practice of morality42, Santiago 
Nino demands self-consciousness and self-regard43 and Kant offers rationality" 
Autonomy 
Some conception of autonomy is crucial to any theory of morality or moral principles 
and it is especially crucial for any investigation into the significance of war crimes 
prosecutions. Indeed, the extent of a state's or an individual's autonomy has a crucial 
bearing on how and when responsibility can be assigned to either. However, the range 
of thinking on the nature of autonomous behaviour varies from one perspective to 
another. Most crucially for this argument is, firstly, the question of whether autonomy is 
an attribute that properly applies to states, and secondly, if it does, whether it is different 
in character. Answers to this question are best represented as a spectrum. This ranges 
from Santiago Nino's positivistic description as an entity with `an independent, 
developed nervous system' which thereby excludes states, as well as any collectives and 
incidentally, inanimate objects, 45 through to the realist position we have already covered 
which sees states in the international system as fully autonomous entities with distinct 
volitions and interests. 
What these positions have in common is a recognition that autonomy in some form is 
crucial for participation in the world of moral discourse, and in particular for the 
ascription of moral accountability. Its minimum requirement is that the entity be self- 
42 T. Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982. 
43 C. Santiago Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights, Oxford: Clarendon, 1991. 
44 I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, London: Longmans, 1959. 
45 C. Santiago Nino, Op Cit. n. 44. p. 156. 
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determining, without this capacity it is reasonable to assume that no ethical choice could 
be made. There must also be a capacity to act and any action must be undertaken in a 
condition of voluntariness. Voluntariness is here a technical term with a usage distinct 
from the common understanding of voluntary. An act is voluntary if it originates with 
the agent, even when perfonned under conditions of duress. " So to employ Aristotle's 
famous example, `when a man throws his goods overboard to stop the ship sinking, 
there is nothing there involuntary but the hardness of the choice'. 47 However, 
voluntariness has an important dimension. Bound up with the notion of freely willed 
action is the notion of informed action. If an agent is mistaken as to the facts or 
outcomes of his/her action, he/she cannot be said to have willed it, in this sense 
`voluntarily' refers to 'knowingly'. " This also embodies a firm conception of the agent 
as a rational being as it assumes a deliberative process in moral choice. 
So far in this argument there is nothing to disbar a collective or state from full 
possession of autonomy. These simple conditions which include self-determination, the 
capacity to act and voluntariness are readily observable in entities which have no 
corporeal existence but still have decision-making structures and legal personalities. In 
fact it is at this point that we might criticise individuals for failing to fully meet these 
criteria. How far do individuals have freedom to make fully autonomous moral choices? 
Could it not be argued that in fact individuals are constrained by their experience, 
culture and context? This line of argument is broadly termed determinism and in its 
46 A. Donagan, The Theory of Morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 115. 
47K. Thomas, Seventeenth-Century England :A Changing Culture, London: Ward Lock Educational, 
1988, p. 209. 
48 Thus defence against moral blame could be because the action was done either `in ignorance' or 
because `of ignorance'. The first is when the agent was unaware of the true nature of his action the second 
when the agent is unaware of the moral prohibition on that action. A. Donagan, The Theory of 
Morality, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 128. This corresponds with the defences under 
international law for war crimes, possible defences include `mistake as to fact', and `mistake as to law'. 
Both of these were cited by defendants at Nuremberg although only the 
first was accepted. Thus the 
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purest distillation it might suggest that individuals lack the most basic free wi11.49 Is in 
then unjust to impose penal sanctions on individuals when they are actually the product 
of their state? If we wish to avoid such an implausible conclusion, implausible because 
of course we could say this of any crime, it is clear that the concept of autonomy needs 
some refinements. 
Agency and Intention 
The other crucial component of moral accountability relevant to war crimes 
prosecutions is for the entity in question to have the capacity of moral agency. Whether 
an organisation, institution, community or group, referred to here as collectives50, have 
the capacity for moral behaviour is dependant on its satisfying the conditions for moral 
agency, through the capacity to act and the manifestation of intentional behaviour in its 
actions. 
At root is a dispute about the nature of moral personality. For individualists, the only 
relevant moral units in the discussion of interests, satisfaction and intention are human 
beings. 51 This assumes a co-extensivity between the class of human beings and the class 
of moral persons. As there is little doubt that individuals are the bearers of moral 
personhood, individualism is characterised by an essentially negative approach in that it-, 
is evident in an exclusion of any other categories such as collectives, states and social 
concept of voluntariness as a condition of moral responsibility is represented within the framework of 
international law. 
49 A comprehensive discussion of this topic is found in K. Lehrer, (ed), Freedom and Determinism, New 
York: Random House, 1966. 
50 I am aware that this term is used far more narrowly within the literature to refer to particular 
communities classified according to their decision-making procedures. However, I will use it when a 
general term is required for anything other than individuals, other than when specific forms of 
organisation are referred to. 
51 This is the approach most commonly found within the literature on human rights. 
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classes . 
5'- A slightly less inflexible approach is more useful here as states certainly 
behave in ways which have a moral character of some kind, they make promises and use 
moral justifications for their actions. For the moment a more useful observation is that 
the only morally relevant entities are moral agents, leaving open to argument for the 
time being, what constitutes moral personality and to what extent states can be 
characterised in this manner. 
The most extreme repudiation of the idea that anything other than individual can be the 
bearer of moral rights is found in the work of Russell, who was particularly interested in 
war crimes, " when he argues with great clarity, 
When it is said that a nation is an organism, an analogy 
is being used which may be dangerous if its limitations 
are not recognised. Men and the higher animals are 
organisms in a strict sense: whatever good or evil 
befalls a man befalls him as a single person, not this or 
that part of him [... ] To believe there can be good or 
evil in a collection of human beings, over and above the 
good or evil in various individuals, is an error. 54 
This highlights the key assertion of individualism, the fact that any collectivity is 
always reducible to individuals who compose it. In addition it claims that collectives are 
resistant to any ascriptions of responsibility we might try to make. This idea is fully 
expressed in what French describes as `the Lewis conception of morality': 
Every ascription of collective responsibility either 
reduces to the claim that each member of the group is 
52 C. Santiago Nino, Op Cit. n. 44, p. 153. 
53 Russell headed a shadow war crimes tribunal convened to examine US crimes in Vietnam. See P. 
Limqueco, and P. Weiss, Prevent the Crime of Silence: Reports from the sessions of the International 
War Crimes Tribunal, founded by Bertrand Russell, London: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd., 
1971. See chapter 6. 
54 B. Russell, Authority and the Individual, London: Unwin, 1977, p89. 
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individually responsible or that the very notion of 
collective responsibility actually evades moral 
descriptions of responsibility. " 
Of course, this has important implications for the suggestion that states might be blamed 
for systematic or whole-state humanitarian violations. When actions such as sanctions, 
military action, aerial bombardment or even nuclear attack are forms of collective 
punishment, they are difficult to defend if they are carried out in response to some 
immoral behaviour by the state itself, behaviour such as the waging of aggressive war or 
the creation of refugees. These types of actions taken against states treat the state as a 
morally responsible collective and this is deeply contradictory. 
As it is self-evident that individuals are moral agents (at least of some time), let us start 
with the argument that collectives can also be moral agents. Should this view be correct, 
the acceleration of the principle of individual responsibility would be a mistake rather 
than a necessity, for states could be morally accountable for their actions on a collective 
level and appropriate action could be taken without reference to individuals? Initially 
there seem to be some convincing reasons for regarding collectives as moral agents, 
with regard to the state it is almost odd to pose such a question when both ordinary 
discourse and the legal tradition seem to grant such status already. " States are agents in 
the legal sense of the term; for instance they can conclude treaties and make promises. 
However, a legal personality is not enough to establish a moral agency. The legalist 
paradigm allows us a perfectly coherent way of accommodating states and other 
institutions as agents in the sense of concrete action whilst maintaining such a view of 
the state as a fictional construct. Within this paradigm states are `all sovereign, 
independent agents capable of directing action so endorsed. Even if they are not, they 
55 P. A. French, Op Cit. n. 1, p. 8 
56 : Donaldson, Op Cit. n. 43, p. 19. Donaldson makes this point in regard to corporations but its sense is 
not changed when applied to states. 
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have to act as if they were'. s' Yet for moral person theory, which regards the collective 
as a moral entity; to be an agent whether legal or otherwise, is to be a moral agent, 
provided a key condition for moral agency is met, that of intentionality SR 
But how do we define and more importantly identify intentional behaviour? We can see 
that the addition of this criterion problematises collective agency in a way the 
requirements of autonomy and its related conditions of self-determination, simple 
agency and voluntariness do not. A common yet narrow, conception of intentional 
action describes simply what an agent intends to do. Yet this is unsatisfying, some 
entities behave intentionally but are not moral agents, such as an advanced computer or 
a mouse avoiding a cat. Intentional behaviour distinguishes the physical from the mental 
realm by embodying notions of beliefs, desires and rationality into the actions of 
agents. 59 How can this apply to states? To ascribe responsibility to a supra-individual 
whole we would have to insist that the collective entity itself had intention, regardless of 
the intentions of the individuals which comprise it. It is difficult to see how this could 
apply. For instance, in terms of states let us suppose that military security is identifiable 
as a goal or an intention of nation-states, but this does not demonstrate that states act 
according to desires and beliefs, instead it could indicate that they operate according to 
a predetermined structural logic in which decision-making apparatus are set in place to 
pursue this goal. This operation according to pre-determined rules is more akin to the 
behaviour of a giant machine than a giant individual. " However, this presupposes a 
somewhat realist/structuralist view of relations between states, perhaps we could 
57 I. Forbes, and M. Hoffman, (eds), Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of 
Intervention, London: Macmillan, 1993, p-50- 
58 T. Donaldson, Op Cit. n. 43. Donaldson uses this illustration in his discussion of corporate moral 
agency. 
D. C. Dennett, `Intentional Systems', Journal ofPhilosophv, Vol. LXVIII, No 4., Feb 197l, pp. 87-106. 
Kenny, A., also makes this point from a legal perspective in `Intention and Purpose', Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 63,1966, p. 642-651. 
60 T. Donaldson, Op Cit. n. 43, p. 20. 
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broaden our claims to include the notion that if individuals within a nation-state change 
their goals, such as the refusal to tolerate slavery, states are then forced to pursue goals 
within a new logical framework. These examples together raise two related possibilities, 
that states are constrained structurally by their own decision-making procedures 
(because they cannot change their own goals within that framework) and that those 
procedures rest on the beliefs and desires of individuals not the beliefs and desires of 
institutional apparatus. Thus the state cannot be considered an intentional entity because 
it cannot change its goals according to its beliefs and desires. But, although I have 
defended the idea that states are not strictly intentional and although their behaviour fits 
a narrow conception of intentionality, perhaps they could still be morally accountable 
under revised conditions of moral agency. 
Moral Accountability 
If we look more closely at the issue of accountability it is clear that the issues in relation 
to corporations, collectives, states, communities and individuals are going to display 
significant differences. My argument is that we cannot ascribe moral responsibility, and 
therefore sanctions, to collective entities. For even when a version of collective 
responsibility is produced, it must be so qualified as to be ultimately, meaningless. 
Consequently, the application of individual criminal responsibility is a manifestation of 
a shared moral order in a way that collective responsibility, or state criminal 
responsibility, is not. 
Distributed Responsibility 
If we return to the definition of individualism, we can see that it includes the argument 
that `the very notion of collective responsibility actually evades moral descriptions of 
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responsibility'. This is an interesting point for the notion that collectives can be 
described as blameworthy or be ascribed moral responsibility independently from the 
individuals who compose them, is widely explored throughout the literature. 6' The 
portrait of responsibility as apportioned amongst individual members of a collective is 
particularly important in terms of discussion about the target of war crimes 
prosecutions. Obviously we cannot literally punish the states themselves, such a 
suggestion falls into what Goldman describes as `the fallacy of personifying states'62 for 
any punishment would be suffered by citizens, but could we legitimately regard all the 
citizens of the offending state as morally blameworthy simply by virtue of their 
membership of that state? If we cannot, and states cannot be morally accountable, we 
cannot logically impose punishment upon them. If we can, then measures against the 
offending state, such as sanctions or reparations would be the more legitimate route for 
punishment. 
This problem is more acute when we consider the nature of system war crimes. For 
instance, by definition, genocide cannot be committed by a single individual nor can the 
waging of aggressive war. However, O'Neill suggests that because some acts cannot be 
accomplished without collective action, then moral action must be mediated through 
collectives. 
No individual can devalue a currency or irrigate a 
desert or have a debate on the best criteria for a soft 
61 V. Held, `Can a Random Collection of Individuals be morally responsible? 'Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 67, No. 14,1970, pp. 471-481; O. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger :: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and 
Development, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986; A. Donagan, The Theory of Morality, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977. P. French, Individual and Collective Responsibility, Vermont: 
Schenkman Books, 1998; P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
VII, 1982: Social and Political Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982; and D. 
Cooper, `Collective Responsibility', Philosophy, Vol. 43, No 165,1968, pp. 258-268. and `Collective 
Responsibility Again, Philosophy, Vol. 44, No 168,1969, pp. 153-155. argue in this light. The debate 
between Cooper and Downie, R. S. Downie, `Collective Responsibility, Philosophy, Vol. 44, No 167, 
1969, pp. 66-69. is particularly instructive in this regard. 
62 A. Goldman, in S. Luper-Foy, Problems of International Justice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, 
p. 198. 
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loan policy. Individuals can only take a part in such 
activities in appropriate social contexts. 63 
The example of genocide could just as easily be substituted here. If genocide must be 
undertaken collectively then it might be argued that sanctions for it could be collective. 
However, this line of argument disguises the fact that an institution or community also 
cannot do any of these things without the actions of the individuals who comprise it. In 
order to ascribe blameworthiness, the adoption of individual criminal responsibility 
must reduce the collective crime of genocide to a series of simultaneous actions, with 
blameworthiness rising according to power wielded. This form of responsibility is 
termed `divided responsibility'. " Although O'Neill specifically distinguishes between 
the problem of war crimes and other types of moral or immoral behaviour, she seems to 
give no clear reasons to do so other than preference. 65 O'Neill however, does highlight a 
crucial distinguishing feature of the practice of ascribing individual criminal 
responsibility; it is formed around a `nucleus of accepted standards' by which 
individuals may be judged. " It would seem that she argues that institutions, on moral 
issues such as global redistribution, are subject to moral evaluation as moral agents, 
although when not supported by consensus this can never include individual 
responsibility. " Thus, O'Neill's position on collective morality seems to exclude any 
63 O. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1986, p. 38. 
64 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic 
Books, 1977, p. 309. Cooper and Downie refer to divided responsibility as `divisible', and distributed 
responsibility as `indivisible' which is somewhat clearer than the more common phrases `divided' and 
distributed. 
65 O'Neill also criticises individual responsibility as being extremely selective, I assume she opposes this 
to an inclusive prosecution of all offenders. However, Post WWII prosecutions stretched far beyond 
Nuremberg to minor officials in national prosecutions. The ICTY also includes in its indictments 
categories of criminal which go down to jailers. 
66 O. O'Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1986, p. 44. 
67 The individuals concerned are obviously not responsible until they have the necessary capacity of 
voluntariness, that is until they are aware of the immoral character of their act, and can then be 
blameworthy. This requires the consensus of the individuals who comprise states, as it is upon them that 
sanctions fall. 
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kind of accountability but only until moral consensus is reached, when the conduct of 
individuals may be judged against those standards. It could be argued that O'Neill has 
made a virtue of the very thing she intended to dispute, namely, that ultimately only 
individuals can be the target of moral discourse. This is a good example of how, 
essentially, descriptions of a potential collective morality evade moral descriptions of 
responsibility. When such descriptions are made accountability or punishment must be 
excluded, when they are included it is because individuals recognise a reductional moral 
offence. 
Distributed Responsibility 
The type of responsibility that I have covered so far is divided responsibility, when each 
individual's responsibility is apportioned according to their degree of culpability. 
However, it could be argued that moral responsibility can be distributed, that is when 
more than one person is blamed without splitting up the blame, as well as divided. This 
would imply that some form of distributed collective responsibility could apply 
provided that that collective satisfies the relevant conditions. Distributed responsibility 
is also a feature of criminal responsibility, in the same way as divided responsibility 
although in this sense its parameters are strictly defined. 68 If, however, we allow 
distributive responsibility across a collective, we may return to the question of whether 
it is acceptable to target citizens of a state as responsible for the actions of the whole 
state. 
French describes three main questions that need to be addressed to answer the question 
of whether we can lay moral blame for the acts of collectives on whole populations: 
68 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument Tt'ith Historical Illustrations, New York: 
Basic 
Books, 1977, p. 309. Cooper and Downie refer to divided responsibility as `divisible', and 
distributed 
responsibility as `indivisible' which 
is somewhat clearer than the more common phrases `divided' and 
distributed. 
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1. Can one be morally to blame for the acts of another? 
2. Can a collectivity such as the American People be 
the bearer of moral blame? And 3. Is vicarious 
collective moral blame reducible to individual vicarious 
liabilities? " 
French, of course concludes that it is possible to hold members of a collective morally 
responsible, but I dispute his reasoning on several grounds. With reference to the first 
point, French argues that it is possible to be to blame for the actions of another, 
although he qualifies this by distinguishing blame from guilt. " Thus a parent may be 
held to blame for the dishonesty of their child, although they would not be guilty of the 
dishonest behaviour themselves. However, French seems to regard moral guilt as akin 
to legal guilt. When he defines guilt he argues that the `paradigmatic use of the word is 
its legalistic use', it is the ascription of a deed. " This distinction between guilt and 
blame is essential for his argument that it is possible to morally blame those who have 
not been involved in the guilty deed. Yet, this version of blame is qualified to such an 
extent that ultimately it is meaningless. By divorcing guilt from blame, French hopes to 
expand the notion of collective responsibility, but such a qualified version of blame fails 
to expand collective responsibility. French argues that some collective moral violations 
are not reducible to the actions of individuals without losing some of the nature of the 
act. Consequently only a collective can be blamed for actions that only a collective can 
perform. Responsibility is distributive in that it is shared simultaneously amongst all 
members of the group. Yet ultimately, this line of argument must imply that there are 
some moral transgressions for which no individual is responsible. Genocide could be 
seen on this view as a collective act. For patterns of killing must be, amongst other 
things, widespread and systematic, and certainly more than could be accomplished by 
69 P. A. French, Op Cit. n. 1, p. 22. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 23. 
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one individual. But it is possible to divide responsibility individually for that act, even 
though it is logically impossible for any individual to carry it out alone. However, by 
implying that the collective itself has committed genocide, the scope for responsibility 
assignation has lessened rather than widened. In fact, unlike French, Lewis claims that 
such blame must inevitably be non-moral blame, 72 and considering the conditions for 
moral agency this would seem a difficult conclusion to avoid. It is logically impossible 
for someone to shoulder moral guilt for someone else's action, for it would imply that 
someone was blameworthy with neither intention, action or autonomy with regard to the 
situation. Thus, neither moral accountability nor legal sanction can fall upon all 
members without discrimination. As a result, the notion of collective guilt can at the 
most extend to a qualified notion of general blame divorced from accountability. 
Although other writers have sought to address this shortcoming, it has always remained 
a stubborn feature of collective responsibility. 
Virginia Held seeks to enforce a notion of distributive responsibility in random 
collectives in circumstances when it is obvious to a `reasonable man' that action should 
and can be taken by the group. 73 However, she too concedes that from the attribution of 
moral responsibility to a collective it can be derived that members of that collective are 
morally responsible. Bates makes a clear criticism of this when he argues that this 
implies that none of the individual members might be morally responsible for an event 
for which the collective is morally responsible. Bates argues that this is an impossibility, 
for some individuals must have actually performed at least a part of the collective act. 
As a corollary to this, Bates continues by pointing out that in cases where responsibility 
is distributive, this occurs because the features which define group membership are the 
72 H. D. Lewis, `Collective Responsibility', Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 84,1948, pp. 3-47. 
73 V. Held, `Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible', Journal of 
Philosophy, 
Vol. 67, No. 14.1970, pp. 471-481. 
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ones by which moral responsibility is assigned. 74 For instance, in Nazi Germany, the 
state was Nazi and therefore its citizens were Nazis. But if we try to assign moral 
responsibility to individuals in a distributive way, for instance by holding each and 
every member of that state morally accountable for its policies, we find ourselves 
redefining `Nazi', until only those who actively and demonstrably contributed to that 
collective are included within it. Thus the collective `Nazi' is redefined until the 
collective is sufficiently small to allow distributed responsibility. In these 
circumstances we can also say that the membership of such a collective is voluntary, 
given that active participation is required, Downie argues in response to Cooper, '' that 
the individual has shown by membership an acceptance of the goals and morals of that 
collective. " Yet this is a very different situation to that of a nation, membership is an 
accident of birth, and even if it is possible with difficulty to leave, it is impossible to 
live without residence in some state. Walzer inadvertently reduces the collective when 
he talks about the indiscriminate bombing of Germany during WWII. Walzer suggests 
that we feel it to be more acceptable to bomb an aggressive nation like Germany, than 
an occupied one on the grounds that there are likely to be more guilty people there. The 
illustration he offers is of a town full of adults only, who had supported the Nazi party. 
He argues that even though such bombing would still be a crime, we are intuitively 
more comfortable with it than if there were innocent people among the inhabitants. " We 
can see from this example that the collective `Germany' when closely inspected, is 
actually the collective `guilty Germans'. 
74 S. Bates, `Responsibility of Random Collections', Ethics, Vol. 81,1971, pp. 343-349. 
75 D. E. Cooper, `Collective Responsibility `, Philosophy, Vol. 43, No 165,1968, pp. 258-268. 
76 R. S. Downie, `Collective Responsibility', Philosophy, Vol. 44, No 167,1969, pp. 66-69. 
77 M. Walzer, War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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Conclusion 
There are several way to circumvent analysis of the moral interplay between individual 
and state in the commission of war crimes. Perhaps the easiest, but the least interesting, 
is the realist refusal to engage with any consideration of morality in the international 
system. When it is evident that states can and do participate in moral discourse by for 
instance promise-keeping, claiming injustice and giving aid, then such denials look 
suspiciously like prejudice, for it is evident that the issue of state moral agency needs to 
be addressed. Refusals to consider morality based on descriptive analysis omits too 
much of how individuals impact upon and interact with the morality of state policy. 
However, the observation that states appear to act morally does not entail a certainty 
that states are possessed of a full moral agency. If it did this thesis flounder on that 
account, for the discussion of the correct view of the individual when embedded in 
state crime could be circumvented by a refusal to consider individual accountability and 
a move towards collective punishment. Such an acceptance of the state as a full moral 
agent is unfeasible, given the minimum requirements of autonomy and intention. I have 
shown that however the state is conceptualised as a collective entity, the possibility of 
tying structures of accountability to the state is logically impossible to achieve with any 
coherence. The observation that collectives are regularly credited with moral guilt 
illustrates this rather than disproves this. For such ascriptions when closely examined, 
are revealed as a shorthand for a far more complex displacement of individual moral 
responsibility. If allowed to go unchallenged they produce precisely the sort of 
incoherence and inconsistency that can be regularly observed in discussions of state 
moral accountability. 
77 
Chapter 3 
Traditions in the Assignation of Responsibility 
The new willingness to confront gross human rights abuses through international legal 
institutions is gathering pace. As well as the establishment of the ad Hoc tribunals for 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), there is also the new International 
Criminal Court (ICC). These developments might suggest that the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility is well entrenched. Yet, in fact, the assignment of 
criminal responsibility to individuals is in opposition to the traditional structure of state 
interactions and in tension with the historical practice of states. The body of 
international law guides the practice of states but has not been law in the true sense of 
the term for it has had none of the enforcement and coercive resources of domestic law. 
A review of the historical growth and development of international law reveals how 
embedded is the customary manner of interaction between states. It is impossible to 
analyse the impact of new developments in responsibility assignation without some 
sense of how radical they are in the context of traditional interactions. An analysis of the 
main features of the conventional practice of international law also highlights the 
potential for tension between the new move to individual criminal responsibility seen 
first at the Nuremberg Tribunal (IMT) and the historical practice of international law. 
Whilst the legislation and practice surrounding humanitarian law is in its infancy, the 
attempt to avoid needless cruelty and destruction during the conduct of war is almost as 
old as civilisation itself. The earliest systematic and coherent study of the relationships 
between states was conducted by Grotius who first formulated the Law of War and 
Peace /De Jure Belli et Pacis (1625). It was this tradition, with its concern to mitigate 
the ravages of war according to humanitarian principles but primarily in defence of 
trade, that informs most modem humanitarian law. This thesis argues that the 
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Nuremberg Tribunal marked a watershed in the application of penal sanctions for war 
crimes, and that it did so by introducing criminal responsibility that was both novel in 
character and individual in its target. Firstly, we will look at the history and the 
principles of legislation prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal with a view to revealing the 
magnitude of the changes it heralded. Then we will examine some of the main features 
of international law, including the principle of military necessity as based on 
expediency and its relation to international morality, showing that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal marked a departure from this perspective towards humanitarianism. Finally, 
we will examine the traditional focus of response to violations of the law of war 
including reprisals and reciprocity, reparations, national prosecutions / court martials, 
and trial by victors post-conflict. These are overwhelmingly state focused and collective 
in their application. Thus, Nuremberg also marked a departure from the collective 
responsibility assigned to states expressed through traditional responses to violations of 
the laws of war. 
Historical Context 
Much of the changes in emphasis and direction of the laws of war are conditioned by 
the changing nature of warfare itself In the Middle Ages, war was a way of life rather 
than a calculated instrument of policy. Battles were small in scale and, in effect, 
extensions of personal disputes. Characterised by chivalric values of personal honour, 
glory and vengeance, it resulted in an attitude to war that emphasised the rules of fair 
contest and ceremonial constraints 
1 Taylor also identifies this early form of 
development as flowing from the notion of knightly chivalry, surviving today in rules 
prohibiting various forms of deception such as the launching of war without 
fair 
R. E. Osgood, Force, Order and Justice, Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1967, p. 43. 
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warning by formal declaration or the use of enemy uniforms or battle insignia. 2 There 
are two aspects to constraints on the waging of war. They may be focussed on the 
restrictions on weaponry and methods of warfare, or they may focus on the targets of 
military action. Although in practice the two kinds of constraints often overlap, it is the 
second category that is illuminating in terms of this thesis because constraints on the 
targets of military action embody a fundamental moral concern for `innocent' 
participants3 or `worthy' victims contrasting with the 'unworthy'. 
The rationale for such limitations was primarily expedient, from about the middle of the 
Seventeenth Century, civilian lives and property were protected from destruction largely 
because of the economic advantages this entailed, and because widespread destruction 
threatened the foundations of established power. As the laws of war evolved the 
considerations of expediency were formalised into the concepts of `military necessity' 
and `proportionality'. Gratuitous violence and excessive force were ruled out. 5 With the 
emergence of nation-building in earnest and the development of standing armies, the 
regulation of armed combat became more formal as military courts were established to 
try offences by soldiers. 6 The Eighteenth Century was essentially characterised by 
limited wars, technological, economic and social conditions engendered constraint, and 
warfare of this period was relatively moderate. Although military casualties were high, 
2 T. Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, New York: Bantam Books Inc., 1971. 
3 T. Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 
289. 
4 This trend to discriminate between worthy and unworthy victims is exemplified by the approach of the 
international coalition to conflict in Afghanistan. `Worthy and Unworthy Victims', TheGuardian, 5 Nov 
2001. 
5 T. Nardin, Op Cit. n. 3, p. 290. 
6 For detailed accounts of Medieval warfare see W. C. Oman, A History of the Art of War: The Middle 
Ages from the 4th to the 14`x' Century. 2 Vols., 2nd Edition, London: Methuen, 1924; andA History of the 
Art of War in the Sixteenth Centu7j,, New York: 
Dutton and Co, 1937; See also T. F. Tout, Medieval and 
Modern T "a, fare, Manchester: Longmans, 1919; Best, G., Humanity in fV'arfare, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980. 
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there were significantly lower levels of destruction of civilian life and property. ' 
However, by the mid Nineteenth Century, the humanitarian movement had gathered 
force and the idea that some weaponry and military tactics might be bad in themselves, 
regardless of their utility, and their use should be prohibited, had come into play. 8 The 
impact of `diverse social, moral, political, scientific, military and economic factors' had 
strengthened the humanitarian movement. 9 
However, it was not until 1856, with the Paris Declaration on Maritime War, that the 
first binding multilateral agreement on the conduct of armed conflict was reached. 
However it was the US that took the lead in producing laws of war that were both 
systematic and written, in the War Instructions produced by Lieber under the direction 
of President Lincoln in 1863.10 The modem development of the law of war began with 
the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. These were essentially limited, exactly how 
limited was to become evident with the advent of the First World War, yet they 
established some fundamental precepts within the law of war. Not only did they 
establish that the right of parties to a conflict to inflict damage on the enemy is not 
unlimited but also drew a basic distinction between civilian populations and 
combatants. " As such, they inform the content of war crimes legislation as well as 
evidencing customary practice. 
Yet, Meurant points out that: 
7 With the exception of the devastating Seven Years War in Prussia. Osgood, Op Cit. n. 1, p. 47. 
8 Nardin, Op Cit. n. 3, p. 291. 
9 G. I. A. D. Draper, `The Ethical and Juridical Status of Constraints in War', Military Law, Review, Vol. 55, 
1972, pp. 169-185, p. 170. 
10 R. Goldstone, Prosecuting War Criminals. London: The David Davies Memorial Institute, 1996, p. 
1. 
11 J. Meurant , 
`Inter Arma Caritas: Evolution and Nature of International Humanitarian Law', Jouurnal of 
Peace Research, Vol 24. No. 3,1987, P24. 
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This international regulation of means of combat served 
in the interests of States. Most of the rules were vague 
and .... 
directly inspired by the Rousseauist conception 
according to which wars are interstate conflicts. No rule 
had been adopted as to the conduct of hostilities in civil 
wars. ' 2 
The target and focus of this legislation is still the state and based on the principles of 
inter-state warfare. Yet nonetheless, these developments marked the beginning of the 
regulation of hostilities through the application of international humanitarian law. The 
emphasis however, was clearly upon the needs and interests of states during conflict, 
rather than the needs and interests of individuals whether in peace or war and this has 
been an orientation that has proved difficult to alter. Even in the innovative application 
of humanitarian law seen in the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the Security Council erred on the side of caution. In its definition of crimes 
against humanity set out in the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal, Article 5 requires that 
all crimes against humanity must have a causal nexus with an armed conflict. 13 The 
innovation in this circumstance was the definition of `armed conflict'. Whereas at 
Nuremberg the definition was strictly linked to inter-state conflict, the ICTY proved 
willing to accept a far looser definition of conflict. 14 This had the effect of extending 
the protection of international law across a wider range of victims. Further to this, the 
ICC has made considerable gains in approaching internal conflict. 
'5 
Whilst the preceding half-century had internationalised and formalised the conduct of 
war, it was not until the bloodshed of the First World War that a substantive body of 
practice and precedent to deal with the escalation of destruction in modern warfare 
began to be produced. By the First World War, there was still no provision at all in 
12 Ibid., p. 24 1. 
13 Goldstone, Op Cit. n. 10, p. 8. 
14 See Chapter 7 
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international law that made either states or individuals criminally liable for either 
declaring or the manner of waging, war. 16 Taylor describes how: 
The Hague Conventions, and other treaties and conclaves in 
the preceding half-century, had internationalised the whole 
subject of limits on warfare and laid the basis for an 
extraordinary expansion of public and political concern with 
"war crimes" throughout the course and aftermath of World 
War 1.17 
The result was a series of international agreements on the conduct of war which 
eventually formed the basis for the charges that were to be laid at the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal. These included the Hague rules of Aerial Bombardment, 1923 which 
Roberts specifically relates to the indiscriminate bombing of non-combatant civilians in 
the First World War. 18 Similarly, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, 1925, was also directly related to the experience of the First World War. ' 9 As 
was the London Proc s-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare. 20 Thus, 
although the term `crime against humanity' had created a new legislative charge, it was 
not so much the content of the charges at Nuremberg that was novel; instead, it was the 
target of those charges, individuals. 
15 See Chapter 8 
16 T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials .A Personal Memoif; London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing Ltd., 1993, p. 16. 
17 Ibid., p. l l. 
18 A. Roberts, and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd 
Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 139. 
19 Ibid., p. 155. 
2" This was set forth in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London, 22 April 1930. 
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Characteristics of the Laws of War 
The Necessity Principle 
As we have seen, the laws of war, although the subject of long-established practice, are 
at their core essentially unstable. Enforcement is erratic and uneven and the extent to 
which they are observed is conditional upon the circumstances and techniques of 
warfare. As Taylor argues: 
In part, this is due to the customary nature of the laws 
of war, and the lack of any authoritative source or 
means of systematic enforcement. For want of an 
international legislature, there is no single, 
authoritative text of the rules, and there are no 
prescribed penalties for their violation .... In such an 
embryonic legislative and judicial context, it is hardly 
surprising that the effective content of the laws of war 
should fluctuate. 21 
Yet the difficulties encountered in regulating armed conflict are also more profound 
than this, indeed they are integral to war itself. Clausewitz most famously formulated 
this difficulty in On War when he argued that "there is no logical end to the use of 
force"22 War is intrinsically desperate and violent and just as individuals will break the 
law in self-defence, so national governments will unhesitatingly break laws if their 
national security is perceived to rest upon so doing. Within modem warfare, the rapidity 
of technological evolution and its concomitant secrecy, mean that effective defence may 
not be compatible with the observance of rules that were previously respected. 23 
21 T. Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy , 
New York: Bantam Books Inc.. 1971. 
22 C. Clausewitz, On War, Ware: Wordsworth, 1997. 
23 Taylor, Op Cit. n. 16, p. l I 
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However, the concept of necessity is not unbounded, and it is the responsibility of states 
to demonstrate that a failure to observe humanitarian law was essential to successful 
prosecution of the conflict. The liinit to the principle of necessity has been defined as: 
Only that degree or kind of force, not otherwise prohibited 
by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or 
complete submission of the enemy with a minimum 
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources, may be 
applied. 24 
It must be demonstrably essential to successful military action; a provision that's history 
of application in humanitarian law is centuries long. Even Napoleon applied this 
doctrine when he said: 
My great maxim has always been, in politics and war alike, 
that every injury done to the enemy, even though permitted 
by the rules [i. e. customary international law], is excusable 
only as far as it is absolutely necessary; everything beyond 
that is criminal25 
Allied to this concept however, are the twin notions of distinction and proportionality, 
recently reaffirmed in the 1977 protocol to the Geneva Convention. Louise Doswald- 
Beck describes distinction thus: 
The principle of `distinction' means that valid targets are 
those of military importance, i. e. the armed forces and those 
installations the destruction of which provides a definite 
military advantage e. g. military depots, means of 
communication for the armed forces etc. 26 
Nowadays essential economic targets, such as power stations or communication 
networks, are also seem acceptable. They were certainly justified as necessary by the 
24 United States, Dept. of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 
1-14 M, Oct 1995, p. 1-5 . 
25 Cited in Best, Op Cit. n. 6, p. 49 
26 L. Doswald-Beck, `The Civilian in the Crossfire', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 24: 
No. 3,1987, p. 
253. 
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Allies in the Gulf Conflict. If the killing of civilians provides no military advantage then 
they should be spared. Proportionality refers to the incidental loss of life that 
accompanies a strike on a target and provides that it should not be excessive in relation 
to the importance of the objective. The method of attack should also be chosen so as to 
avoid as much incidental damage as possible. 27 However, there are some applicable 
provisions of the law which cannot be evaded by using the justification of military 
necessity because such laws have been drafted with prior consideration for the 
concept. 28 For instance the 1923 Geneva Protocol expressly forbids the use of chemical 
or bacteriological methods of warfare. 29 Also, there is an express injunction against 
`dishonourable (treacherous) means, dishonourable expedients, and dishonourable 
conduct during armed conflict... ' 30 Fundamentally, the twin concepts of distinction and 
proportionality are the governing principles of military necessity. 
The body of international humanitarian law is conditioned and determined by the 
paradox at its heart, the prohibition of suffering combined with the recognition of the 
principle of necessity. As Meurant argues: 
Humanitarian law, as a compromise between the principle of 
humanity and military necessity.... is a mixture of both 
idealism and realism. It is constantly struggling for survival 
between these two extreme views, trying to avoid useless 
suffering if not violence itself. It is a policy of lesser evil 
31 
As with most humanitarian law, there is a substantial body of practice which is clearly 
defined and indisputably either correct or incorrect. For instance, although some of the 
strongest prohibitions in the laws of war concern the treatment and protection of 
27 Ibid., p. 253. 
28 Roberts and Guelff, Op Cit. n. 18, p. 10. 
29 Ibid., p. 4 
30 United States, Dept. of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations, NWP 
1-14 M, Oct 1995, p. 1-5. 
86 
prisoners of war, there are commonly accepted situations in which the demands of 
necessity override these prohibitions. For instance, Taylor cites the example of a small 
detachment which may have taken prisoners under conditions where it is impossible to 
either guard them or send them to the rear without endangering the safety of the unit. 
Under such conditions, prisoners are executed by operation of the principle of military 
necessity. Taylor goes on to add that to his knowledge no military or other court has 
been called on to declare killings in such circumstances a war crime. 32 
Some of the greatest difficulties with this principle, however, occur at the boundaries of 
its application. Guerrilla warfare throws the problem of non-combatant protection into 
sharp relief, given that it is often legitimised with reference to the principle of necessity. 
Although often a feature of internal conflict and therefore not automatically within the 
scope of current humanitarian law, an example of guerrilla tactics in an international 
war was the position in Vietnam. Guerrilla strategy dictates that it is impossible to fight 
traditionally when one has such inadequate means at ones' disposal compared to a much 
larger power. For successful guerrilla warfare, it is then a matter of military necessity 
that guerrilla combatants should be indistinguishable from civilian non- combatants. 
The objective for guerrillas is not to harm civilians per se, but to encourage the enemy 
to do so, thereby undermining their legitimacy and decreasing their ground level 
support. This was the strategy of the Vietcong in Vietnam where during the course of 
the conflict between 365,000 and 587,000 civilians in both the North and South were 
killed by all forces. The Vietcong strategy made these civilians vulnerable by turning 
their villages into "defended places" and using villagers to launch attacks. The Vietcong 
consistently claimed that this strategy was the only one available to a force 
facing an 
enemy so much more powerful than they. For their part, the US 
have consistently 
31 Meurant, Op Cit. n. 11, p. 245 
32 Taylor, 1971, Op Cit. n. 21, p. 34 
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claimed that measures taken against civilians were not specifically aimed at them, but 
were part of a general "counter-insurgency programme" the operation of which was also 
conditioned by military necessity. " This was ultimately a remarkably effective strategy 
on the part of the Vietcong leading to what Fein describes as: `The legally-rationalised 
erosion of protective norms by the United States in the face of military frustration. ' 34 
This prosecution of unidentifiable combatants escalated, as did the Vietnam War itself. 
By 1970, Cambodia's border with Vietnam was breaking down. Cambodia's rice crop 
drained into Vietnam sustaining opposition to the US, while both Khymer and 
Vietnamese fled into Cambodia, pursued by the US military and Air Force. In the course 
of the US action against Cambodia 540,000 tons of bombs were dropped on civilian 
settlements. Kiernan describes how: 
Richard Nixon's May 1970 invasion of Cambodia.... 
created 130,000 new Khymer refugees according to 
the Pentagon. By 1971,60 per cent of refugees 
surveyed in Cambodia's towns gave US bombing as 
the main cause of their displacement. 35 
It is difficult to deny then that, within counter-insurgency operations, in at least some 
senses, the civilian is a target. Röling refers to this as `coercive warfare' and 
unambiguously labels it as `criminal according to traditional standards of warfare'. 
36 
In common with most of the literature around this field, the implicit assumption 
underlying our discussion of the development of humanitarian law is that it is 
unquestionably a positive and welcomed development. Yet, there are some who do 
question the inherent benefit or efficacy of such developments, such dissent comes from 
33 H. Fein, `Discriminating Genocide From War Crimes', Denver Journal of International Law and 
Polich, Vol. 22: Fall, 1993, pp. 29-62. p. 42 
34 Ibid. p. 46. 
35 B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and genocide in Cambodia under the Khymer Rouge 
1975-79, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 19 
36 B. V. A. Röling,, `The Significance of the Laws of War, in A. Cassese, (ed), Current 
Problems of 
International Law: Essaus on United Nations Lawn and on the Lau ofArmed 
Conflict, Milan: Dott. 
A. Guiffre, 1975. p. 141. 
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a variety of different quarters, but for the purposes of clarity I shall classify them 
variously as legal, moral and political objections. 
Objections 
Legal objections take a variety of forms, one of the most common being that once war 
became an illegal activity it could not logically be addressed by law. It is paradoxical to 
argue that the rule of law be applied to a fundamentally illegal activity, just as the 
weights and measures act does not apply to the black market, neither can humanitarian 
law apply to an illegal war. For, so the argument runs, if participants are not prepared to 
settle disputes through legal channels, it is futile then to ask them to submit to legal 
regulation of the conflict. For these writers, the essence of war is that it replaces law 
with force. A far greater number of theorists and statesmen have supported this theory 
than the extent of the literature on it would lead one to believe. From Clausewitz to 
Goering who claimed at the Nuremberg Tribunal that in a total war the tenets of 
international law are broken down, the implication is that it is part of the inherent nature 
of war to be uncivilised. 37 A minor strain of such viewpoints also argues that the more 
brutal a war, the quicker it is finished and consequently the more humane it is. This line 
of argument rests on the optimistic hope that the more destructive a war, the less likely 
participants are to repeat it, a hope not born out by the lessons of history. Instead, 
international humanitarian law aims not to prevent war, but to mitigate its effects when 
all other attempts to prevent it have failed, thus logically it is not incompatible with 
efforts to avoid conflict. As Meurant points out: 
Humanitarian law is characterised by its pragmatic 
approach which recognises the realities of our time of 
violence, without purporting to furnish an explanation of its 
38 
causes 
"Meurant, Op Cit. n. 11, p. 237. 
3 Ibid., p. 238. 
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Furthermore, at the present stage of development, the outlawing of war is neither 
complete nor universal, not all wars are illegal, and some are waged in defence of 
international peace and security for instance. Meurant makes another interesting point in 
this vein; international law is expanding to cover more and more non-international 
conflicts, conflicts which are certainly illegal according to domestic law, yet 
humanitarian law can still make a positive contribution to the course of such conflict. 39 
Wholehearted condemnation of the `counsels of desperation' which advocate 
abandoning humanitarian law is also the part of Telford Taylor who points to two main 
reasons why the laws of war should continue to be developed. His first point is quite 
simply that they work. 
Violated or ignored as they often are, enough of the rules 
are observed enough of the time so that mankind is 
considerably better off with them than without them ...... 
if 
it were not regarded as wrong to bomb military hospitals, 
they would be bombed all of the time instead of some of the 
40 time. 
State Responsibility and Collective Punishment 
As the notion of enforcement is central to this thesis, constraining as it does the 
assignation of responsibility, we shall now turn to traditional remedies for violations of 
the laws of war. It is clear that prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal, responsibility was 
directed at states. Liability, such as it was, was a collective liability. Although we shall 
see a few attempts at individual prosecutions, they were neither effective nor 
39 Ibid. 
40 Taylor, 1971, Op Cit. n. 2 1, p. 40. 
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constitutive of a precedent for the Nuremberg Tribunal. Thus an examination of the 
history of enforcement for the violations of the laws of war demonstrates a focus on 
collective punishment and contextualises the radical nature of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
in its refocusing on the individual as a target for liability. The main routes of 
punishments for states have been reprisals, reparations and sanctions, and reciprocity, 
together with the principle of tu Quoque. 41 Attempts to apply liability to states have also 
been conducted through the ICJ. There had been notable attempts to apply individual 
responsibility prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal, noticeably the Leipzig trials and the 
condemnation of the Armenian genocide. 
Reciprocity and Reprisals 
Reciprocity is perhaps the crudest form of collective responsibility and simply refers to 
the principle that should a party to a conflict violate the rule in question, then the 
opposing party can declare itself no longer bound by the rule. In this case, the principle 
is that of `negative reciprocity'. A good example of this is the threat by the US to use 
nuclear weapons against Iraq should it use chemical weapons against its troops in the 
Gulf War. This was a threat of negative reciprocity and it illustrates most forcefully the 
key norm of inter-state warfare, that adherence by a belligerent to even the most 
fundamental legal instruments, cannot be sustained when the opposing force threatens 
to gain military advantage by non-adherence to the law. 
2 Yet negative reciprocity is 
both crude and liable to escalate brutality, given that it signals the abandonment of 
restraint. 
By contrast, reprisals are retributive practices aimed at collectives and as such, they are 
crucial in determining the trends and traditions in responsibility assignations. 
The most 
41 The implications of this defence are discussed in Chap 4- on the Nuremberg 
Tribunal . 
-hoff, 1987, p. 65 42 F. Kalshoven, Constraints On The Waging Of TJ'ar-, The Hague: Martinnus 
N13 
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extreme of methods employed to enforce international law, their use is now of limited 
defensibility. 43 Yet, historically they have been a determining feature of customary law 
and there is evidence that some elements of the practice of reprisals persist in a new and 
mutated form. In terms of responsibility assignation, they are the polar opposite of 
individual responsibility and an examination of their main features illustrates the long 
historical tradition in which they are embedded. Reprisals are then, the most traditional 
method of enforcement44 and the method most hostile to the protection of non- 
combatants in conflict scenarios. They are governed by a sophisticated and detailed set 
of conventions, the sixth most central are i) No resort to reprisals without a previous 
illegality by the opponent; ii) no resort if the adversary desists from such illegality 
without the actual employment of reprisals; iii) notice to resort to reprisals, with a 
reasonable period allowed the adversary for a return to legality; iv) proportionality in 
volume and a limited control as to genus; v) no resort to reprisals except on the 
instructions of a government; vi) immediate cessation of reprisals as soon as the 
adversary desists from the illegality in question. 5 By referring to these rules we can 
clearly see the difference between reciprocity and reprisals and although nuclear 
exchange is often described as governed by the customary law of reprisals, it clearly fail 
to satisfy on that score. 46 
43 The Geneva Conventions 1949, have eliminated the device of reprisals although Combat Law retains it 
as a central method of enforcement. G. I. A. D. Draper, `The Ethical and Juridical Status of Constraints in 
War', Military Law Review, Vol. 55,1972, pp. 169-185, p. 182. For more information on the Geneva 
Conventions see Chapter 3. 
 G. I. A. D. Draper, `The Ethical and Juridical Status of Constraints in War', Military Law Review, Vol. 
55,1972, pp. 169-185, p. 182. 
as Draper, G. I. A. D. `Implementation of International Law in Armed Conflicts', Intet°national Affairs, Vol. 
48: No. 1,1972, p. 49. 
46 For example Draper claims that 'The operation of the legal device of reprisals, an accepted method of 
enforcement of the law of war, certainly comes into play in the event of an armed conflict between 
nuclear belligerents'. G. I. A. D. Draper, `The Ethical and Juridical Status of 
Constraints in War'. Alilitan 
Law Revietilw, Vol. 55,1972. pp. 169-185. p. 175. 
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Reprisals arose under customary international law and then the regulation of armed 
conflicts as a response to the enforcement deficiencies of the laws of war. `' The breadth 
of reprisal broadened, beginning to include non-violent reactions involving economic, 
48 diplomatic or cultural relations. When we move to consider the character of reprisals 
as forms of collective punishment, it seems clear there are implications in modern 
diplomatic practices for the assignation of responsibility. 
It was not until the 19th century that reprisals were used to enforce the regulation of 
armed conflict and the concept of belligerent reprisals emerged and was formalised. 49 It 
seems that reprisals are still a part of the enforcement of the laws of war although 
several developments have limited the circumstances in which they may apply. 0 For 
Oppenheim claims that: 
Reprisals between belligerents cannot be dispensed with, 
for the effect of their use and of the fear of their being used 
cannot be denied. Every belligerent, and every member of 
his forces, knows for certain that reprisals are to be 
expected in case they violate the rules of legitimate warfare. 
51 
The concept of reprisals was specifically attended to in 1863 in Art. 27 of the Lieber 
Code which states `the law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than 
could the law of nations, of which it is a branch'. All this goes to show the entrenched 
nature of a collectivised approach to punishment, the very structure of international 
law 
embeds it. 
47 M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, The Hague: Martinnus 
Nijhoff, 1992. p. 449. 
48 Ibid., p. 450. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See Chapter 3 
5'H. Lauterpacht, (ed), Oppenheims International Law, 7`h ed 1948, p.. 
560. 
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Reprisals, however, are antagonistic to the most fundamental distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant populations, which elsewhere I have identified as a moral 
distinction. 52 They are antagonistic to the equitable assignation of moral responsibility 
because they are at their core a collective punishment. 53 Reprisals exhibit a true non- 
discriminatory collective punishment because they are most commonly directed as 
population groups who have no bearing on the conflict. A prime example of this was in 
the unrestricted campaign of aerial bombardment waged by both sides in WWII. 
Bassiouni gives an illustrative example: 
The German and Allied practice of indiscriminately 
bombing civilian populations during WWII were 
numerous. After the mistaken bombing of London by 
the German Luftwaffe in Sept 1940, England bombed 
Berlin as an act of reprisal. Germany responded by 
excessive bombing of London and other cities of 
England and explained it as acts of legitimate reprisals. 
Then. The Allies firebombed the city of Dresden as an 
act of reprisal for the bombing of Coventry .... 
leaving 
... 
30,000 to 100,000 casualties... 54 
Aerial bombardment clearly offers some direct moral difficulties in terms of distinction 
and proportionality, the moral signifiers for assessing conduct in conflict. When we 
contextualise this mode of warfare within the tradition of reprisals, we have an 
outstandingly clear example of what is nothing short of collectivised punishment. This 
clearly stated by Kelsen `Reprisals and war are directed against the state as such, and 
that means against the subjects of the state.. . This means collective responsibility'. 
55 
Walzer inadvertently reduces to the collective when he talks about the indiscriminate 
bombing of Germany during WWII. Walzer suggests that we feel it to be more 
5- See Chapter 5 
53 See Ch 5 on `Principles of Moral Responsibility' for the rationale behind the abandonment of collective 
punishments. 
sa Bassiouni, Op Cit. n. 47, p. 454. 
ss H. Kelsen, "Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the 
Punishment of War Criminals", Vol. 31, California Law Reviellw, 1943, pp. 530-534. 
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acceptable to bomb an aggressive nation like Germany, than an occupied one, such as 
France on the grounds that there are likely to be more guilty people there. He argues 
that even were there to be significant strategic gains to be made by heavy 
bombardment of an occupied state, public opinion could not support such a move. The 
illustration he offers is of a town full of adults only, who had supported the Nazi party. 
He argues that even though such bombing would still be a crime, we are intuitively 
more comfortable with it than if there were innocent people among the inhabitants. 56 
We can see from this example that the collective `Germany' when closely inspected, is 
actually the collective `guilty Germans'. Thus, there is not only the collectivisation of 
punishment implied by reprisals, but also the collectivisation of moral responsibility . 
This monolithic approach to other states marked the traditional structure of state 
interaction. I see the rise of individual criminal responsibility as mirroring the decline 
in acceptability of such a collectivised approach. Indeed, these concepts are in a zero- 
sum relationship and I contend that it is impossible for both approaches to co-exist with 
any degree of coherence. However, the application of collective responsibility has a 
long and entrenched position which is grounded in the very practice and structure of 
inter-state relations. Indeed the international system cannot exist in its present form 
without this assumption, for states must be treated as monoliths, the legal order 
demands that states are treated as unified sovereign entities. Whilst the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility continues to gain ground, both principles will exist in 
an uneasy relationship with one another. For instance, whilst aerial bombardment, 
despite its doubtful moral grounding, continues to be essential to modem warfare, 
states are increasingly required to demonstrate distinction in its use, a task which the 
very nature of the weaponry makes difficult. Distinctions between combatant and non- 
combatant sections of a population must not only be made, 
but also in recent years, 
56 M. Walzer, War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974, p. 102. 
Walzer is not arguing the case for collective guilt, 
I simply found the example an instructive one. 
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publicly justified. This is despite the fact that the structural dynamics of the military 
have generated armaments, such as nuclear weapons, that are less and less 
discriminatory. The heavy aerial bombardment of Iraq during the Gulf War has been 
heavily criticised, but more interestingly, the US military responded to this criticism by 
continually defending its record on directional bombing and justifying civilian 
casualties. 57 For instance, it was claimed that `great effort is taken, sometimes at great 
personal cost to American pilots that civilian targets are not hit', yet across the total of 
110,000 US aerial sorties across Iraq only 7% of the ordinance used had directional 
control systems and up to 50,000 Iraqi civilians were killed. 58 This sort of uneasy 
compromise between military logic and moral concern is a result of the conceptual 
shift away from collectivised punishment and towards individual criminal 
responsibility. 
Reparations and sanctions. 
Of course, an alternative to de facto collective punishment through the extremities of 
military action, is the application of sanctions and demands for reparations from `guilty' 
states. The concept of reparations implies a duty to `make good' when an international 
obligation has been violated. Malekian describes how `This concept has been accepted 
since the existence of societies, as a consequence of a wrongful action'. 
59 This concept 
is a broad one and appropriate compensatory measures can take a variety of forms given 
that the Permanent Court of Justice in its judgement asserted that: 
Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
57 R. Clark, The Fire This Time: US War Crimes in the Gulf, New York: Thunders Mouth Press, 1992 . 
There was also an unofficial tribunal held to examine the role of the US in the conflict. 
Final Judgement 
of the International War Crimes Tribunal, New 
York, February 29 1992. 
58 Ibid., p. 130. 
59 F. Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of States: A Study on the Evolution of 
State 
Responsibility with Particular Emphasis on the Concept of Crime and Criminal 
Responsibility, 
Stockholm: Borgstroms Tryckei, AB, 1985, p. 11. 
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which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not 
possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which 
a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damage for loss sustained which would not be covered by 
restitution in kind or payment in place of it. 60 
This is certainly a responsibility assignation of some kind towards states but it is not 
interchangeable with the individual criminal responsibility for injurious acts that was 
applied for the first time at the Nuremberg Tribunal. In fact, a clear example of the 
tension between collective and individual responsibility assignation was seen with the 
treatment of Germany after World War I. The heavy reparations exacted from 
Germany61 represented a collective approach to applying responsibility. However, in 
tandem with this, articles 227-230 recognised the responsibility of individuals for war 
crimes and demanded they should be handed over for prosecution. 62 In 1921 the 
German Supreme court at Leipzig, in the case of the hospital ship named Llandovery 
Castle, which involved the shooting of survivors in lifeboats, ruled that criminal 
international law was applicable to individuals. The defendants were found guilty of the 
violation of that law and accordingly punished. 63 However, the Leipzig Trials could not 
be marked a success, only five defendants were convicted and these were all released by 
their jailers. No high-ranking defendants were convicted and the allies did not pursue 
the extradition or prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm who was specifically listed for 
prosecution. It is clear both that the traditional approach to state responsibility was 
dominant and that the consensus around individual responsibility, when examined 
through the actual prosecution rates, was undeveloped. 
60 Ibid., p. 12. 
61 Shirer, W. L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A Histofy of Nazi Germany, London: 
Book Club 
Associates, 1978, p. 51. 
62 J. B. Keenan and B. F. Brown, Crimes against International 
Lativ, Washington D. C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1950, p. 124. 
63 Ibid. 
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The notion of reparations is characterised by compensation rather than retribution; 
technically there are no punitive damages, and liability is therefore civil in character 
rather than criminal. However, it is clear that such collective responsibility assignations 
are wielded retributively on occasion. Yet when measures such as reparations and 
sanctions are applied retributively the result must be unjust. As we have seen in chapter 
two the attempt to apply criminal responsibility to collectives inevitably collapses into 
logical incoherency. Malekian falls foul of this incoherency in his claim that there are 
grounds to criminalise states. As legal entities it is no doubt possible to attribute legal 
responsibility, as Malekian claims, yet when attempting to envisage the form a criminal 
punishment might take he reaches an insurmountable difficulty in that states are 
incorporeal criminals. Ultimately, he must rely on the fact that `official responsible 
individuals can make up the natural body of the state, if physical punishment should be 
required. '64 It is difficult to see how this differs from individual criminal 
responsibility. 65 
Sanctions could almost be characterised as the modern equivalent of economic reprisals. 
They are provided for within the UN Charter, according to Article 41, Chapter VII: 
The Security Council may decide what measures involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed [... ] These may 
include the complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 66 
64 Ibid., P. 170. 
65 This issue is explored further in Chapter 5 
66 Department of Public Information, Charter of the United 
Nations and Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, New York: 
United Nations, Article 41, Chapter VII, p. 23. 
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These powers were intended to allow for mandatory imposition, although they have 
rarely been used coercively. 67 The use of sanctions has gained more currency post- 
world war two and has been systematically linked to the protection of a wider range of 
human rights than the gross system criminality to which this thesis confines itself. For 
instance, the Lome Convention marked a serious attempt by the European Union to 
address apartheid in South Africa. However, the conflict in former Yugoslavia saw 
sanctions used to support the negotiated peace settlement for the region, and an 
outstanding application of sanctions has been seen in relation to Iraq. Both of these 
examples and the implications of the sanctions regime are discussed in depth in Chapter 
seven. 
Conclusion 
The history of international interaction has been the history of state interaction; the 
individual has had no voice, no role and no legal personality. States have been 
monolithic entities, with a discrete legal personality and an intricate network of 
obligations and duties, norms, protocols and customs. Given the way states have 
traditionally related to one another, it is easy to see how the international system is 
structured towards maintaining and fine-tuning these relationships and they are nowhere 
more evident, or more frail, than within international humanitarian law. 
The two main strands of humanitarian law were focussed on either the restriction of 
weaponry or the designation of appropriate targets, otherwise 
known as the principle of 
discrimination. I argue that the history of the concept of discrimination is the 
history of 
the most easily discernible moves towards a shared morality of states. 
In a legal regime 
67 See Chapter 7 for detailed discussion on the use oo, anctions. 
that is marked by pragmatism and utility, the existence of these provisions, although 
largely unobserved, is indicative of the existence of a core shared morality. Yet, when 
we compare the concept of discrimination with that of the concept of military necessity, 
we can see that the traditional state system has rigorously prioritised necessity. The 
prioritisation of the necessity principle is a function of a state system in which the 
defence of sovereignty must be the absolute goal of its members. Given these priorities 
it is not surprising that the notion of justice has been so firmly subordinated to that of 
power, the structural logic of the state system has demanded it. 
The growth of international law has therefore been driven by pragmatism, utility and 
custom. The laws of war have been based more upon principles of `fair play' than 
justice. This can be seen by the civil, compensatory nature of remedies against violators 
of what could be more effectively described as international custom than international 
law in the true sense of law. There are few punitive measures against states; in fact, the 
only remedy available for serious violations of law has been war. As Holland describes, 
`war is the litigation of states'. 68 The civil law, compensatory nature of remedies for 
violations of the laws of war as they have traditionally been applied, demonstrate that 
international law has been structured around utility rather than morality. To criminalise 
an offence is to designate it an offence against a polity, thus in domestic law the victim 
cannot waive the right to prosecution for a criminal offence. Prosecution proceeds 
regardless of the wishes of the victim because such offences are deemed offences 
against the social order. The criminalisation of genocide for instance, was to imply that 
there was a moral order shared and upheld by all peoples, further to this it must imply a 
common polity against which the offences had been committed. This thesis examines 
the modern examples of what might be termed `system crime' and the legislation which 
accompanies them with regard to whether there has been an orientation towards 
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collectivising the blame or individualising it. Examining the new moves towards 
individual responsibility from this perspective is illuminating in that it demonstrates the 
difficulty in fully realising this principle in the face of the limitations imposed by the 
history and practice of international inter-action. Much of the inconsistency and 
apparent timidity of the moves to enforce individual criminal liability can be explained 
by contextualising them in the historical practices of states. The move from 
collectivised to individualised responsibility is more than some new legislation to which 
states waver in their commitment, it is a challenge to the very structural conditions 
under which states operate. An awareness of the magnitude of this challenge explains 
much of the partiality of its success. 
68 Malekian, Op Cit. n. 57, p. 170. 
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Chapter 4 
Nuremberg: A Tentative Revolution 
Even the most cursory glance at the literature on war crimes prosecutions reveals the 
centrality of the Nuremberg Tribunals. For they serve as a fixed point of reference and a 
unique standard, in their precedent, implications and the radical change of direction they 
represented. This chapter addresses two central questions in the context of responsibility 
assignation. How much of a departure from the traditional collective response to war 
crimes did the application of individual criminal responsibility represent, and what 
could explain the necessity for such a departure? 
This chapter argues that it represented a departure in several crucial respects; 
significantly it marked a shift away from the collectivisation or distribution of blame 
and towards its division through the application of individual responsibility. As we have 
seen in the last chapter, traditional punishments for infringements of the laws of war 
were directed at the state concerned and included such measures as reprisals, negative 
reciprocity and reparations. Yet from Nuremberg onwards, the individuals guiding state 
policy would be, technically at least, criminally liable for their actions. However, 
crucially, all of these developments indicated a more fundamental change in inter-state 
relations. Applying Kuhn's arguments that trends which are minor and latent in one 
generation, yet become dominant in another constitute a real paradigmatic shift' and 
further, we contend that such a shift occurred with the Nuremberg Charter. Such a 
change in orientation signalled a major departure from the guiding principles of 
international law and provided a conceptual space to consider the notion of a human 
community. The core of the revolution that occurred at Nuremberg was the 
T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1962, pp. 44-7. 
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criminalisation of the orchestration of system crime. It is this that has had the most 
profound ramifications for international society itself. The root of this insight lies in the 
fundamental difference in the structure of civil and criminal law. Civil law is designed 
to settle disputes between individuals, compensating one individual for the misdoings of 
another. Before Nuremberg this was precisely the position of international law. 
Reparations, sanctions and even reprisals are a method of `compensating' one state for 
the actions of another state. By contrast, criminal offences are not crimes solely against 
victims, instead they are crimes against the polity. Thus I may not waive the right to 
prosecution in cases of murder, murder is a crime against the order of the polity. When 
offences against racial groups were criminalised by the Nuremberg charter, something 
far more fundamental than individual prosecutions was occurring, the international 
community was declaring itself as a polity against whom the offences had been 
committed. The designation `crimes against humanity' was a fundamental declaration of 
the existence of a human polity. Hence the Nuremberg Tribunals are not only of interest 
in the narrow framework of war crimes they are also central to the evolution of 
international juridification. 
International law is fundamentally dissimilar from domestic law, in that the creation and 
definition of a crime is distinct from its justiciability. Hence a novelty of Nuremberg lay 
in the creation of a judicial body, an international military tribunal, rather than in the 
laying down of new offences. Most of the crimes addressed had already been part of 
customary law, and it is clear that it was with these crimes that the tribunal was most 
comfortable. However, the notable exception to this was the creation of the category of 
`crimes against humanity'. It is within the redefinition of this group of crimes, coupled 
with the introduction of individual responsibility, that we see the greatest shift in 
perceptions and the biggest innovation in the treatment of war crimes. However, the 
decision to create such a court, which was such a departure from traditional norms of 
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response, rested firmly within the political arena and its effects have reverberated 
throughout the political community. It is thus the political context of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal which is both instructive and illuminating. 
Thus the most visible achievements of the Nuremberg tribunal were the creation of 
`crimes against humanity' and the application of individual responsibility. The 
introduction of individual responsibility represented such an advance in war crimes 
prosecutions because it contradicted one of the guiding principle of international 
interaction, epitomised by the Acts of State doctrine, as formulated and expressed by 
Kelsen. 2 In tandem with this, the court made innovations in the treatment of command 
responsibility and narrowly collective liability. 
So why was it necessary to make such a response to the atrocities of the Second World 
War? The obvious answer is simply because of the scale of criminality, and it is 
customary to focus on the crimes of Nazi Germany in this respect. But in fact, 
technological advances in warfare had by this time changed the character of warfare to 
such an extent that all sides were guilty of what had already been designated as 
`criminal' behaviour. The tu Quoque argument could be applied to all participants, the 
only crimes which German officials had committed exclusively were those aimed at 
deliberate extermination of a racial group. We can argue that the creation of the 
category of `crimes against humanity' was an essential response to the extreme nature 
of German criminality and the response generated by a genuine international moral 
consensus. However, these were the group of crimes least supported by precedent and 
customary practice, and consequently those that the tribunal participants were least 
intuitively comfortable with. This led to a focus on `traditional' crimes which it could 
2 H. Kelsen, `Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with particular Regard to the 
Punishment of War Criminals', California Law Review, Vol. 31.1943, pp. 530-571. 
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be argued were committed by all parties to the conflict. 3 This has skewed the impression 
left by the tribunal, as simply a stage for `victor's justice'. 
Thus we could argue that the Nuremberg Tribunal occupied a unique position in 
international law as the early manifestation of morality in the international community. 
As Judge Röling, an expert in international law and a Tokyo Tribunal judge 
commented: 
Branding something an international crime has not only 
the purpose of prosecuting and punishing. It is also an 
expression of the unworthiness of certain acts. By 
criminalising the act you give expression to the intensity 
of your disapproval. 4 
Other, non judicial, parts of the international scene, though they may be judged moral 
or immoral, are discussed mainly in prudential terms. Thus for example, the debate 
surrounding the Bretton Woods institutions may have been conducted in the framework 
of obligation and morality, but the institutions themselves are framed in notions of 
utility, notions such as stability, security, benefits and effects. Thus later war crimes 
legislation is a pure expression of international morality, rather than, for instance, an 
ethical stance that also has the effect of evening commercial or strategic advantage such 
as child labour laws or the anti-landmine campaign of the 1990s. If a state behaves in a 
moral way, for instance in enforcing prohibitions on the use of child labour, there is a 
commercial advantage in encouraging similar behaviour in other states- there may be a 
moral impulse involved in such regulation but it is, logically speaking, less than pure. 
However, the category of `crimes against humanity' contrasts with these types of ethical 
legislation, as there is little prudential benefit to states in attempting to regulate another 
state's treatment of its own citizens, and often a great deal of difficulty. This expression 
` Although the sternest punishments were meted out to those to had committed crimes against humanity. 
' A. Cassese, and B. V. A. Roling, The Tokio Trial and Beyond, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, p. 94. 
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of international morality only became overt in the constitution of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal when, for the first time, the laws of war became less a matter of chivalrous 
adherence to sporting rules and more a matter of the determination and punishment of 
gross immorality. 
Nuremberg's legacy was not solely in its legal innovation, but in the revolution it 
brought about in the public mind, through consciousness of what has become known as 
the `Nuremberg Principles'. ' Newspapers of the time reflected the magnitude of this 
development. The New York Times referred to the London Charter as `a new code of 
international morals'. ' And Taylor, one of the prosecutors at the tribunal notes that: 
Beneath ... the Nuremberg precedent there is a common denominator: that there are some universal standards of 
human behaviour that transcend the duty of obedience to 
national laws. 7 
The Nuremberg Tribunal laid the foundation for our current comprehension of what 
constitutes a war crime and how and when they are prosecuted, not only in a strict legal 
sense but also, arguably, in terms of how we view the morality of these crimes. As we 
have seen, prior to Nuremberg, war crimes prosecutions were contained within the 
legalist approach. The laws of war were subject to the same notions of utility as the 
Bretton Woods institutions mentioned earlier. However, the Nuremberg Tribunals were 
couched in the terms of reference we accord to moral discourse. Nuremberg did more 
than codify the laws of war; it codified, for the first time, the moral duties of states. 
5 T. Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, New York: Bantam 
Books, 1971, p. 12. 
6 Leader, New York Times quoted in A. Tusa and J. Tusa, The Nuremberg 
Tria1, London: BBC Books, 
1995, p. 89. 
7 Taylor, Op Cit. n. 5, p. l6. 
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l 
Circumstance and Content of the Nuremberg Charter. 
On the 8 August 1945 the London Declaration was signed by the governments of the 
United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. This formally 
provided for the prosecution of major war criminals, producing the Statute for the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the guiding principles of the trial. It also 
signalled a small revolution in the international legal system and a definitive 
codification of a nascent international morality. The trial began in Nuremberg on 20 
November 1945 and judgement was rendered on 30 September and 1 October 1946, 
there were twenty-two defendants of whom all were found guilty, except three. 8 Twelve 
were sentenced to death and seven received prison sentences. 9 It provided for the 
prosecution of `major criminals whose offences have no particular geographic location 
and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies'. 10 
Prior to this agreement it seems clear that there was a definite intention on the part of 
the allies to punish war criminals. 
Selection of Accused 
Under the terms of the Nuremberg Charter, the tribunal was to try a cross-section of 
German statesmen, bankers, administrators, industrialists, military leaders, educators 
and propagandists. " In addition, representatives of particular organisations and 
collectives were to be tried. This form of collective responsibility is not conceptually 
difficult as the organisations were to be limited to `direct-action units', requiring 
8 The discrepancy in the figures is accounted for by deaths in custody. 
9 A. Roberts, and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, p. 175. 
10 War Crimes: Report of the War Crimes Inquii , 
Members- Sir Thomas Hetherington, William 
Chalmers, July 1989, HMSO Cm744. p. 47. 
R. K. Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials in International Law, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd.. 1960, p. 6. 
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intentional commitment and joined through autonomous choice. '2 This was illustrated 
by the French submission on the issue which argued that the task of prosecuting would 
be enormous, stretching into hundreds of thousands of individuals. It would be 
`impossible to prove an individual's guilt either because witnesses have been wiped out 
or dispersed... or because the German criminals acted collectively, in large numbers, 
and their personal responsibility cannot be established'. 13 Thus the criminalisation of 
collectives was essential to simplify the task of prosecuting huge numbers of people, 
requiring the prosecution only to prove membership of the organisation in question. 
What is more interesting is the selection of individuals accused as representative of 
different categories of the German war machine, as well as in `government, the military 
establishment ... and in financial, industrial and economic life of Germany. This 
selection of representative categories shows a marked tendency to collectivise guilt as it 
seems clear that these categories relate to the German nation itself. Indeed, this trend 
was well exemplified by Czechoslovakia who wished to indict the whole German 
government, not because of particular atrocities but because they were all regarded as 
`bearing ultimate responsibility'. 14 In many ways then, the Nuremberg Tribunal marked 
a staging post to individual responsibility rather than genuine individual moral 
responsibility, it was individual responsibility designed to symbolically try a whole 
nation, if not on the part of the framers and legal professionals involved, then certainly 
on the part of the Allied governments. Even the Chairman of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission described the Germans as `treacherous aggressors and they are as a 
nation chargeable with war guilt. ' 
15 Similar sentiments were expressed in the 
12 Note of the Meeting of the War Criminals Commission Inter-Allied Court, 
Committee II, Question of 
Establishing an International (inter-allied) Court, 3rd June, 1944, P. R. 
O: FO 800/922, item 14. 
13 European Advisory Commission - War Criminals, Memorandum 
by the French Delegation, 21 S` Feb 
1945, P. R. O: EAC 45/13. 
14 War Cabinet, Interdepartmental Committee on War Crimes, 20th March 
1945. P. R. O: CAB 78/31. item 
59. 
15 Lord Wright, `That the Guilty Shall Not Escape', New York 
Times, 13t'' May, 1945, P. R. O: FO 800/923. 
item 235. 
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Declarations by United Nations Governments and Leaders on war Crimes. Of this core 
group of 15 statements, 11 referred to the commission of war crimes by `Germany', and 
2 more condemned the `Genpan government'. Only Churchill and Roosevelt 
condemned `Hitlerfite Nazis' rather than the German nation. 16 This expresses a 
conceptual orientation rather than a legal one and whilst it does not diminish the 
innovative nature of the Nuremberg Tribunal, it illustrates the scale of the reorientation 
that had to be made by Western governments and their populations. 
But of course, the tribunal was nevertheless to impose criminal responsibility upon 
individuals rather than upon states. This led the tribunal in a particular direction, one 
which, as Pompe argues, was to, `Come in the middle of, and contribute to the transition 
from, the traditional system of sovereignty and personal immunity to that of a real world 
community which will be built primarily upon the responsibility of men. 17 Yet it seems 
clear that this shift in orientation was not unproblematic. This bold consensus 
represented not only the beginnings of a new direction for the international community 
but also the culmination of a long period of debate and discussion during which both 
indecision and disagreement were manifest amongst the allies. Indeed, there are 
contradictory strands of argument running through the constitution of the Nuremberg 
Court that indicates the moral consensus though nascent, was by no means complete. 
Form and Nature of Retribution 
Although the intention to seek retribution for German war crimes was announced in the 
Moscow Declaration, 1943, the form and nature of such punishment was unresolved. 
What is certain is that the choice of a judicial response to these crimes was by no means 
16 The countries were the Governments of theNine occupied countries, plus Czechoslovakia in an extra 
declaration and Molotov who laid responsibility at the door of Germany. Poland and Stalin referred to the 
German government. Roosevelt to `nazis' and Churchill to `Hitlerite Nazis'. United Nations 
War Crimes 
Commission, Declarations by United Nations Governments and Leaders on the Subject of War Crimes, 
14 `h June, 1944, P. R. O: FO 800/923, item 163. 
17 C. A. Pompe, Aggressive War, An International Crime. The Hague: Martinnus Nijhof, 1953, p. 97. 
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an obvious one. The process for dealing with most war criminals was to return them for 
trial in the territory where their offences had been committed and upon this there was 
wide agreement. However, it was the process for dealing with major criminals whose 
offences had no particular geographical localisation that were the subject of discussion 
and there were several seriously proposed alternatives. At Teheran on 29 November 
1943, Stalin raised proposals for widespread executions, apparently it seems in jest. 
Nonetheless Churchill showed a strong distaste for them. ' 8 Yet a memorandum 
circulated by the Foreign Office staff in 1942 opposed the trial of arch criminals such as 
Himmler, not on the grounds that lynch justice was naturally to be preferred, but rather 
because their "guilt was so black" that it was "beyond the scope of any judicial 
process". ' 9 The scale of Nazi criminality was so great that it was mooted as beyond the 
capacity of standard judicial procedures. 
In this sense the FCO reflected a view that system criminality stands outside normal 
legal parameters. Foremost in this line of thinking is Hannah Arendt whose work The 
Human Condition tackled the issue of confronting what she terms `the banality of 
evil'. 20 Arendt stresses the link between punishment and forgiveness, not mutually 
exclusive notions but concepts that are linked as part of the same process. Both perform 
the same function in allowing us to "complete" or "close" a particular line of action. 
Massive human rights violations involve what Kant termed `radical evil'- offences 
which are so extreme that `normal' moral assessment seems both inadequate and 
redundant. Arendt argues that: 
It is 
.... a structural element 
in the realm of human 
affairs, that men are unable to forgive what they cannot 
punish and that they are unable to punish what has 
turned out to be unforgivable..... All we know is that we 
can neither punish nor forgive such offences and that 
they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and 
the potentialities of human power, both of which they 
J8 The following extract is taken from his memoirs, but is confirmed by the accounts of others present this 
[ the execution of 50,000 German officers and technicians] I thought it right to say "The British 
Parliament and public will never tolerate mass executions. Even if in war passion they allowed them to 
begin, they would turn violently against those responsible after the first butchery had taken place. the 
Soviets must be under no delusions on this point" Stalin however, .... pursued the subject.... 
I was 
deeply angered. "I would rather", I said, "be taken out into the garden here and now and 
be shot myself 
than sully my own and my country's honour by such infamyQuoted in M. 
Marcus, The Nuremberg war 
Crimes Trial 1945-46: A Documental I Histo73,, Boston: Bedford Books, 1997. p. 23. 
19 Ibid. 
20 H. Arendt, The Hannan Condition, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1958. 
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radically destroy wherever they make their 
appearance 21 
For offences which are outside of our moral capacity there can never be adequate 
punishment, and consequently no conceptual space for forgiveness. Indeed, such 
offences lack even a vocabulary sufficient to express them. On this view, if such 
offences surpass even our linguistic ability to deal with them, it cannot be appropriate to 
attempt to punish them through a criminal system based upon our previous moral 
experience, a legal framework that is designed punish single aberrant violations of the 
law. As Carlos Santiago Nino points out one of the underlying principles of any legal 
framework is that: 
blame and retributive punishment must be proportional 
to the magnitude of the evil committed. But how can this 
be done? Our vocabulary for moral blame soon runs out 
when we want to condemn the genocide of six million 
persons .... 
how can the punishment of these deeds be 
distinguished from those of an ordinary murder? '22 
In April 1944, the question of what was to be done with such criminals was still being 
posed by state representatives and the options of non-arrest and summary execution still 
entered discussion. 23 There is evidence that the allies seriously considered summary 
executions. Marrus describes how `Churchill ... suggests that 
he adamantly opposed 
executions. On other occasions, however, we know that he took precisely the opposite 
view'. 24 Indeed, the British government manifested considerable reluctance to entertain 
the idea of trials. As late as 2 0th April 1945 the British reiterated objections to them. 
This attitude did not soften until the suicide of Hitler, Goebbels and, two weeks later, 
Himmler, at the end of April 1945. This, combined with the capture and summary 
execution of Mussolini meant that by the third week in May, foreign office ministers 
21 Ibid., p. 241. 
22 C. Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, London: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 141. 
23 Report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Committee III, Scope of Retributive 
Action of 
the United Nations According to their Official Declarations, 27th April, 1944, P. 
R. O: FO 800/922, item 
10. 
24 M. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46: A DocumentailT Histor -, Boston: Bedford 
Books, 1997. p. 23. 
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had agreed in principle to the idea of some judicial process. 25 The arguments in favour 
of individual responsibility proved persuasive enough for supporters of individual 
criminal responsibility to justify its adoption on the grounds that it would be a more 
effective deterrence against future abuses. 26 
Yet even the decision to try major war criminals was clouded by the notion of collective 
responsibility. For instance, the Russian delegation at the negotiations for the London 
Charter27 raised the idea that prosecutions of individuals alone would not be adequate 
and that any trial should consider the entire German polity, saying: `We should pass 
judgement on the whole policy of Germany and not on individual acts taken apart from 
the whole. '28 
Legal issues 
Having settled on a judicial approach to the question of retribution and upon those who 
would be tried, it remained to lay down the charges and jurisdiction of the court. Whilst 
the dynamic of change in the development of the laws of war may be the impact of 
technology and gross atrocities, the development of such laws had not so far been 
imposed or enforced. Instead their development was dependent on the consent of the 
parties to it. The regulation of hostilities has, in spite of its relatively recent arrival in 
codified international legislation, always been the subject of custom and convention 
between states. Thus the codifying of certain principles in law is based upon centuries 
of military practice. It is important to recognise that it is this customary practice that is 
25 R. E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, New York: Carroll and Graf, 1983, p. 15. 
26 S. R. Ratner, and J. S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Lawn: 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. p. 15. 
27 These negotiations were pursued at the International Conference in London 
from June 26 to Aug 8 
1945, and lead to the London Agreement which produced the Statute 
for the Nuremberg Tribunal for the 
trial of the German Major War Criminals. 
28 Report of Jackson, R. H., US Representative to the International Conference on 
Military Trials, London: 
1945. Ferencz, B. B., Defining International Aggression Vol. 1, New York, p. 377. 
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the source of international law, unlike other forms of statutory law whose source is the 
legislature from which it emerges. Thus the framers of the charter were required to base 
the charges on crimes which were criminal by customary law. Law which flows from a 
national government can be changed, but is legally binding upon individuals until such 
a time as that occurs. The customs and practice of military conflict are binding on all 
states by virtue of the fact that they are widely or commonly observed. No state needs to 
ratify or adopt relevant treaties for them to become legally binding. There is a simple 
reason for this; there is no international legislature to give the laws of war statutory 
form. 
The laws of war ... 
have grown in somewhat the same 
manner that the common law of England grew in pre- 
parliamentary times ... when very 
little of the basic civil 
and criminal law of England was to be found in 
Parliamentary statutes, but rather in the decisions of the 
English common law courts - judge-made law based on 
custom and precedent. 29 
This explains the common practice of trying such cases within a military tribunal (as at 
Nuremberg) or court martial, and also the constitution of a criminal tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia. As the judge must "create" law based on his interpretation of customary 
practice, and the depositions of states, a jury-system is both inappropriate and 
unworkable. In addition, if practice codified in international law ceases to be customary 
practice, it is no longer an effective part of international law. 
Thus, the focus of the laws of war has always been upon customary practice. Yet this 
was to prove simultaneously both empowering and constraining. It provided a 
firm legal 
basis for the charges, but it also conditioned the potential for creation of new charges. 
A 
clear example of the difficulties inherent 
in extending international law are seen within 
the creation of the category of crimes against 
humanity. This was a new category of 
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crime dealing with murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population. 30 The difficulty in creating 
such a category was that it had no real relationship to the customs and practices of law 
upon which the other charges crimes against peace and war crimes, which were founded 
on customary law, were based. It was necessary to create such a link in order to supply 
legal force to the charges, Bassiouni argues that `the drafters of the Charter found it 
necessary to establish a link between war and `crimes against humanity' in order to 
meet the minimum requirements of the principles of legality'. 31 They did this by 
extending the content of war crimes legislation to cover crimes against humanity, also 
the category of protected persons is similar, the difference lies in whether the violators 
are of the same or another nationality. 32 
An interesting problem is the introduction of a new category of offence. This is of 
particular interest within the context of this thesis. The discussions which surround the 
validity of this course of action are illuminating in terms of the universality of moral 
judgements. Yet the unprecedented nature of crimes against humanity created legal 
difficulties, opening the nullen crimen, nidla poena sine lege line of defence, commonly 
known as retroactivity. The remedy was to link the conceptually distinct `crimes against 
humanity' with the nexus of warfare by attaching them to the waging of aggressive war. 
The difficulty with allowing novel charges is the problem of retroactivity. The issue of 
retroactivity is set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 
under Article 15, forbidding the prosecution of anyone for an offence that was not 
29 Taylor, 1971, Op Cit. n. 5, p. 29. 
30 Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, (1946) Art. 6, para c. Reproduced in 
Roberts, A., and Guelff, R., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd Edition, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. It goes on to say ' [... ] before and during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated. ' 
31 M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity- in International Law', London: Martinus Nijhoff , 
1993. p. 
153. 
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criminal at the time it was committed. 33 However, the definition is narrower that it 
would first appear. Arendt points out that there are both formal and substantive aspects 
to the notion of retroactivity. 34 Prosecution under any new law would be formally 
retroactive, the substantive question is whether the accused could have reasonably 
supposed the character of the acts to be criminal in nature. A description of `crimes 
against humanity' which disputes a substantive retroactivity, must imply that such 
offences are universally recognised as criminal even if the law had not officially 
confirmed them as such. By linking this crime to the offences delineated in the 
traditional laws of war, it was ensured that the criminal content of the new category of 
offence was clearly legislated for elsewhere. There was a clear basis within the laws of 
war to demonstrate that such offences were indeed so recognised, for instance the 
Preamble of the Hague Convention 1907. However, the charge of `crimes against 
humanity' suffered from the weakness of formal retroactivity at least and has been 
widely criticised on that account. 35 Whilst this has led to criticisms of an inherent and 
fundamental legal discrepancy in the Nuremberg Charter, the Nuremberg Tribunal has 
nevertheless succeeded in laying out a unique body of precedent which has since been 
successfully extended away from the nexus of inter-state war. 
32 Ibid., p. 7. 
3; 1 966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), Art 15, para 1. reproduced in 
Ghandhi, P. R. Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents, 1s` Edition, London: Blackstone 
Press, 1995. `No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international 
law, at the time when itwas 
committed. ' 
34 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, 
New York: Penguin Books, 1994, 
p. 254. 
35 T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials :A Personal 
Memoir, London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing Ltd., 1993, p. 29. 
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The Context of the Charter 
The Scale of Criminality 
Why did the allies, supported by the international community, design and conceive the 
Nuremberg Charter, overtly grounded in the historic traditions of the laws of war, yet 
tacitly revolutionary in its direction and implications? Patently, the scale of Nazi 
criminality demanded response and it would be disingenuous to lay emphasis in any 
other direction. There is no doubt that the atrocities of the Nazi government had a 
profound effect upon the perceptions and sensitivities of the European people. Indeed, 
Lord Wright, chairman of the UN War Crimes Commission claimed that `The revolting 
details of what was done in the camps of Germany have appalled the whole world. '36 
The Polish and Provisional Czechoslovak governments described the events as 
`unparalleled in all human history', 37 and Molotov, on behalf of the USSR embassy 
described the activities of the German authorities as violating ` the most elementary 
rules of human morality'. 38 This response is echoed by newspaper reports of the day. It 
is clear that such atrocities demanded an extreme response. 
Tu Quoque 
There is no doubt that the Nazi government had committed atrocities during the course 
of the war. However, it was equally certain by the standards of traditional laws of war, 
36 Lord Wright, `That the Guilty Shall Not Escape', Netiv York Times, 13th May, 1945, P. R. O: FO 800/923, 
item 235. 
37 Declaration Issued by the Polish Government and the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, Nov. 12, 
1940. 
38 The Molotov Notes on German Atrocities, 27th Nov 1941. Issued on behalf of the USSR Embassy 
by 
HMSO, 1942, p. 20. 
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the Allies had also been guilty of war crimes. As Arendt points out `by the end of the 
Second World War everybody knew that technical developments in the instruments of 
violence had made the adoption of `criminal' warfare inevitable. '3'Two of the most 
outstanding examples of this shift in perception of what constituted `acceptable' warfare 
were the responses to submarine warfare and aerial bombardment. Submarine warfare 
was unacceptable because it violated the London Charter of 1930 and aerial 
bombardment for its inability to discriminate between civilian and combatant 
populations. The contention here is that the creation of the category of `crimes against 
humanity' was necessary to distinguish the egregiously criminal from the commonly 
criminal in a war which saw unprecedented bloodshed and technological horror. This 
thesis argues that technological advances served to collectivise war rather than to 
encourage discrimination and it was only by applying a radical individualism to 
criminality that this trend could be addressed. The category of `crimes against 
humanity' expressed the criminality of policies which were not part of ordinary warfare 
but were committed to ideological beliefs entirely tangential to warfare, however bitter 
and extreme it might be. It was only in this respect, and in the category of the waging of 
aggressive war, that the Allies could not be accused of reciprocal crimes. 
The clearest examples of the dilemmas faced by prosecuting governments were 
submarine warfare and aerial bombardment. The problems of justiciability for 
reciprocal offences was most clearly seen at the Nuremberg tribunal in the case of 
Admirals Erich Raeder and Karl Doenitz, successively Commanders-in-Chief of the 
German Navy. Amongst other things, they were charged with war crimes in violation of 
the London Naval Treaty of 1930. During the First World War the sinking of passenger 
and merchant vessels, most particularly the Lusitania which had cost nearly 1500 
civilian lives, had led to strong pressure for the containment of the effects of submarine 
ý9 Arendt, Op Cit., p. 256.1 17 
warfare, particularly from neutral nations. The result was the London Naval Treaty and 
its additional protocols which forbade warships from sinking merchant vessels without 
first having "placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety' . 
40 In 
addition it required that distinctions be drawn between combatant and non-combatant 
vessels. By the Second World War it had become apparent that submarine warfare could 
no longer be effectively conducted in accordance with these rescue requirements. 
Advances in the technology of anti-submarine warfare were such that it was virtually 
fatal for a submarine to surface anywhere near its target, let alone attempt rescue of its 
survivors. 41 Nevertheless, at Nuremberg Admirals Raeder and Doenitz were charged 
with war crimes, in that U-boat operations had breached the international law of 
submarine warfare. However, as Geoffrey Best describes the situation: 
The law itself - customary international law plus its 
conventional accretions at The Hague and London 
between 1907 and 1936 - was not reasonable in relation 
to the natures either of the weapons or of the war it was 
supposed to regulate, and, given that the submarine 
weapon was allowed at all, it raised expectations of 
restraint beyond what was militarily bearable 42 
That it was not reasonable to demand compliance with the rescue requirements of the 
London Naval Treaty was evident from the fact that no belligerent party to the conflict 
had observed them. This was demonstrated by the testimony of Admiral Nimitz who 
had been Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet from 1941 to 1945. He 
confirmed that the US had practised unrestricted warfare from 7 December 1941; US 
vessels had not rescued enemy survivors in cases where their own submarines or 
40 The most important of these is the 1936 London Proces-Verbal 
Relating to the Rules of Submarine 
Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London, 22°d April 1930. Available 
in Roberts, A., and 
Guelff, R., Documents on the Laws of War, 3`d Edition, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
4' Taylor, 1971, Op Cit. n. 5, p. 37. 
42 G. Best. Huinanitý in IVa fare, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 1980, p. 261. 
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missions were at risk. 43 The defence argued that the integration of the merchant fleet 
into Britain's military efforts made discrimination impossible and further that all major 
belligerents had practised unrestricted submarine and air warfare against merchant 
ships. 44 The Nuremberg tribunal therefore ruled that while it was clear that both Raeder 
and Doenitz had violated the London rescue requirements they should not be subject to 
criminal penalties on that account. This was illustrative of the difficulties facing the 
Allies, under the pressure of military necessity they had violated as many of the 
traditional laws of war as the Axis powers. As a result linking the prosecutions to the 
launching of aggressive war was as necessary as it was unfortunate. 
Collectivism In Modern Warfare 
The trend I have identified as approaching collectivisation in warfare was crucially 
linked to the development of new weaponry and the ability to target new population 
groups. It was not until the First World War that a substantive body of precedent and 
practice emerged in response to the escalation of wartime destruction. This was as a 
result of the production of massively destructive weapons. Indeed Latham describes 
how by 1914 `industrialised total warfare' based on mass production and destruction 
had emerged. 45 However, it was with the Second World War that war began to tend 
towards collectivism. In contrast to previous eras new technological developments 
allowed states to mobilise social resources for military ends. The inevitable result of this 
development, according to Sartre, is that `It becomes increasingly difficult to make any 
distinction between the front and behind the lines, between civilian population and the 
43 Tusa and Tusa, Op Cit., p. 360. 
as Roberts and Guelff, Op Cit. n. 9, p. 170. 
as A. Latham, `Re-imagining Warfare' in Contemporary 
Security and Strategy, London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1997, p. 213. 
119 
soldiers. The consequence of this is that everyone is mobilised. "' Martin Shaw argues 
that 
Industrialised war became "total war" in a double sense, both because mechanised weaponry and transportation 
enabled "total" killing and destruction, and because 
expanded state control (or surveillance) of societies 
enabled "total" economic and ideological mobilisation. 47 
Windsor argues that this change "was not merely a change of scale - it was a change in 
the social nature of war". 48 From now on whole societies, instead of just armies, would 
go to war. This is interesting in terms of our argument for it posits an alteration in the 
relationship between state and civil society. Indeed, Windsor argues that `war became 
total because the state had become the whole of civil society. '49 This implies that civil 
society became, for the first time, totally identified with the prosecution of war and 
consequently of some war crimes, notably the waging of aggressive war. 
This strain of argument is certainly indicated in the records. In 1938 an investigation 
was begun into the legality of a relatively new form of warfare, aerial bombardment. 
Although the killing of non-combatants was an old and well-established rule, it had not 
been fully incorporated into international treaties in relation to aerial bombardment. 
Walzer claims there could have been little doubt as to the relation of aerial 
bombardment to previous treaties, 50 but we do find questions raised in this vein. One 
view expressed by Landon specifically addressed the problem of assigning collective 
guilt. He outlines four reasons why aerial bombardment may be legitimate in modem 
warfare. Firstly, that whole nations are called to arms, everyone of a suitable age 
is 
46 J. Sartre, On Genocide, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, p. 59. 
47 Shaw quoted in A. Latham, `Re-imagining Warfare' 
in Contemporary Security and Strategy, London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997, p. 216. 
48 P. Windsor in C. Navari, (ed), The Condition of States, Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, 1991, p. 
134. 
49 Ibid. 
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conscripted and other population groups are asked or compelled to assist the military. 
Secondly, it must be legitimate to bomb outside the theatre of war if the targets are 
objects of value for military communications and preparations. Thirdly, wars are `no 
longer dynastic but national'. Governments are representative, nations are responsible 
for their governments and therefore wars have become wars between all the individuals 
of the warring nations. And finally given these points, economic pressure on citizens of 
that nation is justified. 51 However, it is also clear that Britain did reject the notion of 
unrestricted warfare on the grounds that with regard to international law it was `not 
safe'. 52 Indeed, the Hague Draft Rules of 1923 specifically prohibited `Aerial 
bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population, of destroying or 
damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants' 53 
Yet the original notion of collective guilt survives in the British decision to begin 
bombing German cities. The requirements of military necessity, were expressed 
succinctly by Group Captain Slessor in a letter to Sir William Malkin: `Ultimately the 
only consideration which will limit the use of any method of warfare is that of 
expediency'. 54 But the campaign of bombing was justified in collective terms. From the 
beginning the attacks were defended as reprisals for the German blitz and Churchill 
apparently believed that the reprisals were necessary for British morale. 55 It is clear that 
saturation bombing, particularly at the close of the war when there was little realistic 
chance of a German victory, constituted war crimes in the sense of the Hague 
Conventions. Yet it had become clear that the old definitions between combatant and 
non-combatant, upon which the Hague Conventions were based, had become obsolete. 
50 M. Walzer, War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. p. 94. 
51 `The Legality of Aerial Bombardment', Aerial Warfare, 1938-39, P. R. O: FO 800/937, FR: 77XXII 
52 Report of the Ministry of Defence, 
0 March 1938, P. R. O: FO 800/937. 
53 Article 22,1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare. 
54 Letter from Air Ministry to Sir William Malkin [head of the Committee for the Humanisation of Aerial 
bombardment], The Question ofRelative Vulnerability-, 12th' July 1938, P. R. O: FO 800937. 
ss Walzer, op Cit. n. 50, p. 96. 
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The only crimes which the allies could not also be accused of committing were those 
outside of all military necessity. 56 Hence, the codification of crimes against humanity 
was essential to give expression to the nature of Nazi criminality. 
However, there are commentators, notably Lawrence Freedman and Andrew Latham, 
who argue that the totalising warfare of the Second World War has now given way to a 
new era of military engagement. Instead a new `knowledge-intensive' warfare has 
emerged marking a decline of the mass army in favour of smaller, and increasingly 
professional, armed forces. As the technical limits of destructiveness are reached more 
attention is focused upon precision, with the development of weapons with the potential 
ability to minimise collateral damage and without the need to apply massive quantities 
of firepower. 57 Such evolution in the means of conflict leads to an evolution in the aims 
of warring parties and in turn this produces a different relationship to war between 
civilians and the state. Freedman notes that the conceptualisation of war as the business 
of professional elites leads to the notion of civilians as innocents and as inappropriate 
targets for military action. 58 As a result increased emphasis is placed upon the 
eradication of `inhumane' or indiscriminate weapons. 
However, although this new emphasis on precision warfare seems to imply a lack of 
engagement for civilians with conflict, this is not necessarily the case. It may be that the 
problems confronted at Nuremberg will reappear in a modem guise. Traditional tactics 
were geared towards the conduct of set-piece battles along a continuous front-line, 
however this has given way to combat operations conducted simultaneously against 
several key strategic targets. Latham describes this as a change in the governing logic 
56 Arendt, Op Cit., p. 254. 
57 A. Latham, `Re-imagining Warfare' inContemporar Security and Strategy, London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1997, p. 22 1. 
58 L. Freedman, Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 16. 
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from attrition to `the creation of `chaos' and `paralysis' through highly precise, 
simultaneous attacks through the length, depth and breadth of the battlespace'. 59 Yet the 
effects of this paralysis must necessarily be collective ones, aimed at a total national 
population. 
The potential encroachment of war beyond the `front line' is clearly evident in the Gulf 
War, and this conflict was complicated by the fact that one party fought a limited war, 
whilst the other fought a total war, a situation similar to that of the Vietnam War, and a 
pattern likely to continue into the future. We can see the extension of the effects of 
conflict to the civilian population. Ramsey Clark describes how, in the coalition against 
Iraq: 
Bombs were dropped on civilians and civilian facilities 
all over Iraq. ... 
Of all the assaults, those on the water 
and food supply were the most deadly and revealing. . 
The public [were] debilitated from malnutrition, 
contaminated water, and disease. And sanctions caused a 
60 severe shortage of medical supplies. 
Thus although military engagement could now be regarded as limited rather than total, 
the effects of war, particularly upon the defeated or weaker party are still totalising. 
Thus Freedman is ultimately pessimistic about the potential to contain the effects of 
war. He concludes that: 
Whatever the intentions of belligerents, it can be 
difficult to prevent a conflict spilling over into civil 
society, attacks on power supplies, communications 
nodes and the transport system can all be justified by the 
need to disable enemy armed forces. Most seriously, 
when a country is in desperate straits ... attacking the 
59 Latham. Op Cit n. 57., p. 228. 
60 R. Clark, The Fire this Time, New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 
1992. p. 208. 
123 
enemy's society can appear to be the only remaining 61 
This paradoxical redescription of civilians as unacceptable military targets, combined 
with an expansion of battlespace and a new ability to target civilian infrastructure has 
altered the relationship between civil societies during conflict. In terms of accountability 
this presents a potential distortion of moral responsibility, particularly in an attacking 
society where there is an active civil society and responsive government. As Windsor 
points out: 
A civil society must either feel encumbered with the 
guilt of the state which wages all-out war, or else reject 
its own criteria and glorify the war for the sake of the 
state. 
62 
In the future whilst targeting may become more discriminate, suffering may become 
less so. 
The Birth of Individual Responsibility 
Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The most outstanding feature of the Nuremberg Tribunals was the development of 
individual criminal responsibility. The IMT declared that 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions 
of international law be enforced. 6j 
G1 Freedman, Op Cit., p48. 
6- Windsor, Op Cit., p. 138. 
63 IMT, Vol. XXII, pp. 565-566. Lenkiewicz Archive. 
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But this development is more exciting in its implications than in its substantive 
outcomes. If we were to measure the importance of this principle by the success of its 
results, we may well conclude it to be of only nominal value. Its importance lies in the 
challenge it presents to traditional conceptions of international interaction. The history 
of international interaction is almost exclusively the history of state interactions. The 
Nuremberg Tribunal broke with this history both by introducing the individual as a legal 
personality to the international scene and by challenging the notion of state immunity 
from interference in domestic affairs. 
State Criminality 
The specific challenge that Nuremberg offered to the dominant workings of the 
international system was in its contradiction of the Acts of States Doctrine. This 
position was originally definitively expounded by Hans Kelsen 64 Kelsen's position is 
a clear one. If states are in delict of international law then it is possible to prosecute such 
states and apply sanctions against them. Individuals are not the subjects of international 
law, although they may be responsible for war crimes in the narrow sense of the term, 
such small scale or specific offences can be prosecuted under national domestic laws. 
However, acts such as the waging of war, can by definition be committed only by the 
state. Although these acts are performed by individuals, they are only performed in their 
capacity as organ-of-the-state. Thus legally, their acts must be imputed to the state. This 
is possible because "Imputation to the state is a juristic construction, not a description of 
64 For a defence of state criminal responsibility see primarily H. Kelsen, `Collective and Individual 
Responsibility for Acts of State in International Law', Jewish Yearbook of International Law, 1948; H. 
Kelsen, `Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with particular Regard to the 
Punishment of War Criminals', California Law Review, Vol. 31,1943, pp. 530-571. For later work see F. 
Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of States: A Study on the Evolution of State 
Responsibility with Particular Emphasis on the Concept of Crime and Criminal Responsibility. 
Stockholm: Borgstroms Tryckeri AB, 1985. For an overview of these positions see, Weiler, H. H., 
International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility. 1989 
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natural reality. "65 It is not only possible but indeed necessary for the business of 
international relations to occur, otherwise how could treaties be concluded or 
negotiations be conducted? The natural and essential assumption within international 
interaction is that the acts of any individual representing a state are in actuality the acts 
only of that state. However, Kelsen ultimately concludes that because the sanctions of 
international law fall upon the entire populations of states, via reprisals and war, then 
these sanctions are inevitably directed against those who have had no part in the 
offences. Thus he concludes that system criminality is not punishable collectively under 
international law. However, Nuremberg did not overturn state responsibility, instead it 
augmented it with a new notion of individual responsibility. Currently there may be 
simultaneous prosecutions directed both against the organs-of-state and the state itself. 
This is an issue which is explored in more depth in the next chapter. 
The crucial innovation of Nuremberg was the criminalisation of these offences. Whilst 
states had traditionally been made responsible for their actions within the world 
community, this responsibility had been primarily a civil responsibility, whereas gross 
humanitarian violations, with Nuremberg, became criminal offences. In chapter two we 
saw that there are enormous conceptual difficulties in assigning responsibility to 
collectives. Although some theorists66 have attempted to assign such moral blame, this 
has been of limited success, and is impossible to defend in the application of penal 
sanctions. As a result state criminal responsibility has proved to be extremely 
controversial even though it received support (for a certain number of violations of core 
norms of international law) within the ILC's 1980 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, which finds state criminal responsibility in cases of a breach of "an 
65 H. Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with particular Regard to the 
Punishment of War Criminals, California Lai v Revietitw, Vol. 31,1943, pp. 530-571. p. 533. 
66 For instance P. A French, Individual and Collective Responsibility, 2nd Ed. Rochester Vermont: 
Schenkman Books Inc., 1972. 
126 
international obligation so essential ... that its breach is recognised as a crime by that 
community as a whole"67 Ratner and Abrams list colonial domination, slavery, genocide 
and apartheid as examples of such a breach. 68 Given that the notion of state criminal 
responsibility survives through the current legislation, it is not surprising that post- 
World War 11 it was more intuitive to collectivise blame. 
The Legacy of Nuremberg 
How radical Nuremberg was in its imposition of individual criminal responsibility is 
clearly appreciated when set in the context of the traditional manner in which states 
enforced violations of the laws of war. It easy to assume, given the complete lack of 
prosecutions from this time until the constitution of the ad hoc tribunals for former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that this was a stillborn revolution. Although in 1948 the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission stated that the IMT Charter, 
Presupposes the existence of a system of international 
law under which individuals are responsible to the 
community of nations for violations of rules of 
international criminal law, and according to which 
attacks on the fundamental liberties and constitutional 
rights of peoples and individual[s] constitute 
international crimes not only in times of war, but also, in 
certain circumstances, in time of peace. 69 
there is little evidence that this was actually the case. Yet it would be a mistake to 
assume that the Nuremberg Tribunal had little effect, in fact it contributed significantly 
to the development of substantive law, not only for violations of the laws of war but 
67 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Documents of the 32'd Session, Vol II: Part 1,1980, 
and Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, 
Vol II: 
Part2,1980, A/CN. 4/SER. A/1980. P. 95 
68 Ratner and Abrams, Op Cit. n. 26, p. 15. 
69 United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and 
the Development of the Laws of War, London: Her Majesties 
Stationery Office. 1948 
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also general humanitarian law outlining the responsibilities of state's treatment of its 
own citizens in times of peace. 
The three heads enumerated in the Nuremberg Charter 
have led to the development of a body of substantive 
law - the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Protocols elaborating the Hague rules on the laws and 
customs of war as regards the international humanitarian 
law relating to protected persons; the Genocide 
Convention 1948; and the UN and European Torture 
conventions and other multilateral agreements as regards 
crimes against humanity. 70 
We will examine these developments and the success of their absorption into 
international practice in the next chapter. What seems clear is that the rigid adherence to 
the nexus of inter-state warfare seen at the Nuremberg Tribunal has given way to a 
blurring of the distinction between crimes committed in conflict scenarios and 
domestically perpetrated system criminality. There have also been suggestions of the 
extension of the principle of individual criminal responsibility to radically different 
areas of law, for instance there have been calls for an ecocide convention inspired by the 
damage caused by the policy of defoliation in Vietnam. " These demands have 
intensified following the environmental damage inflicted by Iraq during the Gulf 
conflict. 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
Although there is a wealth of literature and research material available on the subject of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, there is by contrast very little on its sister tribunal the IMTFE. 
70 H. Fox, `An International Tribunal For war Crimes; Will the UN Succeed 
Where Nuremberg Failed', 
The World Today, Vol 49: No. 10,1993, pp. 194-197. p. 194. 
71 R. A. Falk, in V. Held, S. Morgenbesser, and T. Nagel, 
Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs: 
Essaus edited for the Society for Philosophi' and 
Public Affairs, New York: Oxford University Press 
1974, pp 123- 137, p. 134. 
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This is despite the fact that the Tokyo tribunal generated an important development in 
the course of individual criminal responsibility assignation, that of command 
responsibility. This form of responsibility assignation is most unambiguously affirmed 
in the Yamashita case. 
Context and Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal 
The IMTFE, hereafter referred to as the Tokyo Tribunal, was established at Tokyo by 
special proclamation of Gen. MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) on 19 January 1946.72 As the Far Eastern counterpart to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, it was designed to try Japanese war criminals with offences centred around 
crimes against peace. The basic policy for the trial and punishment of Japanese war 
criminals was the `Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender', of 26 July 
1945, usually known as the Potsdam Conference, and accepted by Japanese 
representatives by the `Instrument of Surrender' of 2 September 1945.73 Of the twenty- 
eight defendants, fourteen had held the rank of general in the Imperial Japanese army 
and three were admirals in the Japanese navy. Of the civilian defendants, five were 
career diplomats, five were bureaucrats and politicians and one, Okawa Shumei, was a 
propagandist. 74 The most conspicuous of the military defendants was Tojo Hideki who 
had been Prime Minister at the time of Pearl Harbour and during most of the war. 
75 
For the most part the Charter of the Tokyo tribunal was modelled on that of its 
predecessor, the Nuremberg Tribunal. However, there were a 
few significant 
differences. Aside from the detail of the composition of the court, no organisations were 
72 S. Yoon-Cho, `The Tokyo War Crimes Trial', Quarterly Journal of Library of 
Congress, Vol. 24: No. 4, 
1967, pp. 309-318. 
73 Woetzel, Op Cit. n. 11, p. 227. 
74 R. H. Minnear, Victor's Justice, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971, p. 4. 
75 Ibid., p. 4. 
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pronounced criminal as at the Nuremberg Tribunal, as the patriotic societies that were 
common in Japan were found to have a different character from the Gestapo or SS. 76 In 
addition, the Tokyo tribunal only had jurisdiction over individuals tried with offences 
which included crimes against peace. 77 A further difference was that: 
The definition of crimes against humanity embodied in 
Art. 5c of the Charter was slightly different from that 
laid down in Art. 6c of the Nuremberg Charter: while 
the latter text stated that such crimes were `murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, or other 
inhuman acts committed against any civilian 
population', the words `against any civilian population' 
were deleted from the Tokyo Charter, ... this was to 
make punishment possible for large scale killing of 
military personnel in an unlawful war. 78 
This brought the conduct of the conflict and therefore the personnel who prosecuted the 
war into a central position within the tribunal. This, when coupled with the fact that a 
significant proportion of the military personnel accused had also had political posts, 
contributed to the most significant developments in individual criminal responsibility, 
that of `command responsibility'. It was this doctrine that was to inform the basis of the 
charges laid against Milosevi at the ICTY. It is particularly well developed at Tokyo 
because of the character of the offences. Unlike the evidence at the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, there were no positively criminal orders. 
79 Instead the crimes relied on the 
concept of `negative responsibility' or legal culpability for having failed to prevent the 
76 These societies included the `Black Dragon Society' and the 
`Greater Japan Society'. R. K. Woetzel, 
Nuremberg Trials in International Law, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1960, p. 
229. 
77 Ibid., p. 228. 
78 Cassese. A., and Roling, B. V. A., The Tokyo Trial and 
Beyond, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, p. 3 
79 B. Röling in A. Cassese, (ed), Current Problems of International 
Law: Essays on United Nations Law 
and on the Law of Armed 
Conflict, Milan: Dott. A. Guiffre, 1975. 
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commission of war crimes. 80 A case which exemplified this principle was that of 
Tomoyuki Yamashita, Commander of the Japanese forces in the Phillipines 1944-45. 8 
Yamashita 
The trial of Tomoyuki Yamashita was one of the 2,116 military trials that were 
prosecuted by national governments under the statute of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals which addressed only the major war criminals. 82 The reliance on the concept 
of negative responsibility coupled with command responsibility lead to the conviction 
of Yamashita, charged with: 
Having failed to discharge his duty to control the 
operations of the persons subject to his command who 
had violated the laws of war by committing massacres, 
murder, pillage and rape against civilians and prisoners 
of war. 83 
This was such a clear endorsement of the principle that it is not uncommon to find 
references to the `Yamashita principle'. 84 This is because the Yamashita case was the 
first authoritative statement of the doctrine of command responsibility. 85 It is especially 
significant for this thesis because the doctrine of command responsibility applies only at 
the apex of the responsibility structure, it cannot apply to low ranking soldiers. The 
Yamashita case is instructive in that its application is so strict. Reviewing the trial 
transcript reveals that whilst the bulk of the evidence presented goes towards 
cataloguing the atrocities and revealing their extent and brutality, there is little evidence 
80 Cassese and Roling, 1993, Op Cit. n. 4, p. 5. 
81 United States of America v Tomoyuki Yamashita, (1885-1946) Military Commission Convened by the 
Commanding General, US Army Forces, Manila, 1945. available at the SOAS archive, London. 
82 Woetzel, Op Cit. n. 11, p. 230. 
83 Meron, T., War Crimes Law Comes ofAge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. p. 84. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., p. 86. 
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as to the links between Yamashita and the soldiers who committed the atrocities in 
person. 86 Indeed, Yamashita never denied that the offences had taken place but argued 
that he had no means of communicating with his troops and that command functions 
had been destroyed. However, in an appeal ruling, the US Supreme court upheld his 
conviction and the capital sentence that was imposed on the grounds that the general 
principle must be that commanders were responsible for their subordinates. 87 This strict 
view of criminal liability makes one of the grounds for the prosecution of Slobodan 
Milosevi 
. 
There is no `paper chain' in the case of the high-ranking accused in the 
ICTY but efforts have been made to justify intent through the use of witnesses. This 
constitutes more convincing evidence than the reliance only on command responsibility 
as it shows `positive criminality' rather than negative responsibility. 
Conclusion 
The Nuremberg Tribunal represented a significant departure from the long-established 
state focussed orientation to inter-state relations. Seen in the context of the customary 
orientation to states, the introduction of the individual as a target of international law 
was unprecedented and radical. The scale and extremity of nazi criminality demanded a 
comparable response and although a judicial solution was by no means a forgone 
conclusion, after much deliberation an international tribunal was duly constituted. 
The detail of the tribunal revealed a cautious approach to individual responsibility. It 
linked prosecutions firmly to the nexus of inter-state war, to such an extent that this 
86 United States of America v Tomoyuki Yamashita, (1885-1946) Military Commission Convened 
by the 
Commanding General, US Army Forces, Manila, 1945. available at the SOAS archive, London. 
87 Meron, Op Cit. n. 83, p. 84. 
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l 
caused inconsistency in parts of the trial. The tribunal judges were intuitively most 
comfortable with the charges relating to violations of the laws of war, for these were 
the crimes most firmly based in customary international law. Yet those based on the 
then new charge of crime against humanity were the only crimes which exclusively 
addressed Nazi criminality. The nature of modern warfare had produced violations of 
the laws of war on both sides. Consequently, focus upon traditional violation of the laws 
of war, whilst legally more secure, served to skew the impression of the trial. The fact 
that none of the reciprocal behaviour of the allies during the conflict was addressed has 
served to create the impression that the tribunal was simply a stage for victor's justice. 
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Chapter 5 
Later Developments in Legislation and Implementation 
As we have seen, by far the greatest influence upon the course of international 
humanitarian law, particularly with regard to the principle of individual responsibility, 
had been the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Its effect on the public and 
professional consciousness of war crimes was immense, but it also effected change in 
three main areas of international legislation. Firstly, although Nuremberg technically 
addressed only atrocities committed in war, it proved a springboard for the development 
of international human rights law ' as it addressed the state's treatment of its own 
nationals. 2 Secondly, it directed responsibility away from the state and towards the 
individual, laying the groundwork for individual criminal responsibility which would 
culminate in the International Criminal Court. Finally, it influenced the development of 
international humanitarian law by, amongst other things, paving the way for the Red 
Cross to initiate new codification of the law of armed conflict through the Geneva 
Conventions 1949, and later the 1977 Protocols. 3 It is the latter two developments which 
I shall address here. 
S. R. Ratner, and J. S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond 
the Nurernberg Legacy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 6. 
2 It did this through the inclusion of `crimes against humanity'which technically had no link to the nexus 
of armed conflict (although however, in practice states have proved reluctant to tackle such abuses 
through the international legislature) Some commentators might disagree with this point, for instance 
G. I. A. D. Draper, `The Ethical and Juridical Status of Constraints in War', Military Law Review, Vol 55, 
1972, pp. 169-186. He here argues that developments in humanitarian law have sprung from the human 
rights movement: However, I think the alternate position is defensible given that Nuremberg was 
firmly 
linked to the nexus of inter-state war and it was Nuremberg which established the legal precedent of 
intervention in the states treatment of its own nationals - surely the heart of human rights. 
Ratner and Abrams, Op Cit. n. 1.. p. 6. 
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The Nuremberg tribunal also marks a definite moral watershed in the development of 
humanitarian legislation. Whilst implementation may since have been uneven, within 
the enacted legislation we can see a new consideration for morality tied to the notion of 
individual responsibility. It is this issue which we will examine in relation to several 
major pieces of legislation. 
The Geneva Conventions 
Arguably, the most influential of these landmark agreements were the four Geneva 
Conventions (1949) made under the auspices of the Red Cross. These concern the 
amelioration of the condition of sick and wounded members of the armed forces both in 
the field and at sea, the treatment of Prisoners of War and the protection of civilians in 
persons in time of war. 4 Essentially then, these conventions are concerned with the 
protection of `war victims', and are located within the larger framework of the laws of 
war. Yet interestingly, the conventions carefully avoid the term `war crimes' and contain 
no reference to the `Nuremberg principles'which have since come into currency. 5 At the 
time the novelty of the International Military Tribunals for Nuremberg and Tokyo was 
such that it was thought advisable to avoid incorporation of the legal aspects of these 
trials which were still in dispute. It was not until the following year that the Nuremberg 
Principles were authoritatively codified by the International Legal Commission (ILC), 
which had been working on an international code of crimes since its establishment. 6 
4 See Article 50 1949 Geneva Convention 1. `Grave Breaches' are also listed inArticles 51,130 and 147 
of the four Conventions as well as in Article 11, paragraph 4 and Article 85 of Protocol 1. All include the 
same elements as above. Thus the notion of a `grave breach' is both finite and exhaustive. A. Roberts and 
R. Guelff (eds), Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 169. 
5J. F. Kunz, in G. Lipsky, (eds), Latin and Politics in the World Community, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1952. p. 285. 
6 ILC, `Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950, No. 82. ' Adopted by the ILC. 1950. Available 
internet, http: //deoxy. org/wc/wc-nurem. htin, accessed 23.10.00. 
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Yet, it is still posssible to trace a response to the atrocities of World War II and their 
remedy in the Nuremberg tribunal, in the language, the tone and the central concerns of 
the original conventions. It is evident that there is a strong moral sense running through 
these conventions inspired by the atrocities of World War It. That this was the intention 
is evident in the words of the rapporteur: 
Future generations will certainly be astounded that, in 
the midst of the twentieth century, it was considered 
necessary to embody such elementary moral rules in our 
conventions. The vivid recollection of recent 
indescribable atrocities is, however, sufficient evidence 
that this was necessary. 7 
Although the inclusive nature of the conventions precluded overt inclusion of the 
Nuremberg Principles, there is evidently a moral consensus within this legislation. For 
instance, the protection of the aged and infirm, expectant mothers within the civilian 
population and the many provisions on child welfare, can have no logical reason for 
inclusion other than a shared moral conception that this was a proper area of concern. 8 
This trend was to be amplified with the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, drafted by a Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 1977. The First Additional 
Protocol states that: 
In cases not covered by this protocol or by other 
international agreement, civilians and combatants 
remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of public conscience. 
9 
J. F. Kunz, in Lipsky, Op Cit. n. 5, p. 295. 
Convention IV, Articles 16 and 24 
9 Reproduced in War Crimes: Report of the War 
rimes Inquiivv, Members- Sir Thomas Hetherington and 
William Chalmers, HMSO: Cm 744, Presented to 
Parliament July 1989, p. 52. 
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This statement traces its lineage back to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of war on Land, particularly to the so-called `Martens Clause' 
found in the preamble: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Reguklations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents 
remain under the protection and the rule of the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the 
usages established among civilised peoples, from the 
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience. 10 
However, the inclusion of the Martens Clause in the 1977 Protocols marked a `moral 
enlargement' in the scope of the legislation. For originally the Martens clause was not 
an attempt to make the laws of war universally applicable, but to refuse a 
circumscription in the laws of war which would apply between belligerents. In other 
words the scope of the crimes punishable would be universal within the parameters 
established above (those of inter-state war), not the scope of their application. In 
addition Article 3 makes it clear that such crimes are the responsibility of the state and 
are to be punished by compensation payments, as we shall see later, this precludes the 
possibility of individual criminal responsibility for breaches even as it strengthens the 
criminal character of the acts it describes. With the enlargement of the Protocols to 
cover `armed conflict' rather than inter-state war, ' I and the inclusion of international 
law established by custom (a tacit reference perhaps to the principles of responsibility 
Nuremberg had established), the scope of the clause is increased. So, although these 
conventions are noted to be complementary to the Regulations annexed to the 1899 and 
10 Roberts and Guelff, Op Cit. n. 4, p. 44. 
11 Although it is debatable whether there is an intention to provide for individual criminal responsibility 
in 
these circumstances, this has become a contentuious point with regard 
to the ICTR. 
137 
1907 Hague Conventions, they represent a considerable enlargement of those earlier 
conventions. Although only nascent at this stage, these conventions could be interpreted 
as a move towards the universalism that many theorists are now identifying within the 
latest moves towards an International Criminal Court. 
Central to these agreements is the notion of `grave breaches' of the conventions which 
are defined similarly in all four conventions. 
Grave breaches 
... [are] those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property 
protected by the convention: wilful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, and extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. ' 2 
As we have seen this notion of `grave breaches' has replaced the limiting use of the term 
war crimes, limiting because it was interlocked with the notion of inter-state aggression, 
within the discourse of international and domestic law, although the concept largely 
refers to those categories of offences which had hitherto been covered by the term war 
crimes. 13 This is significant in the context of our discussion because it moves the 
treatment of war crimes away from the traditional nexus of inter-state conflict and 
towards a more universalist approach to aggression and conflict. This makes the 
`criminalisation' rather than the `politicisation' of war crimes more likely. Also, the 
replacement of `war crimes' with `grave breaches', allowed later additional protocols to 
expand the convention's application to cover armed conflict as well as inter-state 
12 Reproduced in War Crimes: Report of the War Crimes Inquil-y, Members- Sir Thomas Hetherington 
and William Chalmers, HMSO: Cm 744, Presented to 
Parliament July 1989, p. 5 1. 
'j This is stated in the Additional Protocol of 1977 Article 85, paragraph 
5. Grave breaches of the 
convention `shall be regarded as war crimes'. 
This is of interest as several states refused to accept that 
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aggression. In addition, by definition `grave breaches' can be committed only by the 
individual. This is evident when we consider Article 49 which requires contracting 
states to instigate effective penal sanctions against persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, a grave breach. 14 Erich Kussbach, the chairmen of the International Fact- 
finding Commission, describes grave breaches as: 
illegal acts not only perpetrated by but also attributable 
to individuals. Thus, they constitute criminal acts 
invoking the responsibility of individuals under 
domestic or- occasionally- international jurisdiction. 
The contracting states are obliged to take the necessary 
legislative steps to ensure the prosecution of the 
offenders under national criminal law. 15 
Yet, although the framers of the Geneva Conventions placed great emphasis on the 
matter of penal enforcement, ultimately it cannot be relied on to be effective. The 
potential for individual prosecutions still rests ultimately upon the artifical distinction 
between state and individual represented in the legislation via the distinction between 
`grave breaches' and `serious violations' of the conventions. ' 6 `Serious violations' occur 
where the obligations of the conventions are not met, and the state which is party to the 
conflict is culpable as it has capacity as the subject of the international law governing 
the operation of the convention. Thus, a serious violation occurs when a state refuses, 
for instance, to instigate penal enforcement against an individual. At first sight this may 
be unproblemmatic, but tensions emerge when we consider that `grave breaches' often 
grave breaches were war crimes because of the Military Tribunals established after World War II. For 
further discussion see F. Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, Geneva: ICRC, 1987. 
14 1949 Geneva Convention 1, Article 49 requires that `The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact 
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to 
be 
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present convention defined in the 
followingarticle ... 
' 
15 E. Kussbach, `The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Comm] ssion', Inter°national and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 43, Part 1, Jan. 1994. p. 177. 
16 This distinction is by no means clear cut or rigorously specified but becomes apparant in Article 90, 
paragraph 2 of the first additional protocol to the conventions. 
For a more detailed discussion of this 
distinction see E. Kussbach (1994) and G. I. A. D. Draper (1972) 
139 
require resources beyond those available to the individual criminal. This is evident when 
the individual criminal is also an organ of the state, in which case the grave breaches are 
attributable to both the individual and simultaneously to the state to which the 
individual belongs. In this case a serious violation has also been committed by the state. 
Obviously, the practical ramifications of effecting individual prosecutions in this 
situation are enormous, for instance, as Draper points out `if the belligerent is the author 
of orders that led to the `grave breaches' there will manifestly be no domestic penal 
process. ' 17 In addition, although there is an entrenchment of the principle of individual 
responsibility the scope of the Conventions and Protocols ties their application once 
again with the state. Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts, Protocol II 
applies to wars of national liberation. 18 Although they now apply to armed conflict as 
well as inter-state war, this only occurs where the state is a party to the conflict. In 
addition, they do not apply in cases where the violence is of too low a level, `situations 
of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts'. 19 Inevitably 
then penal sanctions against the individual are still linked to the nexus of state violence 
on a large scale. 
Thus the tensions which lie beneath the surface of individual-state interaction in the 
commission of war crimes or grave breaches remain. It is my contention that this 
problem exists throughout all potential prosecutions but is only evident when it is 
17 G. I. A. D. Draper, `Implementation of International Law in Armed Conflicts'Jnternational Affairs, Vol 
48, No. 1, Jan. 1972, p. 53. 
18 See Protocol I, Article 1, paragraphs 3 for the same situations of international armed conflicts as those 
covered in the Conventions, and paragraph 4 for `armed conflicts in which people are 
fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes 
in the exercise of their right of self- 
determination ... 
' For a detailed examination of the Conventions and additional Protocols see . 
F. 
Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, Geneva: I. C. R. C., 1987. 
19 See Protocol II Article 1, paragraph 2. 
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apparent that large-scale or `whole-state' violations have occurred. I argue that the road 
toward universal criminalisation of systematised atrocities is still largely untravelled, 
and where individual responsibility is introduced but state sovereignty remains prior, 
such prosecutions will inevitable dissolve into a series of minor prosecutions against the 
low-ranking agents of such crimes, primarily those which can be prosecuted by the state 
concerned within a national context. These are the `narrow' war crimes which Kelsen 
describes. 20 It is for this reason that prosecutions are inevitably still politicised, as for 
even this to occur there must be an appropriate intra-state political situation to permit 
this. 
As we would expect then, in tenns of implementation these conventions have had 
uneven levels of success. Although they have entered into the common discourse of 
inter-state negotiation and discussion, substantial elements of the implementation 
procedure have in practice been ignored or side-stepped by the international community. 
Roberts gives the example of the system outlined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 
using the institution of Protecting Powers to supervise and implement the convention's 
provisions which has not been widely used. 
21 Certainly states have observed unevenly 
their duty to ensure those suspected of grave breaches are tried. Also although Article 90 
of the 1977 Geneva Protocol provides for the establishment of an International Fact- 
finding Commission to enquire into grave breaches, and although this body was set up 
in July 1991, not one of the numerous problems between then and now has been referred 
to it. 22 In part this is due to complications with adopting the protocol into domestic law, 
problems which have led to a widespread lack of ratification. 
However, Britain at least, 
20 See Note 18. 
21 A. Roberts, `Implementation of the Laws of War in Late 20th-century 
Conflicts'. SE'curit Dialogire, 
SAGE Publications, Vol. 29: No. 2,1998, p. 
141. 
22 Ibid. 
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finally ratified the protocols on 29th January 1998, thus formally accepting the 
competence of the Fact-finding Commission. It is hoped that this will lead to others of 
the 149 signatories ratifying the protocols. Yet, even if this were the case, it would seem 
that the current mechanisms for the ad hoc establishment of bodies to deal with alleged 
violations is currently preferred by the UN Security Council and the states which so 
painstakingly negotiated the protocols. 23 
Genocide 
If the Geneva conventions and their protocols expanded the ambit of international law 
post-Nuremberg to cover actions which had previously to be described as a crime 
against humanity, so did the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (1948). 24 Here we saw the first move towards protecting the citizens of a 
population against its own government even at times when there is no armed conflict. 
As Helen Fein describes `The UNGC [Genocide Convention] moved beyond pre-war 
international law, making genocide a crime in peace as well as in war, against one's own 
citizens and foreign citizens. The UNGC implied that genocide need no longer be 
unpunished and unrecognised. ' 25 In addition there is an arguable intention to allow 
universal jurisdiction, a principle which has since become firmly entrenched. Meron 
notes that `.. the crime of genocide ... may also 
be a cause for prosecution by any state. '26 
It is certainly widely accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal 
23 `Britain in the USA', Foreign Office Press Release, 29.01.98, available, internet, http: //britain- 
info. org/bis/hdev/290198. stm, accessed 18.10.99 
24 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) available in P. R. 
Ghandi, Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents, London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1995, pp. 
18-21 
25 H. Fein, Genocide; A Sociological Perspective , 
London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1993, p. 3. Fein is here 
evidently referring to Article 1 `The contracting parties confirm 
that genocide, whether committed in time 
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to punish'. 
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jurisdiction 27 But it is the cutting of the tie between state conflict and enforcement that 
marked the most significant shift in the treatment of such crimes. This was an important 
departure from the Geneva Conventions and Protocols; the novelty of punishing gross 
humanitarian violations in times of peace as well as war cannot be overstated in its 
implications for a limited state sovereignty. It is interesting to note that the emphasis of 
the debate has now shifted from arguments that the state should respect human rights 
during peacetime which, at least in terms of political rhetoric, seems an unassailable 
position, to arguments that the state should be limited in its ability to override human 
rights in its prosecution of war. 28 
There are several points to make about this treaty. Firstly, despite the progress it 
represents and although it is moral in character, its record of enforcement is dire. In 
addition, in the cases in which it has been employed it has been less a rigorous legal 
ascription, and more a tool of political rhetoric and condemnation. However, it has 
offered a stability to the definition of genocide that has been absent in other types of 
systematic criminality such as crimes against humanity, and whilst that definition may 
have been on occasion unfortunately limiting, nonetheless it offers an objective 
benchmark for the treatment of minority groups within states. Yet this great legislative 
step towards universalism, although it stops short of absolute moral universalism (as its 
focus is upon multiple acts of aggression against a strictly delimited collective group 
rather than any act of aggression against individual citizens committed by the state), has 
been rendered virtually useless as a piece of substantive legislation. 
26 T. Meron, War Crimes Law Comes ofAge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 160. 
27 See M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, The Hague: Martinnus 
Nijhoff, 1992, pp. 510-527; Also, T. Meron, War Crimes Labt' Cones ofAge, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 
pp. 248-256; Y. Dunstein, and M. Tabory, 
(eds), War Crimes in International Law, The Hague: 
Martinnus Nijhoff, 1996. p. 16. 
'8 Draper. Op Cit. n. 17, p. 174. 
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The reluctance by states and the U. N. to label massacres and other atrocities as genocide 
according to its strict legal definition 29 has seemed to render this convention impotent 
on many occasions. Fein notes that `between 1960 and 1979 there were probably at least 
a dozen genocides and genocidal massacres ..... although in a few cases these events 
stirred public opinion ... these acts were virtually unnoted in the western press and not 
remarked upon in world forums ` 30 Leo Kuper also comments on the record of the UN 
saying: 
the performance of the United Nations in response to 
genocide is as negative as its performance on charges of 
mass murder. There are the same evasions of 
responsibility and protection of offending governments 
and the same overriding concern for state interests and 
preoccupation with ideological and regional alliances. 31 
This lack of enforcement has meant that the body of precedent and thus the expansion of 
the detail and ambit of the convention has been severely limited. In addition, the original 
convention has proved limited in its application to the point of paradox in some cases. 
The great evolution that this legislation represented was the complete cutting of the link 
between armed conflict and genocide. This represented a crucial step forward from 
Nuremberg where, as we have seen, all crimes were required to be linked to the nexus of 
29 Art II (Genocide Convention) `genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such: a) killing members of 
the group, b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, c)deliberatly inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, 
d)imposing measures intending to prevent births within the group, e) forcibly transferring children of the 
group to anotjher group. See P. R. Ghandi, Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents, London: 
Blackstone Press Ltd., 1995, p. 19. 
30 Fein, Op Cit. n. 25, p. 6. Fein cites amongst others the Kurds in Iraq, southerners in the Sudan, Chinese 
and `communists' in Indonesia, Hindus and other Bengalis in East Pakistan, the 
Ache in Paraguay, many 
peoples in Uganda and East Timor. 
31 L. Kuper, The Prevention of Genocide, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, p 160. This point is 
echoed in S. Totten, W. Parsons, and I. 
W. Charney, (eds) in Century of Genocide; Eveit'itness . -1ccounts 
and Critical Views, New York: Garland 
Publishing Inc., 1997, p22. Indeed the stated purpose of this 
volume is to counteract such complacency 
by introducingeye-witness accounts. 
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inter-state war. In this respect, the Genocide Convention pioneered an expansion of 
international concern outside the framework of the laws of war, and towards more 
explicitly humanitarian ideals. 
There are several key points to be made concerning this legislation. Firstly, it provides 
for a strict individual criminal responsibility for genocide. Also, for individuals to be 
found guilty there must be commission of one of the acts listed in Article II, 32 but there 
must in addition be the intent to commit such an act, and the direction of any of these 
acts towards any specifically mentioned category of groups. The protected groups are 
confined to ' national, ethnical, racial or religious groups'. 33 The Genocide Convention 
was officially initiated within the United Nations General assembly with the unanimous 
passage of Resolution 96(I). 34 However, Abramas points out that, ` As the product of a 
negotiating process, the Genocide Convention represents a political compromise that 
departs in several important respects from the treatment of genocide in the works of 
Lemkin, the Nuremberg Principles, and Resolution 96(I). '35 The main difference here 
was the inclusion by Lemkin and Resolution 96(I) of political and other groups, such as 
economic or particular social groups (such as professional groups). The decision to omit 
political groups has caused great controversy and as we shall see through examining the 
Cambodian situation, has led to paradoxical application of the definition of genocide. 
Arguments against the inclusion of political groups, rested on the notion that 
membership of political organisations is contingent and avoidable, whereas ethnic or 
32 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) available in Ghandi, 
P. R., Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents, London: Blackstone Press Ltd., 1995, pp. 18- 
21 
33 Article II, Genocide Convention, (1948) 
34 In Ratner and Abrams, Op Cit. n. 1, GA Res. 9696(I), United Nations Doc. A/64/Add. l pp. 188-89, 
(1946) 
35 Ratner and Abrams, Op Cit. n. 1, p. 26 
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national memberships are not. In addition, political groups do not have stable 
characteristics for identification. In reality, inclusion of political groups would have 
constituted such an infringement of state sovereignty that states would have been 
unwilling to ratify the convention, 36 and a primary goal of the convention was that it 
was as inclusive as posssible. The `intent requirement' has proved another controversial 
aspect of the convention. The intent to destroy a racial group in whole or in part 
distinguishes genocide most from other crimes and `unless this intent element is present, 
no act, regardless of how atrocious it might be, can constitute genocide. '37 In tandem 
with the exclusion of political groups from the convention it is possible for governments 
to claim that a targeted group was a political enemy and only coincidentally an ethnic 
group. An interesting issue is also the numerical aspect of genocide. Although a group 
need only be destroyed `in part', scholars have disagreed over how large that part needs 
to be. However, the consensus and understanding seems to be that it must constitute 
large numbers, or at least have a substantial impact upon that group, for example 
targeting the leadership of a protected group. To me this seems of greater importance in 
determining whether genocide has been committed than the intent requirement. 
Although responsibility and intent is therefore exclusively aimed at individuals, we can 
see that there is still an inextricable link with the state. No individual could commit 
genocide without mobilising considerable resources, resources which are usually only 
available to an organ of the state. 
A good example of this, and an illustration of some of the deficiencies of the convention 
itself is provided by examining the international reaction to the atrocities committed by 
36 The decision to omit political groups was primarily at the insistence of the Soviet Bloc and has caused 
great controversy, in part this was why the 
US refused to ratify the Convention for decades. 
37 Ratner and Abrams, Op Cit. n. 1. p. 33. 
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the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia under Pol Pot. 38 Kiernan describes how `for 
nearly four years freedom of press, of movement, of worship, of organisation, and of 
association .. all completely disappeared. ' Of 8m. inhabitants of Cambodia 1.5m. were 
worked, starved and beaten to death. 39 Yet legal action has yet to be taken to bring the 
perpetrators to justice. The killings in this case were directed at the whole society rather 
than a particular ethnic minority. The failure to make any provision for either auto- 
genocide or the extermination of either political or social groups, (for instance the 
french educated elite were targeted), has inevitably had ramifications for the convention 
as an effective response to systematic extermination. Thus Kiernan describes how: `The 
charge of genocide remains hostage to political fortune. 40 This is an unfortunately 
instructive example of how the genocide convention has tended to be used. It serves as a 
focus for public and professional opinion, it spawns mock trials41 and allows legal 
judgements as to the seriousness of offending behaviour, However, its use as a 
substantive legal instrument has been undermined by the reluctance of states to accept 
the implications that such a judgement might bring in an international court. 
By the same token the Genocide Convention can, and has been, used simply as a tool for 
political rhetoric or as a merely verbal expression of condemnation. An example of this 
sort of misuse occurred following the military occupation of Lebanon by Israeli armed 
38 For a full historical account of Political Pot's rise to power and policies of the Khmer Rouge see B. 
Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge 1975-79, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996. 
39B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge 1975-79, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996, p. 9 
40 Kiernan in Totten, S., Parsons, W., and Charney, I. W., (eds), Century of Genocide; Eyewitness 
Accounts and Critical Views, New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1997, p. 356. 
41 See note 24 above. Also see the Russell Tribunal convened on Nov 13,1966 in an attempt to assess 
whether the US had comitted genocide in Vietnam, see 
Sartre, J. P, On Genocide, Boston : Beacon Press, 
1968. Also the International Commission set up by private individuals to establish the legality of Israel's 
actions in the Lebanon, see the McBride 
Report, `Israel in Lebanon. Report of the International 
Commission to Inquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel During the Invasion of the 
Lebanon', London: Ithaca Press, 1983. 
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forces. During this time the Lebanese President, Bechir Gemayel (leader of the 
Phalangists) was assasinated, his death was attributed by the Phalangists to the 
Palestinians. The Israeli army entered West Beirut to ensure order and prevent reprisals. 
However, they allowed the Phalangists to enter two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra 
and Shatila, to track `Palestinian terrorists'. 42 Under the umbrella of the Israeli military, 
who surrounded the camps, the Phalangists entered and on Sept 16,1982, massacred 
hundreds of civilians. 43 Parsons describes how `the results of this atrocity were carried 
into the living rooms of the world, attracting unprecedented sympathy in the US for the 
Palestinians and creating revulsion in Israeli public opinion. '44 Cassese highlights 
several relevant certainties within this situation, 
1. The massacre was perpetrated by the Phalangists 2. 
The Phalangists entered the Palestinian camps only 
with the consent and under the eye of the Isreali army. 
3. The latter discovered at once that the Phalangists 
were killing the inhabitants of the camps 
indiscriminately and did nothing to stop the slaughter. 45 
The high profile of Middle Eastern affairs and the immediacy of television coverage 
ensured at least that this atrocity was brought to the attention of the public and the 
international community. However, the response revealed more of the deficiencies of 
international law than its benefits and no individuals were found criminally responsible 
for the massacre. In its investigation, the Israeli Commission of Enquiry ( also known as 
the Kahan Commission. ) chose neither to apply Israeli law nor international law but 
instead to refer to moral and religious imperatives. In doing so it followed a line of neo- 
natural law, concluding that Israeli armed forces were only indirectly responsible for the 
4' A. Cassese, Violence and Law in the Modern Age, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986, p. 77. 
'' A. James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990, p. 356. 
44A. Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995, London: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1995, p. 30. 
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massacre, but simultaneously omitting a ruling on the apprehension and treatment of 
the individuals (Phalangists) who were directly responsible. 46 In 1982 the UN General 
Assembly approved a resolution which actually condemned the massacre as genocide 
referring to the Genocide Convention. This unequivocal resolution: 
affirmed that genocide is a crime under international 
law which the civilised world condemns, and for the 
commission of which principals and accomplices - 
whether private individuals, public officials or 
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on 
religious, racial, political or any other grounds- are 
punishable. 47 
In addition, it goes on to state: 
Appalled at the large-scale massacre of Palestinian 
civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps 
situated at Beirut, Recognising the universal outrage 
and condemnation of that massacre, [.... ] Resolves that 
the massacre was an act of genocide. 48 
Yet, this was not the positive development it seemed. Although the resolution mentions 
punishment of perpetrators, it makes no provision for criminal proceedings, nor does it 
call for Israel or any other state to find and punish the individuals responsible. Instead 
the massacre is simply defined as genocide without reference to the proper 
consequences of such a definition. As we have seen, the thrust of my argument is that 
conceptually it is in the assignation of blame and punishment that the difficulties with 
individual criminal responsibility, at the current stage of development of international 
45 Cassese, Op Cit. n. 42, p. 78. 
46 See International Legal Materials Vol 22: 1983, p. 473ff. For commentary on this report see A. Cassese, 
Violence and Law in the Modern Age, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986. 
General assembly Resolution, `The Situation in the Middle East', A/RES/37/123, Dec 
16,1982. 
available online, gopher: //gopher. un. org/00/ga/res/37/123%/09%/2b, accessed 
13.06.00, this extract is 
from section D. 
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law, become apparent. At the very least it is indicative of the manner in which the 
genocide convention has been invoked but also, as we shall see, it is relevant when 
considering the evolution of the notion of `command responsibility' which we will 
examine later. However, when we consider that the ICTY makes direct reference to the 
Genocide Convention in its statute, incorporating the definition of genocide and its 
punishable acts verbatim from the original, 49 we can see that undoubtedly the Genocide 
Convention has provided a valuable source of international law, for the very length of its 
survival indicates an acceptance of its principles into international customary law. 
Yet although these were important steps towards an individual approach to 
prosecutions, the principle of individual criminal responsibility had virtually lain 
dormant between the flurry of activity post-WWII and the 1990's. As we have seen, the 
international Fact-finding Commission has not had one case referred to it and numerous 
instances of gross humanitarian abuse had gone unpunished. The genocide convention 
had produced no criminal prosecutions, apart from the Israeli invocation of its 
provisions in the trial of Eichmann. Most of the responses to violations of humanitarian 
law were political rather than judicial in their character. SO Whilst, as we have seen, 
although legal instruments can provide a focus for public and government opinion, a 
benchmark for state behaviour and a source of legal language to empower criticism of 
abusing regimes, without the political will to establish penal sanctions for individuals 
they are substantively empty. Indeed, the international community has on occasion 
abandoned the notion of individual criminal sanctions against offenders, and instead 
``s General assembly Resolution, `The Situation in the Middle East', A/RES/37/123, Dec 16,1982. 
available online, gopher: //gopher. un. org/00/ga/res/37/123%/09%/2b, accessed 13.06.00, this extract 
is 
from section D. 
49 Article 4 is transposed from Articles II and III in the Genocide Convention 
50 A. Roberts, `The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts', Duke Journal 
of Compcn-ative and International Lan', 
Vol. 6: No. 11. pp. 11-78. 
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imputed responsibility towards the state regardless of the direction of international legal 
instruments. 
Expansion of Offences 
Another welcome development fostered by the tribunals has been the expansion of the 
definition of crimes against humanity to include systematic rape as a specific category of 
offence. Although Article 46 of the Hague Regulations could be broadly construed to 
prohibit rape, 51 in practice it has seldom been interpreted in such a manner. However, 
there was something of a precedent in the Tokyo Tribunal where rape was listed as a 
war crime, the most notorious example being the rape of Nanking. 52 Under the weight of 
the events in Former Yugoslavia the use of rape both as an attack on individuals and as 
a systematic policy used to fracture and disperse Muslim communities, was protested by 
many concerned observers. The special rapporteur of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, characterised the pattern of rape in former 
Yugoslavia as a method of `ethnic cleansing' `intended to humiliate, shame, degrade 
and terrify the entire ethnic group'. 53 The ICRC and various states have accelerated the 
treatment of rape as a war crime by adopting a broad construction of existing law. The 
ICRC declared that the grave breach of `wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health 54 covers rape. This implies that rape could also, in particular 
5' Article 46 refers to `Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as 
religious convictions and practice must be respected. ' Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct 18,1907 [Hague Convention No. IV] 
52 It was estimated by the IMT for the Far East that approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred in 
Nanking in the first month of occupation. See W. P. Nagan, `Strengthening Humanitarian Law: 
Sovereignty, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, ' Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law, Vol 6: 11, pp. 127-165, p. 
163. 
'' Mazoweicki, T., `Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia', UN 
Doc. A/48/92-S/25341, (1993) 
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV. 
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conditions, be treated as other grave breaches such as torture or inhuman treatment. 
Moreover, the massive and systematic practice of rape, and its use as a `national' 
instrument of `ethnic-cleansing' qualify it to prosecuted as a crime against humanity. s' 
However, it should not be forgotten that rape has always been a violation of the laws of 
war, it was codified as a capital crime in Lieber's Code of Instructions as early as 1866, 
and as such could be prosecuted in a domestic court or military court martial and has 
always carried a natural imputation of individual responsibility. However, in such a 
context it is a war crime in the narrow sense of the term, the development of the ICTY 
and ICTR was that it became redefined as an illegal instrument of war, an unacceptable 
military strategy. As such, it came under the ambit of crimes against humanity, and 
individuals could be criminally responsible for using it as an instrument of military 
strategy. This is a major contribution to the scope and nature of crimes against 
humanity. This development was confirmed by the first convictions for sexual offences 
at the ICTY, on 22 February 2001.56 The final and yet probably most outstanding 
contribution that the tribunals represented was in preparing the ground for the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Of course, the need for such a court was first recognised over 50 years ago when the 
Genocide Convention was adopted by the General Assembly. In the same resolution the 
ILC was invited to `study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international 
judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide. '57 Previously to this the 
ILC had been asked to formulate a `Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
55 Meron, Op Cit. n. 26, p. 207. 
56 On Feb 22 2001 Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic were sentenced to 28 years, 
20 years and 12 years respectively for crimes which 
included rape as a crime against humanity. 
57 General Assembly Resolution 260,9 Dec , 
GA/RES/260 (1948) 
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Security of Mankind', these were to indicate the principles of international law that had 
sprung from the Nuremberg Tribunal. Although work began on this issue, and in 1950 
`Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal' was adopted by the ILC 5.8 The General 
Assembly postponed consideration of the full draft code submitted in 1954. This was 
because the draft code as formulated by the commission raised problems closely related 
to those of a definition of aggression, and given that it had entrusted a Special 
Committee with the task of preparing a report on a definition of aggression, it was 
decided in resolution 897 (IX) Dec 4,1954, to defer the Draft Code until after the 
committee had submitted its report . 
59 Although, this issue surfaced periodically, it was 
not until 1991 that the General Assembly invited the commission to analyse the question 
of international criminal jurisdiction, including proposals for the establishment of an 
international criminal court. This culminated in the adoption at the 46th session in 1994 
of a draft statute of an international criminal court which the commission submitted 
with the recommendation that an international conference was convened to conclude a 
convention on the matter. 60 This was to be of course, the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Rome, 15 June- 17 July 1998. 
The convening of an international court marks a significant departure from the criminal 
tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR in terms of ceding sovereignty, the issues I have raised 
concerning the relationship between individual and state, particularly when that 
58 International Law Commission, Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950, available online at the 
website of the International war Crimes Commission: 
http: //deoxy. org/wc/wc-nurem-htm. Accessed 
23.10.00. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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individual is an organ of state, remain largely unchanged 61 Instead, what needs to be 
examined is how the statute and practical operation of the court impact upon that 
relationship, and as a result, how that relationship is altered and the likelihood of 
prosecution is impacted. Accordingly, I propose to treat these issues as they are raised in 
both the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC in depth in a separate chapter. 
State Responsibility and International Crime 
Whilst considering the import of the new willingness to ascribe individual criminal 
responsibility for system crime it is valuable to examine the treatment of state 
criminality. This represents a tension between collective and individual assignations of 
responsibility. The Geneva and Genocide Conventions manifest a dualism in 
responsibility assignation, in that there are offences for which responsibility can be 
assigned simultaneously to state and to individual. This demonstrates a potential not 
only for tension but also for discretion in the direction in which responsibility is 
assigned. The principal organisation which adjudicates state responsibility is of course 
the ICJ. The use of this judicial institution is particularly indicative of a collectivised 
response to system crime. This trend is manifested particularly in the ICJ decisions and 
advisory opinions on humanitarian issues which are of particular interest within the 
context of this thesis as they highlight both the intersection between state and 
individual, and the contradictory position of an individual who is an `agent of the state'. 
Comparing the treatment of system crime within the ICJ and the ICTY/ICTR highlights 
the importance of prosecutions in the designation of responsibility. Through this we can 
" Many authors have highlighted this important facet of the ICC, see for instance H. Corell, `Nuremberg 
and the Development of the International Criminal Court', Mill tan-i, Law Review, Vol. 149, pp. 87-100, 
1995. Y. Dinstein, and M. Tabory, (eds), IT ar Crones in International Law, The Hague: Martinnus 
Nijhoff, 1996. and I. Josipovic, `The International Criminal Tribunal and the Croatian legal System. ' 
Croatian International Relations Reivieu. ', Vol. II: No. 4/5,1996. 
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see that the label `criminal' has very different outcomes, and therefore very different 
implications, in its collective application. 
An `international crime' can have two connotations. It can be the type of offence which 
is always committed by an individual but are designated by treaty or by customary 
international law as criminal, for instance, terrorism. 62 The second approach to 
international crime targets responsibility collectively towards states; breaches of 
international obligations are criminal when: 
An internationally wrongful act which results from the 
breach by a state of an obligation so essential for the 
protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that its breach is recognised as a crime by 
that community as a whole, constitutes an international 
crime. 63 
There are two major treaty instruments which may direct responsibility at either the 
individual, the state, or towards both simultaneously. These are the Genocide 
Convention and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims 
supplemented by Additional Protocol I of 1977 on the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts. 64 Here, the criminal acts of individuals are 
simultaneously `internationally wrongful acts' and `crimes'. 
An interesting case in this respect were the proceedings instituted by Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in the ICJ against Yugoslavia (specifically Serbia and Montenegro) for 
62 S. Rosenne, `War Crimes and State Responsibility', Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
Law, Vol. 6: No. 1,1995, pp. 65- 81. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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violating the Genocide Convention. 65 In a decision which highlights the co-existence of 
collective and individual approaches to system crime, the ICJ ruled that a state's 
responsibility could be engaged under the Genocide Convention not only where the state 
had failed to fulfil its obligations of prevention and punishment, but also where the state 
itself had perpetrated the crime of genocide. 66 Thus the case in the ICJ ran parallel to the 
prosecutions by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On 
8 April 1993, the ICJ issued an order calling on Yugoslavia to `take all measures within 
its powers to prevent commission of the crime of genocide' and to ensure that any 
armed units, organisations and persons that may be subject to its control, direction and 
influence do not commit any acts of genocide. 67 What is instructive here is that whilst 
the ICTY applied individual criminal responsibility, the proceedings instituted by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were civil in character. 68 Although the designation is `criminal' 
towards Yugoslavia, when implementation of this ruling is seen it appears qualitatively 
different from that of the ICTY. There is no retributive or penal consequences for the 
criminal state. Such collective responsibility assignations are, therefore, inevitably less 
indicative of an international polity than the penal sanctions within comparable 
individual prosecutions. 
Conclusion 
65 G. Guillaume, `The International Court of Justice and Human Rights', in N. H. Wirajuda and F. Delon, 
The Fourth Informal ASEMSemninar on Human Rights, Singpore: Asia Europe Foundation, 2001. 
66 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Preliminan' Objections, Judgem en t, ICJ Reports, 1996. 
67 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, ICJ Reports, 1993. 
68 Meron, Op Cit. n. 26, p. 193. 
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The creation of international legislation connected to the development of individual 
criminal responsibility can be characterised as a journey that is less a steady progression 
and more a series of fitful leaps. However, this should not disguise the fact that real 
progress has been made. The development of individual criminal responsibility was by 
no means inevitable, and represents a novel departure from traditional conceptions of 
international law. Undoubtedly this departure was fuelled by the atrocities of WWII, but 
once these precedents had been set they laid the groundwork for the later constitution of 
the ICTY and ICTR as well as the ICC. 
The adoption of individual responsibility was a deliberate and difficult path promoted 
by the legal community in opposition to a significant current of thought which supported 
the traditional conception of international law whereby states were always the subject 
of such legislation with only occasionally citizens as its object. The expansion of crimes 
against humanity and genocide as statutory offences, and the treatment of these crimes 
as committed by individuals who were criminally liable for their actions, made 
individuals the subjects of international law for the first time. This compares with a 
dominant conception of states as the subjects of international law and the non- 
retributive, compensatory characteristics encountered in collective responsibility 
assignations, even when the collectives, or states, involved, are labelled as criminal. 
This is only clearly seen at the point of implementation of the judicial decision. It is 
within the treatment of violations of humanitarian law that there is the most obvious 
deviation from the dominant tradition of state responsibility, and it is by examining 
system criminality and its lexicon of accountability that the changing relationship 
between individual and state becomes evident. 
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Yet, although the principle of individual criminal responsibility has been adopted 
through the legislature, we could tentatively suggest that the political acceptance of this 
principle lags some way behind. For although the Geneva Conventions place great 
emphasis on penal enforcement, there has yet to be a case brought to its enforcement 
body, the fact-finding commission. Also in the years since the legislation was set in 
place terrible atrocities have gone unpunished by the international community. Where 
action has been taken, it has tended to be political rather than judicial, actions such as 
sanctions against South Africa or the withdrawal of trading or aid relationships. Even 
within the tradition of state criminal responsibility and international crime, when states 
are found guilty it is guilt of a very different character to that found in the ICTY/ICTR. 
All this points to the difficulty in moving beyond the traditional approach to system 
crime as being a state responsibility rather than an individual one. However, the 
constitution of the ICTY and ICTR suggest a renaissance in the willingness to make 
individuals responsible for systematic criminality. It is the resonance the crimes 
committed in former Yugoslavia have with the crimes of WWII, that accelerated public 
and media demands for action. When evidence of death camps and `ethnic cleansing' 
came to light, the parallels with the holocaust became pointed in a way that was absent 
from most other crimes. Thus we might suggest that the techniques for dealing with 
such crimes also had to be reminiscent of post-World War II. It is clear that the 
tendency to collectivise blame is a strong undercurrent, sustained by the most 
fundamental traditions of international law. However, the arguments in favour of 
individual responsibility have proved persuasive enough for supporters of individual 
criminal responsibility to justify its adoption on the grounds that it is a more effective 
deterrence against future abuses. 
69 However, currently the principle of individual 
6" Ratner and Abrams, Op Cit. n. 1, p. 15. 
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responsibility sits in an uneasy relationship with the principle of state sovereignty. It 
rests in contradiction to the common practice of states but without overturning it, and 
whilst it does so it will be in danger of lapsing into legal form without political 
substance. 
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Chapter 6 
Features of Responsibility Assignation 
The willingness of the international community to apply the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility by sponsoring prosecution of offenders indicates a nascent moral 
community. This in turn must imply a basic polity against which criminal offences have 
been committed. Yet, this development is mitigated by the structural conditions under 
which states co-exist, resting in contradiction to the principles which underpin 
traditional international interactions. In addition, this moral consensus is more basic 
than political rhetoric might suggest. Since the Nuremberg Tribunal, there had been no 
international action whatsoever towards enforcing the legislation agreed post- 
Nuremberg, despite some egregious examples of atrocities, until the ICTY was 
convened. Up to this point, there was seemingly little political will to deal with states 
and none to prosecute individuals. In short, there was no move towards a substantive 
criminal legal regime and thus little evidence of a true moral community. 
It would be foolish to deny the impact of political context on system crime, but to blame 
post-Nuremberg inaction solely on macro-power relationships can be both superficial 
and unproductive. If we highlight moral consensus and analyse this as being in tension 
with traditional collectivised approaches to state relationships, the emphasis is reversed. 
Whatever the political context of the crime, were the moral consensus around its 
criminality strong enough, action would have been taken. In fact, the moral consensus 
around Nazi criminality was so great that it overrode the traditional power dynamics 
and state structural traditions. By analysing the character of later atrocities, appalling as 
they might have been, universal moral consensus was not strong enough to prompt 
international criminal and penal sanctions. This was not due in many cases to the scale 
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of the atrocities but to their ambiguities, for many of them blended political or military 
dynamics with humanitarian ones. Genocide is perhaps a form of system crime that has 
the least relationship to the laws of war. It has always been applicable to governments in 
times of peace and universally enforceable. Yet it is also the most controversial and 
delegitimising of allegations. In fact, although I have identified the application of 
individual criminal responsibility as logically resting on shared moral values, the 
consensus around these values is extremely narrow and deeply restrictive. This becomes 
readily apparent when we assess some atrocities according to their character rather than 
their international context. Indeed, this adds more to an explanation of the pattern in 
prosecutions than reliance on macro-political conditions for it is the moral character of 
an atrocity that determines the likelihood of international prosecutions. 
Several of the most outstanding and widely debated atrocities (in terms of their moral 
character) are summarised in Fig 1. These characteristics include the scale of the 
offences, the nature of the targeted group, the character of the techniques in terms of 
how systematised and orchestrated the attacks were and the nature of the conflict during 
which they occurred. Only those atrocities at which accusations of gross system crime 
or genocide have been levelled have been included. This is because the great number 
and frequency of attacks by governments on their citizenry and their varying degrees of 
criminality would preclude thorough analysis. Thus, the more general abuse of human 
rights ranging from the denial of civil and political rights to more general life-integrity 
violations' such as torture and disappearance have not, for the most part, been included. 
Given that there was a consensus around the criminality of the Nazi regime which has 
since been absorbed into international humanitarian law, I have taken the Nuremberg 
Tribunal offences as defining the moral character of actionable system crime. In 
The term is that of S. C. Zanger, `A Global Analysis of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity 
Violations, 1977-93', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37: No. 2,2000, pp. 213-233. 
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particular, I have compared the character of the offences in terms of systematisation but 
also, and more unusually, in terms of how dispassionate they were. The more 
dispassionate the programme of system criminality, the more clearly the intent towards 
the target group emerges. 2 Thus, the death camps of Nazi Germany were systematised 
in a deliberated and dispassionate manner and the victims were selected purely on the 
basis of ethnicity. In this way the pattern and nature of the killing is morally relevant to 
the issue of criminalisation. 
Fig 1. shows that unlike other atrocities, the events in former Yugoslavia were resonant 
with the events in Nazi Germany. Whereas the varying contexts and circumstances of 
other atrocities impacted upon the way they were regarded, in former Yugoslavia there 
were clear moral parallels between the two occasions and for this reason a clear moral 
consensus to criminalise the atrocities3. We shall look at the constitution of the 
ICTY/ICTR in depth in the next chapter, but here we will examine three differently 
profiled cases which indicate the variety of elements and characteristics that make up 
the component parts of any atrocity. The three cases are that of the US engagement in 
Vietnam and the domestic prosecution of Calley; the Cambodian regime under Pol Pot; 
and Indonesia's action against the East Timorese and the Committee of Enquiry into the 
Santa Cruz massacre. 
In examining these events much of the analysis would be lost were they not to be placed 
in the context of allegations made about the wider conflicts in which they were 
embedded. Accordingly, we will look first at the allegations made about war crimes in 
2 This issue of intent is crucial in determining prosecutions for genocide and crimes against humanity. It 
is dealt with in some depth in chapters 5, in relation to the Genocide Convention and Chapter 7, as 
it 
emerged in relation to prosecutions at the ICTY. 
j The exception to this is the ICTR which does not present the same pattern as the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. 
There is, however, wide consensus around the idea that the willingness to intervene in non-international 
conflict was a development fostered by the 
ICTY. 
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these conflicts and the difficulties associated with proof of such allegations and action 
with respect to them. Not least, we will revisit the core question here, first raised in 
chapter 3, of what constitutes system criminality. The conduct of the Cambodian regime 
lacked a crucial component of the crime of genocide, in that the target was not an ethnic 
group. Whilst within East Timor although there was a targeted ethnic group the pattern 
of the atrocities committed was uneven and was not unambiguously orchestrated by the 
regime in the same way until late in the conflict. In many cases, it is clearly apparent 
that there have been violations of humanitarian law but the cases under consideration 
exist at the boundaries of such judgements. This is particularly true of the case in 
Vietnam where there were allegations of war crimes that can be re-expressed as a 
fundamental dispute over the nature of illegal warfare and what can acceptably be 
defined as being within the normal parameters of waging war. 
The US in Vietnam 
The accusations levelled against the US conduct in Vietnam have been extreme and 
considerable. Most famously, they have included the charge of genocide, levelled by the 
unofficial War Crimes Tribunal (Russell Tribunal) founded by Bertrand Russell. 4 The 
Russell tribunal was an unofficial international enquiry into US conduct undertaken by 
respected intellectuals and experts in the field of international law. There were also 
allegations that there were violations of the laws of war primarily centring on the use of 
weaponry such as cluster and fragmentation bombs and napalm which it is alleged, 
caused unnecessary suffering. In addition, the policy of free-fire zones and defoliation 
have also been described as violations of the laws of war. However, the focus here is 
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primarily on the charge of genocide, as it is an example of the sort of system crime that 
could be the subject of international criminal responsibility. The table below 
summarises both the component elements of the genocide convention and the US 
strategies that could comprise them. 
UNGC Clause Violated Acts Comparable Events in Vietnam 
Killing members in whole or in part Massive bombing, free fire zones 
`indiscriminate shooting, murder, rape and 
looting' 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm Anti-personnel weapons, napalm, fragmentation 
bombs 
Deliberately inflicting conditions of life Defoliation, shooting livestock, transferring 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction populations to refugee camps 
in whole or in part 
Imposing measures to prevent births within the Transferring populations to refugee camps 
groups 
Forcible transferring children of the group to None 
another group 
Was the `intent to destroy in whole or in part, a None 
national ... group as such' present? 
Fig 2. Summary of the UNGC Clause Violated Acts and the Comparable US Strategies in Vietnam. 
These complaints have been due in no small part to the prosecution of Lt. Calley for the 
My Lai massacre in the province of Quang Ngai. This was a province targeted as an 
4 P. Limqueco, and P. Weiss, Prevent the Crime of Silence: Reports from the sessions of the International 
War Crimes Tribunal, founded by Bertrand Russell, London: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd., 
1971. 
5 L. Moir. `The Historical Development of the Application of Human Law in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts from 1949', International and Comparative Latin Quarterhv, Vol. 47: Part 2,1998, pp. 337-361. 
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area that required `sterilisation', 6 or pacification, and it was in this province that the 
most controversial event of the war occurred, the massacre at My Lai on 16 March 
1968.7 Task Force Barker under the aegis of the Americal (23rd ) Division included three 
companies and miscellaneous units, one of the companies, Company C, ist Battalion, 
20th Infantry under the command of Lieutenant Calley. He in turn was under the 
command of Captain E. Medina. The orders were to search and destroy the village of 
Son My, quadrant 4 in the My Lai sector, and the troops were told they would meet a 
force of around 250 Vietcong and could expect heavy casualties. 8 In fact, the village 
contained only old men, women, children and infants who offered no resistance to the 
advancing troops. By the time the US troops had left almost all the civilians had been 
killed, there had been a significant number of rapes and total destruction of property and 
livestock. 9 Civilian deaths were estimated at around 200,10 these included babes in arms, 
a special category of protected civilian as they can in no circumstances be described as 
combatant. Eyewitness accounts described Lt. Calley personally shooting groups of 
unarmed civilians in groups of twenty. " Public disquiet was also aroused by the 
conclusions of the Peers Report. On the 26 November 1969, General Peers had been 
appointed to head the official military investigation into the alleged `cover-up' and the 
report ultimately concluded that there had been a serious attempt to conceal the 
massacre and protect the perpetrators. 12 Calley's court martial was uncomfortably close 
6 Attributed to an anonymous senior officer, much quoted in the literature. The full quote is `We've been 
told by our superiors that in many areas there isn't any chance of pacifying the people, so instead we've 
got to sanitize our region - kill the Vietcong and move the civilians out. We are not going to 
be able to 
make the people loyal to our side. So we are going to sterilise the area until we can win it back', cited 
here in S. Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath, New York: Random House, 
1970, p. 4. 
7 A. Everett, K. Johnson, and H. F. Rosenthal, Calley, New York: Dell, 1971, p. 3. 
8 R. Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Callel-, New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971, p. 18. 
9 Ibid. 
10 J. Olsen, R. Roberts, My Lai: A Brief Histoi: iT with Documents, Boston: Bedford Books, 1998. p. 4. 
" Ibid., p. 26. 
12 W. R., Peers, Report of the Dept of the Ai7n y Review of the Prelirnina! Tr Investigation into the A, Mi' Lai 
Incident. Vol. 1, `The Report of the Investigation', Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1970. 
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to demonstrating a charge of the Russell Tribunal, that the Vietnam War revealed a 
`spirit of genocide in the minds of American soldiers'. 13 The military context of the US 
action in Vietnam is crucial to an evaluation of these claims, for the nature of military 
engagement conditioned and limited the range of options available to the US. 
Con text 
The Geneva Agreement of 1954, ending the first Vietnamese war had established a 
temporary border between North and South Vietnam pending elections due to be held in 
1956. When the South Vietnamese refused to allow the election, Ho Chi Minh, the 
leader of North Vietnam, began recruiting sympathetic southern Vietnamese into a 
southern army, known as the Vietcong. The Vietcong launched a guerrilla war against 
the American-backed regime of Diem. 14 The strategic situation was complicated by the 
differing objectives of the combatants. Olsen and Roberts describe how whilst the 
Vietcong fought a political war, gaining popular support and moving in and out of south 
Vietnam, particularly the Quang Ngai province, the Americans fought an increasingly 
territorial war where attention was focused on gaining and holding land. 15 This is 
particularly relevant for a consideration of the nature and potential criminality of events 
induced by the very trajectory of the conflict itself. Indeed, the very necessity of foreign 
intervention could be said to precurse the perception of America as an illegitimate 
intervener by the Vietnamese people. Walzer in his theory of humanitarian intervention 
goes so far as to claim that a government such as that of the south, that receives 
economic and technical aid, military resources and strategic advice and yet still cannot 
maintain order, is clearly illegitimate. 
' 6 
13 Limqueco, Op Cit. n. 4, p. 11. 
14 Olsen and Roberts, Op Cit. n. 10, p. 4. 
15 Ibid., p. 6. 
'6 M. Walzer, `The Theory of Aggression', in Luper-Foy, S(ed), Problems of International Justice, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, p. 172. 
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There is no doubt that the resulting character of the conflict as a guerrilla war made the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatants virtually impossible to sustain in 
such a counter-insurgency scenario. This is demonstrated by US policy on `free fire 
zones'. In theory, free-fire zones were areas from which non-communists had been 
removed; those who remained were by definition Vietcong or Vietcong sympathisers. 
They remained in the hamlets at their own risk. '? However, even the most staunch 
defenders of the American engagement in Vietnam accept that many of the innocent 
civilians evacuated returned to their homes, Paust admits that if this was the case for 
`even half of the hundreds of thousands of civilians killed in Vietnam, it would seem to 
demonstrate [... ] at the very least a key failure in United States foreign policy'. 18 This 
violates the key norm of `discrimination' in warfare. The principle of discrimination 
between combatants and non-combatants is linked to the debate on collective vs 
individual responsibility. Indeed, the principle of discrimination has become a 
benchmark for assessing morality within the conduct of war. 
The My Lai Massacre 
It is clear that it was due to the persistence of one Ronald Ridenhour, a Vietnam veteran 
discharged from the army, that the My Lai case came to trial at all. He had heard 
rumours of a slaughter of unarmed civilians which on his enquiry were confirmed by 
some of the soldiers of Charlie Company. On 29 March 1969, he wrote a detailed letter 
to his local Democratic congressman, Mo Udall, and copied it to thirty other leading 
government officials. ' 9 At the congressman's insistence the army instructed Col. Wilson 
17 Olsen and Roberts, Op Cit. n. 10, p. 8. 
18 J. J. Paust, `My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility', Militaiy Law Review, 
Vol. 57, Summer, 1972, p. 57. 
19 Letter from Ronald L. Ridenhour to Secretary of Defence, March 2}h 1969. in W. R., Peers, Report of 
the Dept of the Army Review of the Preliminal v Investigation into the 
Ml. Lai Incident, Vol. 1, `The 
Report of the Investigation', Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1970, p. 7-11. 
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to head the Army's Criminal Investigations Division in an enquiry into the allegations. 
As a result, Calley was the first to be charged, possibly because his discharge was 
imminent and a civilian court could not have charged him. 2° But alongside Calley, 11 
other men were also charged with participation in the slaughter and another officer was 
charged with murder in a nearby hamlet. Seymour Hersh, a reporter, broke the story of 
the charges and details of the crimes the men were accused of on 13 November 1969. 
Calley was the central figure in the prosecutions over My Lai. However, by the end of 
the Peers enquiry there were 23 others accused including those both higher and lower 
than himself in the chain of command. Calley, however, was in the unique position of 
having both ordered and participated in the slaughter. Officers higher than him had 
played no direct part in the slaughter, and those lower had followed the orders they had 
been given by him. He alone had both initiated and participated in the slaughter. 21 
Calley was tried by court martial, not under the Geneva Conventions for `grave 
breaches', but for a common murder by a person subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, an Act of the US Congress. 22 He was charged with Violation of the 
Uniform Code of justice, Art 118, specifying the murder of an unknown number, not 
less than 30, of the occupants of My Lai 4.23 From the outset, there was no doubt that 
Calley had killed, and had ordered killed, civilians. The question hinged on whether the 
killings were pre-meditated or justified under the rules of proper military conduct. 
24 
Calley claimed in his defence to be acting under orders from his superiors, specifically 
attempting to shift the blame to Medina, his superior officer. In answer to the charge of 
20 Hammer, Op Cit. n. 8, p. 32. 
21 Ibid., p. 33. 
22 G. I. A. D. Draper, `Implementation of International Law in Armed Conflicts', International Affairs, 
Vol. 48: No 1,1972, p. 51. 
23 He was also charged with the premeditated murder of 70 more villagers and two more specified 
murders, one of which was a child aged2. 
All under Art 118. T. Tiede, Callei : Soldier or Killer, New 
York: Pinnacle, 1971. p. 112. 
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pre-meditation, he claimed to be under combat-stress at the time of the killings, 
although it was clear no shots had been fired before Calley opened fire. 25 In addition, 
the incidence of `parallel killings' was raised as mitigation. Such practices, it was 
claimed, were part of the landscape of the confl ict. 26 All of these defences failed and 
Calley was found guilty on all counts. 7 
It is against the backdrop of guerrilla action that the massacre at My Lai needs to be 
placed, for it crucially conditioned the knowledge and expectations of the soldiers, 
impacting upon the degree and quality of their responsibility. It is the relation of the 
crime to the wider conflict which informs the debate surrounding the trial and 
conviction of Lt. Calley for violations of the laws of war. One of the key issues of the 
case was the controversy that surrounded Calley's argument that such an event as the 
massacre at My Lai was a routine feature of the US military strategy in Vietnam. 
Assessment 
What seems certain is that the massacre took place against a background in which the 
local populace was itself regarded as the enemy. This seems clear when we look more 
closely at controversial policies such as the `Strategic Hamlet Programme' launched 
nominally by the government of Saigon, but enforced by the US. This programme later 
known as `pacification' or `rural construction' was formulated in 1962,28 establishing 
the `free-fire zones' which covered large areas of the province of Quang Ngai. Hersh 
estimates that 
24 Tiede, Op Cit. n. 23, p. 119. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hammer, Op Cit. n. 8, p. 197. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Hersh, Op Cit. n. 6, p. 4. 
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Tens of thousands of tons of bombs, rockets, napalm and 
cannon fire were poured into the free-fire zones during 
1965, '66 and '67. '[... ] By the spring of 1967 ... as a side effect of the two years of US operations in Quang Ngai, at 
least 138,000 civilians had been made homeless and 70% of 
the dwellings in the province had been destroyed. 29 
This policy, which simultaneously alienated the local population at the same time as it 
de-humanised them in the eyes of the US troops, was a direct response to the dynamics 
of counter-insurgency. The Hague Convention IV, 1907 prohibits the attack and 
bombardment of undefended dwellings. However, occupation by a military force 
defines a village or town as a defended place and therefore subject to attack. Such 
places are legitimate military objectives. Thus, there were no strict violations of 
traditional laws of war with regards to pacification. 30 However, it seems clear that many 
commentators link this destructive policy with the My Lai massacre. On this view 
contempt for the indigenous population was inevitable, a by-product of the attempt to 
conduct military operations in such an environment. 31 
The links between the general population and the guerrilla fighters is a complex one and 
this relationship impacts upon the laws of war in a contradictory way. On the one hand 
as Mao-Tse-Tung famously remarked the people are the ocean through which the 
revolutionary fish swims. The guerrillas are dependant upon the support of the general 
populace. 32 Yet, at the same time their imperative is to provoke the established power 
into acts of reprisal against the populations who shelter them. The strategic imperative 
for a fighting force that is under-resourced and with fewer combatants necessarily 
29 Ibid., p. 5. 
30 Lewy elaborates on this point arguing that as the conflict was not clearly 
international in character, the 
entire body of the laws of war did not apply. Instead only 
Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949 which 
specifically applies to conflicts not of an international character. 
G. Lewy, America in Vietnam, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 227. 
1 Hersh, Op Cit. n. 6, p. 11. 
32 Paust, Op Cit. n. 18, p. 135. 
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embodies stealth and subterfuge and violations of the traditional laws of war. The word 
`necessarily' is resonant in this context. Although guerrilla warfare is not new, it is 
relatively young as a recognised part of international law. Although there had been 
recognition of the role of guerrilla fighters, this was ill developed in international law 
and mainly operated to deny official status to insurgents whilst it elaborated their 
treatment. 33 Yet, it seems difficult to deny the logistic imperative of guerrilla warfare, 
and given that it is difficult to deny this, it is also difficult to override the customary 
reservation that if an action is militarily necessary it is acceptable. Certainly, the Hague 
Convention 1907 was ambiguous on the matter of recognition for guerrilla forces 
emphasising the condition of `bearing arms openly' amongst others. 34 But by the 1977, 
Geneva Protocol this condition had been modified to encompass the realities of guerrilla 
warfare. 35 This demonstrates an acceptance that the principle of military necessity is 
modified in this circumstance. 36 
Yet, this issue was addressed squarely by the Russell Tribunal. As early as 1969, 
Bertrand Russell organised a non-governmental `mock' tribunal. This was set up to 
collect evidence and conduct investigations in order to determine whether the US 
33 For instance, the Lieber Code 1863, Art 82. which states that hostiles who dissociate themselves from 
the `character and appearance of soldiers' are not entitled to prisoner of war status, and shall be `treated 
summarily as highway robbers or pirates'. Also in 1856 the Attorney General described how irregulars 
are to be treated as `lawless banditti, not entitled to the protection of the mitigated usages of war as 
practised by civilised nations'. Paust, Op Cit. n. 15, p. 131. 
34 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the 
Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section 1- On Belligerents, 
Art 1 and Art 2. 
35 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, Section II, Art 43. Para 3. The relevant passage 
includes `Recognising, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of 
the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant 
provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
During each military engagement, and 
During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged 
in a military deployment preceding 
the launching of an attack in which he is to participate. ' 
This modification is evidently concluded with resistance 
forces in mind. 
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government was responsible for committing various crimes in Indo China. Of note in 
this context was the argument made by Jean-Paul Sartre claiming that the US had 
committed genocide in Vietnam. It is illustrative because Sartre tackled the issue of 
intent by claiming that `intent' could be implicit within a certain course of behaviour. 
His central contention was that the very nature of the conflict as anti-guerrilla warfare, 
admonitory in character, and waged by a powerful nation against a developing nation, 
meant that strategic logic naturally and inescapably led to genocide. He described a 
`genocidal intent implicit in the facts'. 37 There are some difficulties with this concept of 
genocide; firstly, it doesn't meet the standards of strict intent imposed by the 
convention. For instance, the US set up refugee camps for the indigenous population 
and although they were unpopular, there is no evidence that the inmates were in any 
danger. This indicates the reverse of genocidal intent, in fact there were 
accommodations made to guarantee some measures of safety. The evidence is only that 
these measures were prioritised far below military advantage. Whilst the strategy may 
have been brutal and ill advised, it was regarded as a necessary response to the conflict 
and was openly adopted and debated. It was recommended by advisors, both military 
and political, and initially accepted by the media, it was even sanctioned after a fashion 
by a popular election. Sartre's argument implies that as strategic logic leads to genocide, 
intent can be attributed to the collective `America', rather than to individuals. But if 
responsibility is to be allowed implicitly, the whole society is implicitly guilty. This is 
inherently unsatisfactory in terms of outcome, to blame everyone is in a very real sense, 
to punish no one and it is significant that the prospect of penal sanctions is dismissed as 
impractical. 38 This clearly shows that collectivising blame inevitably divorces it from 
the end step of criminal sanctions. But in addition, it also shows that where there is 
36 Even though this protocol was concluded after the Vietnam War it is based on customary practice and 
therefore indicative of a pre-existing and wide consensus. 
37 Limqueco, Op Cit. n. 4. p. 11. 
38 Sartre, J. P., and Dedijer, V., War crimes in Vietnam, Nottingham: Spokesman 
Pamphlet, No 12. 
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evidence that there was not a clear and purely criminal intent, there will be no real 
consensus around prosecutions. The concept of necessity, related as it is to the survival 
of state sovereignty, always trumps individual criminal responsibility, except under 
narrowly circumscribed and restricted circumstances around which there is a shared 
moral consensus. 
This case has shown the ambiguities that surround the notion of military necessity and 
intent. In this case the target group were not selected purely on the basis of ethnicity but 
rather as a consequence of the dynamics of counter-insurgency operations. The next 
case examines a radically different situation where the target group was selected for 
political purposes rather than military ones. Here the potentials for taking action are 
equally difficult and also ambiguous in terms of the intent requirement demonstrated in 
the precedent set by the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
Cambodia 
The Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia under Pol Pot (1975-1979) aimed at nothing 
less than radical transformation of the whole of Cambodian society. The scope of the 
intended changes was enormous: 
Its designs penetrated beyond the reorganisation of political 
and economic institutions, social relations and kinship 
systems, and into the very seat of human consciousness 
itself This was genuine totalitarianism ... The aim was to 
transform the grammar of thought within the culture. 39 
The process of imposing this transformation left an estimated 1,671,000 dead by 1979, 
from all ethnic groups including that of the majority. The thoroughgoing nature of the 
39 T. Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report 
No. 9, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 193. 
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transformation Pol Pot's regime envisaged as well as the systematised nature of the 
measures that were imposed in pursuit of this goal, are key to assessing the claims of 
genocide in Cambodia. 
As the scale of the crimes perpetrated against the Cambodian people became known, 
calls for international action against the perpetrators began to gain momentum. As was 
the case in the Vietnam conflict, concerned groups began to lobby for the application of 
individual criminal responsibility for the Khmer leadership. These calls have centred on 
Pol Pot, but other individuals widely believed to be responsible were Khieu Samphan, 
Hu Nim, Son Sen, leng Sary, leng Thirith and Koy Thuon40 Some examples of such 
demands have come from the US Cambodian Genocide Project, which proposed a 
world court in 1980 to try Khmer leaders, the Australian section of the International 
Commission of Jurists which called for trials of the leadership of the Pol Pot regime in 
Jan 1990, and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee which 
held a one day mock trial of Pol Pot in June 1990. In addition, the "Campaign to 
Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge" has the support of over 45 US organisations 
and the Oxfam initiated NGO Forum -a coalition of private voluntary agencies 
working in Cambodia. 
However, despite the consensus around this opinion evident in the media, 41 NGO's and 
the legal community there has been a reluctance to address this issue on the part of 
individual states and the international community. Despite the report submitted by Ben 
Whitaker, Special Rapporteur to the UN on Genocide, which described it in 1985 as 
40 Ibid. 
{! For instance N. Cumming-Bruce, `End of the Nightmare', The Guardian, June 24,1997, p. 2: P. 
Shenon, `Cambodian Factions Sign Peace Pact, ' Neu' York Times, Oct 24,1991, p. 16.; and 
L. Murdoch, 
`Evans Backs Pol Pot Trial, ' Melbourne Age, Oct 24,1991, p. 1. 
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genocide "even under the most restricted definition. "42 Due to an ethnic dimension to 
the atrocity, the first time that the genocidal activity of the Pol Pot regime was officially 
recognised in an international forum (as the initiator of the resolution noted) was when 
the UN sub commission on Human Rights passed a resolution noting "the duty of the 
international community to prevent the recurrence of genocide in Cambodia, " and "to 
take all necessary measures to avoid conditions that could create for the Cambodian 
people the risk of new crimes against humanity". 43 Yet, despite this unequivocal 
condemnation of the Pol Pot regime, legal action has yet to be taken to bring the 
perpetrators to justice. 
Con text 
Ruled by the French until independence in 1954, Cambodia had spiralled into severe 
economic decline until the civil war of 1970 when communists mounted a bitter 
insurgent campaign to seize power. Food shortages, high inflation and a rapid decline in 
the standard of living promoted disturbances and unrest amongst the peasantry. This 
situation was further complicated by the general strategic position in the region, during 
the US engagement in Vietnam. The US began bombing the border regions of 
Cambodia where Vietnamese fighters took cover, but quickly extended this campaign to 
the increasingly large areas under communist control. 44 `Between 1970 and 1973, the 
US dropped 3 times the tonnage of bombs on Cambodia that it had dropped on Japan 
during all of WWII. '45 More than half of this total was dropped in the last 6 months, 
culminating in the carpet-bombing of the whole country in July and August. This tipped 
42 B. Whitaker, `Revised and Updated Report on the question of the Prevention and punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide', Report to the Economic and Social Council, E/CN. 4/Sub. 
2/1985/6,2 July, 1985. 
4', Quoted from `1991/8 Situation in Cambodia', Resolution passed by UN Sub commission on Human 
Rights, Aug 23,1991. In R. Jenner, The Cambodian Gamble, Belgium : European Centre for Far Eastern 
Research, 1991, p. 35. 
44B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996 
45 Findlay. Op Cit. n. 39, P. 190. 
Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge 1975-79, New 
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the balance in favour of Pol Pot's communists who propagandised the situation to gain 
popularity. 46 On April 17 1975, the Khmer Rouge occupied Phnom Penh and 
immediately proceeded to evacuate the city and impose the radical restructuring of 
Cambodian society. 
Character 
The main aims of the Khmer Rouge were to create a society based around the soil. 
Under this regime religion, money and private property were to be eradicated. The aim 
was to create an agrarian society in which life was communal and no one was 
distinguished from society by either wealth, private property or education. Thus the 
evacuation of the cities, which caused immense loss of life, was prioritised as the means 
to social levelling. 47 A key feature of this regime was the struggle for centralised, top- 
down control, characterised by suspicion and mistrust. The harsher the regime became 
in an attempt to impose its ideological vision, the more resistance it created and the 
more brutally it struggled for centralised control 48 
Undoubtedly Pol Pot's regime targeted some groups more brutally than others. 
Ideologically, religious groups were targeted, as were some regions such as the 
politically suspect Eastern Zone which bordered Vietnam. 
9 Yet, other targeted groups 
included intellectuals and urban dwellers, and such repression was not based upon 
ethnicity. Although there was undoubtedly an ethnic dimension to the killings, it is clear 
that numerically at least, the greatest proportion of victims came from the majority 
46 Kiernan, Op Cit. n. 44, p. 22. 
47 Findlay, Op Cit. n. 39, p. 193. 
48 Kiernan, Op Cit n. 44, p. 27. 
49 S. Totten, W. Parsons, I. W. Charny, Centin-v of Genocide: Eveit'itness Accounts and Critical 
Vieh'.. 
New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1997, p. 343. 
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Khmer ethnic group. By the time Vietnam invaded in 1979 ending the Khmer Rouge 
rule, an estimated 21 % of the total population had been killed. 50 
Assessment 
That the Political Pot regime planned, initiated and successfully waged a campaign of 
mass murder and extreme coercion is not in doubt. The central question here is why this 
case was never subject to individual criminal responsibility. The impact of the 
international political context here cannot be denied; the situation in Cambodia was 
central to the geo-political landscape of the region. Yet, there were opportunities to have 
launched individual trials some years later after Vietnam withdrew from the country in 
1989. The international community proposed to unite all the main political factions in a 
Supreme National Council. The transition to democracy was to be supervised by the UN 
through UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. ) The Paris Agreement 
which brokered the power sharing deal within Cambodia51 was an undoubted 
opportunity to impose individual criminal liability had their been sufficient international 
consensus to do so. The situation in Cambodia at the time of the agreement was clearly 
not conducive to allowing an internal resolution of the situation. The Khmer Rouge had 
significant armed support and a government which excluded them would have faced 
substantial opposition. There were efforts to establish some form of accountability 
within the new regime, but these were timid and incomplete. During UNTAC's 
administration of the area, a Special Prosecutor's Office was established by 
administrative directive, to press charges against suspects for flagrant political and 
50 Ibid., p. 343. 
51 The Paris Agreement comprised three stages Paris I, July 1989, the Australian Initiative, 
November 
1989 and Paris II signed in Oct 1991. Hong, 
M., `The Paris Agreement on Cambodia: In Retrospect', 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2: No. 1. Spring 1995, pp. 93-98. 
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human rights crimes. 52 Yet, there was no independent Cambodian judicial and penal 
system to conduct the prosecutions. 
UNTAC did not attempt to establish a compete new judicial 
system... Foreign donors baulked at financing the 
construction of gaols. The idea of importing foreign judges 
and lawyers was never pursued, although it was considered 
within UNTAC. According to human rights groups, the 
failure to follow this through was the result of legalism and 
timidity... " 
The few suspects detained were still awaiting trial when UNTAC departed and 
prosecutions were left to the new government. Both the Secretary of State for the US, 
James Baker, and the then Foreign Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, confined 
themselves to offering support to an incoming Cambodian government which may 
decide to prosecute. 54 
Although there was an ethnic dimension to the killings, and the Khmer regime could 
properly be brought to book for those killings, under the Genocide Convention the great 
mass of the Cambodian population who were killed were ethnically identical with the 
oppressing regime. Thus, only part of the population is a protected group. 
Although presented as a communist atrocity by many western sources, 
55 there is 
evidently an ethnic / race dimension to Khmer policies at this time., 
56 Yet, it is also clear 
that the killings were targeted at perceived political opponents rather than ethnic groups 
and the intention was fixed upon political objectives rather than racial ones. However, 
the targeting of ethnic groups for further political purposes should not technically debar 
52 Findlay, Op Cit. n. 39, p. 66. 
53 Ibid., p. 67. 
sa Kiernan in Totten et al, Op Cit. n. 49, p. 356. 
55 For a more controversial discussion of the power politics surrounding the 
US and later Vietnamese 
impact upon Cambodia see W. Shawcross, Sideshow- Kissinger, 
Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, 
New York: Pocket Books, 1979. and particularly `The Trouble with John Pilger', The 
Observer, London. 
March 17,1991, p. 20. 
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prosecutions for genocide or crimes against humanity. Provided the intention was to 
destroy the target group, it may not necessarily preclude action even if the group was 
being targeted for some eventual end other than pure racial hatred. However, the 
Cambodian case admirably shows the limits to international moral agreement. Despite 
the scale of the killings, their political objectives and nature set them outside the limits 
of moral consensus. 
Indonesia in East Timor 
Another case which demonstrates the restricted nature of international consensus is that 
of Indonesia in East Timor. The allegations over Indonesia's conduct in East Timor are 
longstanding and assert a general pattern of severe human rights abuse including torture 
and disappearance. However, given that this thesis focuses on prosecutions and 
enforcement of humanitarian law, two incidents, separated by eight years, are 
particularly relevant. We shall assess the judicial response to them, looking at the 
impact of the perceived character of the offences and how the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility has matured in the intervening period. 
Two specific incidents in the Indonesian occupation stood out as being appropriate for 
the application of individual criminal responsibility. Although they took place within 
the context of widespread human rights abuses, they were discrete and actionable 
offences. One was the massacre at Santa Cruz on 7 November 1991, and the other were 
the massacres committed after the referendum in 1999. The international response to the 
massacres at Santa Cruz in 1991 and the more widespread massacres following the 
Referendum on Independence in 1999, altered significantly in tone with a new 
willingness to consider international jurisdiction. The invasion of 
East Timor by 
56 Kiernan, Op Cit. n. 44, p. 26.178 
Indonesia took place in 1975 and was marked by bitter resistance and harsh repression. 
The long and concentrated attempt to subdue the East Timorese has become one of the 
most dramatic human rights situations on the international agenda. However, although 
the issue had been on the UN agenda since 1977, it was not until the massacre at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in November 1991, which was by chance videoed by western 
journalists 57 that demands began to be made for some form of action. Yet until this 
point the international community had seemingly accepted Indonesia's occupation of 
East Timor as a `fait accompli'. 58 It was not until the post-referendum massacres that we 
can trace calls for criminal prosecutions of the individuals responsible. 
Context 
East Timor had been a Portuguese colony for 400 years before it had declared its 
independence only days before its annexation by Indonesia. On 28 November 1975, one 
of the East Timorese political parties, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 
Timor (FRETLIN), declared independence from Portugal because Portugal was 
considering dismantling its colonies. On 7 December 1975, Indonesia sent its troops 
into the territory on the grounds that other East Timorese political parties and elements 
were seeking its intervention. 59 The Security Council condemned the intervention by 
Indonesia, adopting resolution 384/1975 calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian 
forces. On 17 July 1976 Indonesia formally annexed the territory and proclaimed East 
Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia. The General Assembly rejected this claim and 
called for the national self-determination of the East Timorese. 
60 
57 The journalists in question were Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman Excerpts From The Testimuni 
Of 
Allan Nairn Before The United States Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, February 27,1992. 
available online, http: //etan. org/timor/nairndili. 
htm, accessed 20 July 2002. 
58 `Report of the International Platform for Jurists for East Timor', 
July 1999, available online, 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/huridoca. nsf/(symbol)/A. 54.726+S. 2000.59. 
En, accessed 15 Aug 2002. 
59 General Assembly 54 `h Session, `Question of East Timor', 31 January 2000, A/54/726, 
S/2000/59. 
60 Ibid. 
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The Santa Cruz Massacre 
The occupation was accompanied by brutal measures to subjugate the territory, yet 
despite an estimated total death toll of 200,000 (out of a total population of less than 
800,000), 61 there were still few concrete measures to divert the course of the conflict. 
Western governments continued to sell arms to Indonesia and the US, Australia and the 
UK continued to train the Indonesian military. 62 However, the Santa Cruz massacre 
brought the issue of East Timorese self-determination back into international focus. 63 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian forces shot into an unarmed crowd of people who 
had gathered at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili for a memorial service for a youth shot 
dead by Indonesian security forces. 4 The youth, Sebastiao Gomes, had been scheduled 
to speak with a UN sponsored delegation that was due to arrive from Portugal. Although 
the delegation never arrived the security forces reportedly hunted those prepared to 
speak. 65 The funeral of Gomes attracted over a thousand mourners and commemoration 
continued culminating in a memorial service on 12 Nov 1991, attended by 3-5000 
people. Allain Nairn, one of the journalists present, claimed that Indonesian troops 
arrived and opened fire on the unarmed crowd without provocation in a systematic and 
disciplined manner. 66 A. the journalists returned to the west, their testimony and the 
videotape of the incident was extensively publicised in the west. 
61 Senate Committee Findings, `Human rights abuses in East Timor since 1975', Final Report on the 
Inquiry into East Timor, 07 December 2000, available online, 
http: //www. aph. gov. au/senate/committee/fadt_ctte/East%20Timor/cO5. doc 
62 `Report of the International Platform for Jurists for East Timor', July 1999, available online, 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/huridoca. nsf/(symbol)/A. 54.720+S. 2000.59. En, accessed 15 Aug 
2002. 
63 General Assembly 54th Session, `Question of East Timor', 31 January 2000, A/54/726, S/2000/59. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Nairn, A., Excerpts From The Testimony Of Allan Nairn Before The United States Senate Committee 
On Foreign Relations, February 27,1992, available online, http: //etan. org/timor/nairndili. 
htm, accessed 
20 July 2002. 
66 Ibid. 
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Largely in response to the international reaction, the Indonesian government set up a 
Committee of Inquiry which issued its preliminary report on 26 December 1991. Whilst 
the report acknowledged some mistakes and lack of control, it absolved the authorities, 
including the military command in East Timor, of any responsibility for the massacre. 7 
Although several senior military officers were removed from their posts, they were not 
formally charged with any offences. Subsequently, nine junior ranking officers and one 
policeman faced court martial but on relatively minor charges. 68 This contrasted with 
the heavy sentences handed out to demonstrators, this issue was raised by the UN 
Human Rights Commission who complained of the: 
disparity in the severity of sentences handed to those 
civilians not indicted for violent activities - who should 
have been released without delay- on the one hand, and to 
the military involved in the violent incident on the other. G9 
Yet despite the relative strength of the international communities position in relation to 
imposing prosecution, no attempts to insist on individual criminal responsibility were 
made. Although, the Santa Cruz massacre had revived interest in the issue of East 
Timorese self-determination, there was little or no discussion of individual criminal 
responsibility for the Indonesian regime itself. Although the UN Commission of Human 
Rights had kept East Timor on its agenda, `investigating allegations of extrajudicial 
killings, torture, `disappearances' and acts of sexual violence', 70 there were no 
suggestions of international prosecutions until the events of 1999. 
67 Totten et al, Op Cit. n. 49, p. 277. 
68 Ibid. 
69 `Situation in East Timor', Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/97,11 March 1993, 
available online, 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/Huridoca/Huridoca. nsf/TestFrame/Oe3e3 l 789ad306fdc 
1256a8b002fdbb9 
70 General Assembly 54`1' Session, `Question of East Timor', 31 January 2000, A/54/726, 
S/2000/59. 
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In May 1998, following the resignation of President Suharto, the new government of 
Indonesia under President Habibie committed itself to reform and respect for human 
rights. Habibie offered East Timor the opportunity to decide by referendum between 
either autonomy within Indonesia or independence. On 30 August 1999, nearly 99% of 
the registered voters turned out for the vote. The UN missions in East Timor 
(UNAMET) announced on 4 September, that over 78% of the voters had chosen 
independence. Localised militias, who had apparently been mobilised by the Indonesian 
military in an attempt to intimidate the electorate, embarked on a wave of destruction 
including widespread killing and forcible deportments .71 This violence led to the 
establishment of an International Commission of Enquiry on East Timor. 72 The Enquiry 
concluded that there had been `a pattern of serious violations of fundamental human 
rights and humanitarian law in East Timor'. 73 Further to this, it recommended that the 
UN should establish an independent and international body to investigate violations of 
humanitarian law and identify those responsible. 74 
Assessment 
It is clear that the responses to both of these events occurring in the same place, with the 
same actors, were treated substantially differently. Prior to the 1991 Santa Cruz 
massacre, there was little intervention in what was treated as a domestic case. Even 
71 'Report of the International Platform for Jurists for East Timor', July 1999, available online, 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/huridoca. nsf/(symbol)/A. 54.726+S. 2000.59. En, accessed 15 Aug 2002. 
72 General Assembly 54th Session, `Question of East Timor', 31 January 2000, A/54/726, S/2000/59. 
73 General Assembly 54`h Session, `Question of East Timor', 31 January 2000, A/54/726, 
S/2000/59. Section 9 Para 142 
74 General Assembly 54`" Session, `Question of East Timor', 31 January 2000, A/54/726, 
S/2000/59. Section 9 Para 152. The recommendations listed were that `The United Nations should 
establish an independent and international 
body charged with 1. Conducting further systematic 
investigations of the human rights violations and violations of international 
humanitarian law in East 
Timor during the period from January 1999; 2. Identifying the persons responsible 
for those violations, 
including those with command responsibilities; 3. Ensuring reparations 
for the violations from those 
responsible; 4. Prosecuting those guilty of serious 
human rights violations within the framework of its 
function to ensure justice; and 5. Considering the issues of truth and reconciliation. 
182 
when Santa Cruz brought the issue to the international public, the Indonesian regime 
was allowed to deal domestically with the allocation and enforcement of individual 
responsibility. Even though the inadequacies of this approach were widely accepted. 
there was still little official reference to internationally sponsored trials. The massacre 
itself was small in scale and an allegation of widespread criminal killings would have 
assaulted Indonesia's sovereignty. This is particularly true given that repression of 
insurgents is the sovereign right of any state. It would seem that even when a political 
target group is identical with an ethnic target group there is a reluctance to take action. 
This indicates how restricted is the consensus around system crime, it must be 
unambiguously ethnically directed. 
This contrasts with the recommendations which followed the massacres of 1999. As 
well as the International Commission of Enquiry for East Timor, `Operation Indictment: 
War Crimes committed by Indonesian military and security forces against the peoples 
of East Timor' was drawn up in readiness of prosecution. This related to 44 cases 
between September 1975 and March 1999 which could cause a war crimes tribunal to 
find validity in the charge of war crimes. 75 In addition, the description of the situation in 
Indonesia during 1999 made by Mary Robinson the UN High commissioner for human 
rights, was that there was `overwhelming evidence of a that East Timor has seen a 
deliberate, vicious and systematic campaign of gross abuse of human rights. I condemn 
those responsible in the strongest terms'. 
76 This is in addition to the recommendations 
and protests of NGO's such as Amnesty International, Asia watch and the International 
Commission of Jurists. This reorientation to international jurisdiction was due to the 
75 Senate Committee Findings, `Human rights abuses in East Timor since 1975', Final Report on the 
Inquir-y into East Tirnor°, 7 December 2000. Available online, 
http: //www. aph. gov. au/senate/committee/fadt_ctte/East%2OTimor/cO5. 
doc 
76 UN Economic and Social Council. Report of the High Corninissioner° 
for Hannan Rights on the human 
rights . situation 
in East Timor, 17 September 1999. E/CN. 4/S-4/CRP. 1 
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numerical scale and widespread nature of the crimes; in this respect, they were 
reminiscent of the charges at Nuremberg. 
There are also great parallels between the massacre at My Lai in Vietnam and the 
massacre of demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery. Both were small in scale but 
both inspired wider allegations about the pattern of violence within which they 
occurred. In both cases, the issue of parallel killings was sidestepped in Courts Martial 
and the accused received light sentences for minor offences. Both of the wider conflicts 
which framed these offences were driven by military or political considerations, issues 
around which states' interactions are bound by custom and protocol. 
Conclusion 
Although a precedent had been set for prosecuting gross and widespread human rights 
abuses at the Nuremberg Tribunal, there was little political will to approach and try 
these cases. Yet, few of the atrocities had the moral character of earlier Nazi crimes. 
The restricted nature of international moral consensus is shown by the evident lack of 
will to pursue allegations in cases where there was purity of intention displayed in 
genocide by killings that were exclusively motivated by racial hatred and carried out in 
a systematic and controlled manner. In the many cases of atrocities that had occurred 
since the Nuremberg Tribunal, none had shared the characteristics of Nazi system crime 
until the conflict in former Yugoslavia. This conflict also saw dispassionate, 
systematised attacks against an ethnic minority. In this sense, it was resonant with the 
crimes of the Nazi government. The consensus around these sorts of crime 
is evident, 
for instance, when the attacks by Indonesia in East Timor became widespread and 
clearly orchestrated there was more willingness to consider and recommend 
individual 
prosecutions. In addition, when states take 
decisions grounded in military or political 
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logic any prosecution is an intervention that represents a violation of the key norm of 
sovereignty. As the notion of individual criminal responsibility is in tension with this 
none, where moral consensus is weak criminal responsibility will not be applied and 
states will be the focus of protest or representations. In the next chapter we will examine 
two more recent cases and examine more closely the issues involved in collective and 
individual assignations of responsibility. 
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Chapter 7 
Tensions in the Modern Application of Individual Responsibility 
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
an undeniably groundbreaking response to allegations of widespread atrocities by both 
parties to the conflict. It represents the first serious attempt by the international 
community to address this problem by legal means and as such, its importance cannot 
be underestimated. Its constitution represents a qualitative shift in the justiciability of 
system criminality and as a visible and concrete symbol of the significance of 
international law; it was as bold as it was ambitious. 
That it was radical is evident from the complete lack of prosecutions in the period post- 
Nuremberg. As we saw in chapter three, there had been no move whatsoever towards 
prosecution for what many would regard as some of the most serious abuses of human 
rights this century. ' For instance, although the Geneva Conventions place great 
emphasis on penal enforcement, there has yet to be a case brought to its enforcement 
body, the fact-finding commission. Where action of some sort has been taken, it has 
tended to be political rather than judicial, actions such as sanctions against South Africa 
or the withdrawal of trading or aid relationships through agreements such as the Lome 
Convention (now superseded by the Cotonou Agreement) Not only had there been no 
prosecutions for genocide, within the genocide convention the legal mechanisms in 
place to try it were of doubtful value, and there was no court specifically constituted to 
See S. Totten, W. Parsons, I. W. Chamy, Center of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical i 
lew1s, 
New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1997, for some examples. 
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adjudicate upon it. 2 Thus the inclusion of such offences as justiciable under the 
constitution of the ICTY/ICTR was a substantive step forward. Taken together with 
other advances in international law such as the prosecution of rape as a military strategy 
as a crime against humanity, the tribunals represent a clear advance in the justiciability 
of system criminality. But within the context of an investigation into the current 
condition and status of a potential international moral consensus it could be possible to 
overestimate its significance. Whilst it represents a significant step forward it cannot be 
regarded as the definitive proof of moral consensus it might first appear to be, for it is 
limited in several crucial ways. There is evidence that the moral consensus necessary to 
fully support this shift is still undeveloped as indicated by some difficulties with the 
current prosecutions, for instance funding difficulties and problems with the 
apprehension of suspects in terms of state cooperation. In addition, the legal character of 
the prosecutions indicates that the international community stops some way short of the 
full and absolute moral consensus necessary to indicate a nascent polity. This is also 
evidenced in both cases of non-prosecution such as, for instance, the current impunity of 
Saddam Hussein of Iraq. 
This chapter looks at the ICTY/ICTR in some depth with the aim of establishing to what 
extent'they are indicative of a fledgling international polity. That this term is so loosely 
generic is intentional, for given the current state and level of international interaction it 
would be foolhardy to imply anything but the most tentative of steps in this direction. 
The term `polity' implies only a unified supervision of public affairs, it refers in the 
most general sense to some form of overarching political organisation. This thesis 
2 Prosecutions were to be undertaken in the state where the offences were committed 
(Art VI) and states 
could bring complaints about violations of the convention 
by other signatories to the International Court 
of Justice. (Art IX) 1948 United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
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begins with the observation that the first steps in this direction are implied by the 
assignment of individual responsibility,; and goes on to assess the real extent and 
influence of this principle in practice. To this end this chapter will look at both the 
practical aspects of the court's operation, and also the legal aspects of the tribunals 
constitution. It also compares the tribunals with some other recent cases of system 
criminality, in terms of consistency of approach, to ascertain how well established the 
principle of individual responsibility is. In addition, we will look at the problem of the 
unity of law and its potential impact upon the future course of this aspect of 
international law. This will go to show that despite the massive step forward the ICTY 
and ICTR represent, there is still room to argue that the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility is in tension with, and ultimately, abeyance to, traditional forms of inter- 
state interaction and that this tension is not only expressed politically as we shall see in 
this chapter, but also to some extent, legally, as we shall explore in greater depth in 
chapter 8. That there is such a tension is evident when we look at inconsistencies in 
approaching gross examples of system criminality such as that shown in the measures 
against Iraq and the apparent impunity of Saddam Hussein. 
The Context of the Tribunals 
The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR) 
Genocide. Genocide has since been deemed part of customary international law and therefore applicable 
to all states. 
3 This is implied by the criminalisation of these offences. Criminality must imply a society against which 
the offences are committed. As we have seen 
in chapter 4, the minimum conditions needed to assign 
criminal responsibility can only 
be located within individuals. Thus. any move towards collectivising 
blame is necessarily a move away from a global polity and vice versa. 
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Considering the dearth of prosecutions since Nuremberg the constitution of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, (ICTY), and its sister tribunal 
the ICTR is all the more outstanding. The beginning of the process that would lead to 
the constitution of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), could perhaps be marked by the London Conference for Former Yugoslavia, 
held on 29 Aug 1992. There, the then German Foreign Minister, Dr Klaus Kinkel, 
proposed establishment of a criminal court saying, "Those responsible for all crimes and 
violations of human rights, both inside and outside the camps, must be brought to 
account. An international court of criminal justice has to be created. "4 Prior to this there 
had been increasing evidence that there were death camps, torture camps and rape 
camps. As well as this, there was also evidence, largely presented by pioneering NGOs 
such as Amnesty International, as well as the key report of the Helsinki Watch 
Committee, of Aug 1992, alleging the widespread occurrence of genocide, mass killings 
and disappearances. 5 This conflict certainly had characteristics which made it more 
amenable to intervention. Although it had the character of a civil war, after the newly 
independent states of Croatia and Bosnia had been recognised, the continued Serbian 
hostilities in these states gave the conflict an international element, combined with 
multiple hostilities between and within other former FRY states. Also it was clear that 
the basic aims of some parties included removing a rival ethnic population. Thus the 
conflict was waged less as combat between rival forces and more as a series of 
successive actions against civilians. ' All of these elements made the links with 
4 Speech of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Kinkel, at the London Conference, 
1992. 
`General debate, Aug 26,1992: Conference Statement. ' Available online: 
http: //Un. org/icty/publicatioii/path. htm#a, accessed 12.08.00. 
5 W. P. Nagan, `Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law and the Ad 
Hoc Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, ' Duke Journal of Comparative and International Laic, 
Vol. 6: 11, 
pp. 127-165, p. 129. 
G A. Roberts, and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of 
War, 3rd Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 565. 
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Nuremberg rigorously defined and the legal precedent unambiguous. After Security 
Council Resolution 764 drew attention to obligations under international humanitarian 
law and suggested the possibility of individual responsibility for grave violations! 
Resolution 771 called for states to submit data on the offences, 8 whereas 780 established 
an impartial commission of experts to examine this data. ' Resolution 808 entailed an 
agreement in principle to establish an international tribunal to try individuals for serious 
violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. " Finally resolution 827 of 22 
Feb 1993, officially established the ICTY. ' 
All this would seem to suggest a fairly orderly progression through the international 
system, but it is certain that the Security Council took action only after information 
about the atrocities have been extremely well publicised by the media and the NGOs. 'Z 
In particular, two US sources, Roy Gutman of Newsday and the key report of the 
Helsinki Watch Committee which came out in Aug 1992, had a substantial impact upon 
public opinion. 13 Nagan suggests that the domestic political situation in the US may 
have been a key factor in its insistence on security council action. Suggestions of 
inaction by the incumbent administration, particularly in the face of such appalling 
reports, may have fuelled the opposition campaign. Perhaps the electoral position of 
both of the parties encouraged the Bush administration to push the Bosnian crisis away 
7 Security Council Resolution 764, Section 10, July 13, UN Doc. S/RES/764 1992 
8 Security Council Resolution 771, Aug 13, S/RES/771 1992 
9 Security Council Resolution 780, Oct 6, S/RES/780 1992 
10 Security Council Resolution 808, Feb 22, S/RES/808 1993 
1 Security Council Resolution 827, May 25, S/RES/827 1993 
12 Thus strengthening public opinion in favour of some 
form of action. R. Norton-Taylor, `The Ghosts of 
Nuremberg', The Guardian, 25 Aug 1995, p. 5. 
13 Nagan, Op Cit n. 5, p. 129. 
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from the domestic agenda, and into an international forum. 14 Certainly the US gave a 
great deal of support to the notion of an international tribunal, despite, or perhaps 
because of, the murky associations of its representative Lawrence Eagleburger. 15 
Support also came from France, which was the only state that had commissioned 
official follow-up to the proposal for an Iraqi war crimes trial, " and continued to lobby 
the international community for action, in addition to proposing a permanent 
international court. This combined with the coalescence of factors which allowed, and 
indeed demanded, a comparable response to that seen at Nuremberg. 
It was the death of the Rwandan Prime Minister Habyarimana and other government 
officials on 6 April 1994 that sparked a wave of violence so severe that it has been 
described as the worse genocide since WWII. An interim government under the 
presidency of Venat Theodore Sindikubwabo seized power, and it is this interim 
government that is largely blamed for the genocide which followed. " By the time a new 
broad-based government of national unity had been established on 19 July 1994, the 
conflict had left 500,000 dead, 3 million internally displaced and 2 million fled to 
neighbouring countries. '8 The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) with a peacekeeping force of 2,500 had been established in Rwanda since 
14 Ibid. 
'' Eagleburger was rumoured to be a `drinkingbuddy' of Milosevic, during his time as US 
Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, in addition as a private citizen he was co-director of the Yugoslav Bank along with 
Milosevic 
and was also the president of a US company importing cars 
from Yugoslavia. These allegations are most 
clearly made in Aran K. Mitra, 'US Policies have Helped 
Serbs Dominate, ' St Louis Post Dispatch, Aug 
20,1993, at 7b. 
16 France commissioned Professor Pellet to report on the 
issues of international law and the likely shape a 
prosecution of Saddam Hussein might take. P. 
Pellet, `The International Responsibility of Saddam 
Hussein', April 16,1991. In The Path to the Hague, available online - 
http: //Un. org/icty/publicatiori/path. htm#a, accessed 
12.08.00 
17 T. Sapru, 'Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Security 
Council Foray in Rwanda, 'Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 32,1997, pp. 329-354, p. 
334. 
18 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation 
in Rwanda, 3 Aug 1994, S/1994/924 
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Oct 1993 following four years of civil war. This was scaled down to 270 on the 21 April 
1994. From then the massacres continued uninterrupted until the UN approved French 
intervention at the end of June. 19 It seems clear that the international community was 
well aware of the impending disaster, but chose not to intervene. "'Indeed, General 
Dellaire has publicly accused the US, British and French governments of deliberate 
concealment of intelligence about the situation, going as far as to lay individual 
responsibility for inaction on the heads of state of these countries. 2' Given this, it is easy 
to see why it has been suggested that the plight of African victims would not have 
generated the same outcry as the suffering of Europeans. On this view, it is solely the 
precedential effect of the ICTY which led to the ICTR. 22 
What seems clear is that the tribunals have contributed substantially to the expansion of 
international criminal law and the development of the norms of humanitarian action. 
Firstly, it has undoubtedly paved the way for further action to be taken by the 
international community against any aggressors. Most notably it immediately spawned a 
successive ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda, with the adoption of security council resolution 
955 
." 
The constitution of this tribunal was a far simpler affair as a precedent had 
already been created by the ICTY. There was only one negative vote cast, and that was 
by the Rwandese government, this reflected principally their unhappiness that the death 
19 B. Willum, `Legitimising Inaction Towards genocide in Rwanda: A Matter of Misperception?, 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6: No 3, Autumn 1999, pp 11-30. P. 11. 
20 Ibid., p. 13. 
21 General Romeo Dellaire in interview with Tim Sebastian, `Hard Talk', BBC News 24,4.35 am, 
Mon 
15 April 2002. 
22 P. Akhavan, `The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and 
Pragmatics of 
Punishment', American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90: 1996, pp501-510. 
23 Security Council Resolution 955, S/RES/955 (1994) 
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penalty was not be imposed. 24 In addition both tribunals paved the way for the 
constitution of an International Criminal Court 
, 
but more importantly they established a 
benchmark for individual criminal responsibility. As such they are deservedly described 
as the `twin pillars of moral outrage on which the beginnings of a long-awaited 
international criminal jurisdiction can be discerned'. 25 This notion of the tribunals as 
indicative of universal moral consensus, strong enough to support the development of 
international criminal jurisdiction is central to this thesis. This thesis also argues that 
this is in turn is indicative of some form of international polity. 
Legal Issues 
However, apart from a refinement in international norms, the tribunals also made 
several innovations in the scope and parameters of international criminal law. Of course, 
simply the invocation and operation of criminal trials develops international law as rules 
of procedure and evidence are laid down and refined, and also a corpus of cases 
produces precedent, enlarging and interpreting legal statutes. But the ICTY and the 
ICTR not only refined, but considerably enlarged, the scope of application of 
international law. There are ten substantive differences between the ICTY and the 
Nuremberg Charter. 26 I shall assess several of the most relevant to the argument of this 
thesis. 
24 R. Goldstone, Prosecuting War Criminals, London: The David Davies Memorial Institute, 1996, p. 5 
25 Akhavan, Op Cit. n. 22. 
26 1. The ICTY is more broadly international than the Nuremberg Tribunal which was constituted 
by the 
allies. 2. It has jurisdiction over offences committed after 
its constitution instead of only in retrospect. 3. 
It has indicted suspects from more than one side of the conflict. 4. It does not 
include crimes against 
peace. 5. Crimes expressly include that of genocide. 
6. The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity committed in internal as well as international armed conflict, 
but is not limited to only those 
crimes against humanity substantively connected 
to a war crime. 7. Rape is specifically included as a 
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Customary law 
The statute of the tribunal contributes significantly to affirming major components of 
international humanitarian law as customary law. 27 This is significant in that it is 
indicative of a shared consensual basis to the laws in question. To define an offence as 
illegal under customary law is indicative of shared standards and a commonly expressed 
moral standard. Perhaps the most important development in this respect was the 
treatment of the provisions of the Genocide Convention ( Articles II and III) as 
established customary law. 28 Properly falling under the wider category of crimes 
against humanity, these provisions were repeated verbatim in the statutes establishing 
jurisdiction of both tribunals. This is particularly interesting in the context of our wider 
argument, genocide is a pure system crime and articulation of opposition to it is purely 
expressed in moral terms. Logically there is no connection with conflict and it is an 
indictable offence when committed internally. It is this fact that sets it apart as 
evidential with respect to the potential for an international polity. To criminalise this 
offence is to imply that genocide is committed against world society rather than simply 
individuals. However, in its definition of crimes against humanity set out in the Statute 
of the ICTY, Article 5 requires that all crimes against humanity must have a causal 
nexus with an armed conflict. 29 In this respect, the security council erred on the side of 
crime against humanity. 8. Due process protections have been extended9. 
The ICTY ha a death penalty. 
10. The ICTY is not empowered to impose the death penalty. Summary provided in A. Roberts, and 
R. 
Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 565. 
27 T. Meron, `The Normative Impact on International Law of the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia', in Y. Dunstem, and M. Tabory, (eds), War Crimes in International Law, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, p. 211. 
28 Meron, Ibid., p. 213. 
29 Goldstone, Op Cit. n. 24, p. 8. 
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caution treating the requirements of customary law as paramount. Thus at this stage the 
principle of full criminalisation of individuals for this offence was not fully expressed. 
However, it represented an advance from the position at the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals which dealt exclusively with crimes committed around the nexus of aggressive 
war. Although the crime of aggressive war was clear cut in the circumstances that led to 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the notion of aggression is, at the boundaries of the 
concept, as fraught as ever in the current political climate, with states still reluctant to 
agree a workable definition of aggression. In this context the notion of armed conflict is 
a more secure one, given that it makes reference to the Geneva conventions and their 
protocols, and as such is firmly within the ambit of customary law. 
Internal Atrocities 
Whilst the ICTY retained, in some form, the requirement of a link with armed conflict, 
although much relaxed in comparison with that of the Nuremberg Tribunal, its impact 
upon the development of international law can be seen by the advance achieved by its 
sister tribunal the ICTR. The statute of the ICTR dispenses with this requirement 
altogether and in its definition of crimes against humanity in Article III, does not require 
a nexus with armed conflict. j0 Indeed, the statute is `predicated on the assumption that 
the conflict in Rwanda is a non-international armed conflict. "' This is perhaps based 
upon the decision of the appellate court in Prosecutor v Tadic within the ICTY where it 
was unanimously held that: 
Y) Statute of the International Tribunal, Art 
3. 
31 Meron, Op Cit. n. 27, p. 231. 
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It is by now a settled rule of customary international law 
that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to 
international armed conflict. Indeed, as the prosecutor 
points out, customary international law may not require a 
connection between crimes against humanity and any 
conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that crimes against 
humanity be committed in either internal or international 
armed conflict, the security council may have defined the 
crime in Article 5 [of the ICTY statute] more narrowly than 
necessary under customary international law. ;2 
Art 4 of the statute for Rwanda was both controversial and groundbreaking. It provided 
for prosecution of persons violating common article three of the Geneva conventions.;; 
The novelty and importance of this decision lies in the fact that the Geneva conventions 
are so well established, and have such a long history of observance as to be an accepted 
part of customary law but that they have not previously been subject to criminal 
sanctions. A report by the Secretary-general recognised the extension to international 
law that the statute of the ICTR represented: 
The Security Council has elected to take a more expansive 
approach to the choice of the applicable law than the one 
underlying the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal, and 
included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
Rwanda Tribunal international instruments, regardless of 
whether they were considered part of customary 
international law or whether they have customarily entailed 
32 Prosecutor v Tadic, in the Appellate Chamber of the ICTY, available online: file: //A: \ICTY, Tadic- 
Appeals Judgement_files\tad-aj990715e. htm 
33 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, of August 12,1949. Chapter, Article 3 `Common article three' relates to the conduct of 
participants in `armed conflict not of an international character', 
its provisions are described as `a 
minimum' and are therefore illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
Referring to those who take no active part 
in the hostilities it prohibits `a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of 
hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognised as 
indispensable by civilised peoples. Available A. Roberts, and R. 
Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd Ed, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, p. 198. 
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the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of 
the crime. 34 
Until the Rwanda statute, common article three had not been subject to criminal 
proceedings. This is an important development in terms of assessing the impact of 
responsibility assignation as a signpost to the development of an international polity. 
Criminalising non-compliance with such a widely observed treaty is clear move towards 
solidifying the rule of international law. 
Another move towards extending the scope of international law was seen with the first 
ever convictions for rape brought by the ICTY. Although rape has a long legislative 
history as a narrow war crime, see chapter five, this marked the beginning of its 
treatment as a crime against humanity. On Feb 22 2001 Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir 
Kovac and Zoran Vukovic were sentenced to 28 years, 20 years and 12 years 
respectively. The convictions of the men were for various charges including rape as 
both a crime against humanity and as a violation of the laws or customs of war. In 
addition, enslavement was prosecuted as a crime against humanity. Trial Chamber II 
found that rape was `used by members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces as an 
instrument of terror'. 35 This is somewhat different from the common description of the 
charge as `rape as a military strategy'. The judges found that there was no evidence of 
high-level strategic planning, thus excluding prosecutions of indirectly responsible 
individuals. All of the defendants were personally responsible for the crimes. This was 
also evident in the Trial Chamber judgement which also stated that "lawless 
opportunists should expect no mercy, no matter how low their position in the chain of 
34 UN Doc. S/1995/134, Para 12 (1995) 
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command may be" " Thus in this case, the prosecutions were relatively unproblematic 
and directed at relatively low-ranking offenders. The difficulties inherent in proving a 
strategic motive remain to be seen. 
The statute of the ICTR represents an important convergence between the application of 
humanitarian law in internal as well as international armed conflicts. Despite this 
development, there are a few dissenting voices. Sapru, for instance rejects this as an 
intrusion into domestic affairs which is outside of the United Nations mandate, and is 
particularly indefensible under a Chapter VII action. Sapru argues that it is 
inappropriate to characterise internal problems as threats to international security. 37 
Sapru's argument however, neglects the nature of customary law. Essentially it is both 
fluid and reactive, it is intended to evolve alongside the international community. It is 
significant for a consideration of a nascent international polity though, as it achieves 
more fully the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 
Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The ICTY also represented an extension of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility. This was represented by the inclusion of acts of planning and 
participation in the preparation of a crime, and also aiding and abetting. [Article 6] 38 
35 Judgement Of Trial Chamber II In The Kunarac, Kovac And Vukovic Case, ICTY, The Hague, 22 
February 2001. JL/P. I. S. /566-e 
36 Judgement Of Trial Chamber II In The Kunarac, Kovac And Vukovic Case, ICTY, The Hague, 22 
February 2001. JL/P. I. S. /566-e 
37 T. Sapru, 'Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Security Council Foray in Rwanda, ' Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 32,1997, pp. 329-354. For a good review of the benefits of the ICTR see 
P. Akhavan, `The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment', American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90,1996, pp. 501-510. 
38 Statute of the International Tribunal (adopted May 
25,1993) Articles 5 and 6, available online, 
http: //www. United Nations. org/icty/basic/statut/statute. htm, accessed 26.10.00. 
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Although these changes are not in themselves huge, they represent a firming and 
shaping of the norms of individual criminal responsibility, a vital development if the 
requirements of deterrence are to be served. 
In addition, according to Article 6 the tribunal has jurisdiction over persons only, there 
are no criminal collectives or organisations. This is a far narrower definition of liability 
than that of Nuremberg, and as such is a fuller realisation of the principle of individual 
responsibility. This had lead some theorists to describe such a direction as part of a 
`modern trend' to exclude strict liability and impose individual responsibility. " 
However, it seems clear that the assignment of guilt to collectives was essentially a 
practical solution to the enormous task of de-nazification undertaken by national courts 
under the aegis of the Nuremberg statute. 40 Once an organisation had been pronounced 
criminal it was only necessary for the prosecution to prove that an individual had 
belonged to that organisation in order to deliver a guilty verdict. However, this was still 
a move towards individual responsibility as the organisations pronounced criminal were 
only those for which individuals had had to undertake positive and autonomous steps to 
gain membership, as in, for example, the SS. The United nations War Crimes 
Commission reported that: 
Organisations such as the Gestapo and the S. S. were direct- 
action units, and were recruited from volunteers accepted 
only because of aptitude for, and fanatical devotion to, their 
violent purposes. 41 
39 K. Turkovic, `The Contribution of the Statute of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal 
for Former 
Yugoslavia to the Development of International Humanitarian Law. 'Croatian International 
Relations 
Review, Vol. II, No 4/5-1996. p. 25 
40 United Nations War Crimes Commission, The Problem of the Major 
War Criminals, 16 May 1945. 
P. R. O reference: FO 800/923, p. 4-5. 
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As we saw in chapter 4, this autonomy is one of the necessary conditions of criminal 
responsibility. However, within the prosecutions at the international Nuremberg 
Tribunal for the `major war criminals', the accused were selected as `representative' of 
the wider population. The accused were drawn from categories encompassing 
propagandists and industrialists as well as every branch of the military and 
government. 42 In many ways this was a collectivised approach to responsibility, rather 
than an extraction of `most guilty' individuals. In many senses the Nuremberg Tribunal 
was crucially concerned with the prosecution of a whole state, it simply did this 
symbolically rather than practically as is the case with reparations and sanctions. Thus 
the ICTY represents a significant step towards the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility, rather than the accused being representative of different categories of 
society, indictments are made solely on the basis of evidence and apply to anyone 
committing an offence. 
To this end Art 7 of the tribunal statute provides that: 
The official position of any accused person, whether as 
Head of State or Government or as a responsible 
Government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. " 
Neither a plea of superior orders nor immunity by reason of official position in the state 
should constitute a defence. However, it does seem that a belief that the act was justified 
41 Ibid., p. 5. 
42 See Chapter 2 on Nuremberg. 
43 Statute of the International Tribunal (adopted May 
25,1993) Article 7. available online, 
http: //www. UnitedNations. org/icty/basic/statut/statute. htm, accessed 26.10.00. 
Also available in A. 
Roberts, and R. Guelff, Documents on the 
Laws of War, 3rd Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 
p. 565. 
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for military purposes might constitute a plea in mitigation, more crucially it may also be 
used to disprove the issue of intent. " The issue of intent is a difficult one in these 
circumstances and best explored by an analogy with domestic law. Suppose an 
individual were to hit another on the back with, say, a large piece of wood, causing 
injury. In one case we can assume that the individual intended the hurt they caused. 
However, further investigation of the circumstances might show that the individual was 
in fact attempting to save the injured party from the potentially fatal bite of a scorpion 
they had spotted on their back. In this circumstance we can clearly see a distinction 
between intent and motive. The intention in both circumstances would have been the 
same, to hit the injured party with a large piece of wood. But in the second case the 
motive is different from the intent. At Nuremberg the distinction between motive and 
intent was hidden, as it is in most domestic cases. The motive was well documented and 
clearly criminal, as well as being evident from the pattern of killings. But when such 
documentation is not available it may seem impossible to prove the mens rea of 
genocide especially given that within the genocide convention there is no numerical 
threshold after which mass killings become genocide. Within the genocide convention 
the proof of the offence lies solely with the `intent to destroy ... a racial group'. 
5 
Francois Hampson points out, that it is therefore the business of the prosecuting lawyers 
to infer intent from the actions, orders and behaviour of the accused and as a result it is 
preferable to avoid the convention altogether and prosecute on other grounds. 46 The 
ICTY has, however, clarified the manner in which charges of genocide may be 
introduced by imposing the requirement that violations must be widespread and 
44 H. Fox, `An International Tribunal for War Crimes: Will the UN Succeed Where Nuremberg Failed'? 
', 
The World Today, Vol. 49, No. 10,1993, pp. 194-197, p. 195. 
as See chapter 3. 
46 Interview conducted with Francoise Hampson. University of Essex, 
Colchester. , February 
22 2002. 
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systematic, thus introducing an extra element into the prohibited conduct. 47 Meron 
suggests that this may have `made the burden of proving crimes against humanity more 
difficult to meet'. " Yet given the difficulties I have outlined with the concept of intent, 
a new focus upon the more concrete notion of parallel or pattern killings must be an 
advantage. Indeed, in the first successful prosecution for Genocide achieved in the 
ICTY against General Krstic49, Mark Harmon relied principally upon witnesses and the 
pattern of the killings. " 
Yet although it is possible to infer intent and therefore prosecute those who are remote 
from the crime, there still seems to be a gap between what is legally possible and what 
is politically feasible. Notwithstanding Art 7, it is still impossible to prosecute those 
who are current heads of state. As we have seen the reason for this is not a legal one, 
there are clear grounds for arguing that the perpetrators of genocide at least cannot 
claim impunity. However, there are equally well grounded precedents for claiming 
immunity from prosecution. The ICJ went to great lengths to distinguish between the 
two concepts in its latest judgment" yet came down in favour of allowing immunity 
from prosecution for heads of state and diplomatic staff. This despite the fact that in the 
deliberations over the form and nature of the Nuremberg Tribunals the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was already described as `obsolete' and a `relic of the doctrine of 
47 Statements of France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Security Council, 
25 May 
1993, S/PV. 3217; UN Secretary-Generals Report of 3 May 1993, S/25704, para. 48. 
48 Meron, Op Cit. n. 27, p. 233. 
49 Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33) Judgement on 2 August 2001 13 March 2000 - 26 June 2001. Found guilty 
by virtue of his individual criminal responsibility on one count of genocide, one count of crimes against 
humanity and one count of violations of the laws or customs of war 
by Trial Chamber I on 2 August 2001 
and sentenced to 46 years' imprisonment. 
Both Defense and Prosecution have filed notices of appeal on 
15 August 2001 and 16 August 2001 respectively. 
so Interview conducted with Mark Harmon QC , ICTY, 
The Hague, April 11 2002. 
51 See chapter 8, Belgium v The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. 
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the divine right of kings'. 52 Ultimately then in cases of system crime, the immunity is 
coextensive with the crime. This was doubtless, as Witteween put it, a `conservative' 
decision, but one essential to protect the current manner of inter-state interaction. 53 
Thus we are left with an illogical and contradictory position, but one ultimately 
expressive of the tensions between individual and state in system criminality. On first 
sight this latest decision from the ICJ seems to contradict the statute of the ICTY, 
perhaps representing a reversal of the gains made by the ICTY. This contention is 
demonstrated when we assess the path through the ICTY that the prosecution of its most 
high-ranking accused followed, that of Milosevic. 
Milosevic 
On the 22 May 1999, an indictment was issued by the chief prosecutor Louise Arbour 
against Slobodan Milosevic. 54 Charged with both crimes against humanity and 
violations of the laws and customs of war, it was the first time proceedings had been 
instigated against a current head of state. 55 At the time of issue Milosevic was still 
president and it was to be another 27 months, until his extradition to the ICTY on June 
52 United Nations War Crimes Commission, The Problem of the Mcjor War Criminals, 16 May 1945, 
P. R. O reference: FO 800/923, p. 4. 
53 Interview conducted with A. Witteween, Information Officer, ICJ, The Hague, 8April, 
2002. 
sa Along with Milan Milutinovic and Nikola Sainovic, who both 
held various high-ranking positions 
within Milosevic's government. Colonel General 
Dragojub Ojdanic, the Chief of the General Staff of the 
VJ, and Vlajko Stojljkovic, the minister of Internal 
Affairs of Serbia. All also charged with crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws of war. Listed in the 
indictment, available online http: //www. 
Unorg/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e. htm accessed 18.08.00 
55Milosevic Indictment, available online http: //www. Unorg/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e. 
htm 
accessed 18.08.00, p 1. 
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28 200 1.11 Whilst Milosevic was in power the ICTY made relatively few moves towards 
enforcing the warrant. However, after Milosevic attempted to deny that the opposition 
had won the Sept 26 2000 Serbian election, a campaign of civil disobedience and strikes 
ventually forced him to concede on October 6 2000.57 After this time the ICTY 
prosecutor, Carle Del Ponte began a series of representations to secure Milosevic's 
extradition to stand trial at The Hague. 
In contrast with the case of Iraq below, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) had been strongly oriented towards 
individual responsibility. 58 But although the Dayton agreement contained fairly robust 
language with regard to co-operation with the tribunal, enforcement of that cooperation 
had been another matter. 59 Nevertheless, the agreement contained several explicit 
references to the ICTY, outlining the responsibilities of corporations and public 
officials. " Yet Milosevic's position as incumbent head of state allowed him immunity 
from prosecution. His removal whilst in office would be unsustainable within the 
current international diplomatic structure. The head of state is more than their state's 
representative, in legal terms he or she embodies that state within traditional diplomatic 
56 Milosevic Case (IT-02-54), `Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina', ICTY, The Hague: Ongoing. 
Details included in the case material: Slobodan Milosevic, born on 20 August 1941 in Pozarevac, Serbia, 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Arrested: 1 April 2001 in Belgrade by local authorities. Transferred to 
ICTY: 29 June 2001. Initial Appearances: 
3 July 2001, `not guilty' plea entered for all counts on the `Kosovo' indictment. 
29 October 2001, `not guilty' plea entered for all counts on the `Croatia' indictment. 
11 December 2001, `not guilty' plea entered for all counts on the `Bosnia' indictment. 
57 `The Milosevic Years', April 24 2002, CNN. com. available online 
http: //www. cnn. community/2002/WORLD/Europe/02/ 11 /milosevic. timeline, accessed 
12.08.02. 
58 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Office of the High 
Representative, December 14 1995. 
59T. Meron, `Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans', Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1997, pp. 
2-8. 
60 See the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Annex I a. article X. also 
Annex 9, article IV and Annex 11, article VI. 
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norms. Were heads of state at risk of detention, the practice of international diplomacy 
would be unworkable. As we shall see in chapter 8 this is a principle that has been 
upheld and reinforced by the ICJ and it is here, at the apex of responsibility, that the 
tension between traditional inter-state structure and the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility, is most revealed. It is telling that in the most outstandingly successful 
application of individual responsibility, the case of Milosevic, the principle of 
sovereignty triumphed. 
Even when Milosevic had conceded electoral defeat Del Ponte had to respect the 
sovereign autonomy of Yugoslvia. She began by making representations to the newly 
formed government of the opposition, headed by Kostunica. Initially declaring that he 
would not co-operate with the tribunal , Kostunica was put under pressure to meet 
Del 
Ponte by members of his government after the Tribunal issued a revised warrant for 
Milosevic's arrest. G' In it the tribunal demanded that Milosevic's financial assets were 
frozen and demanded that the former president and other indicted criminals were 
handed over to The Hague. In a statement the ICTY said that Yugoslavia, as a holder of 
UN seat, was obliged to comply with its obligations under Security council resolutions. 
If Yugoslavia did not comply, the ICTY threatened to seek UN sanctions against it. 2 
Her first meeting with Kostunica was reportedly `frosty', with the president refusing to 
accept the jurisdiction of the tribunal. " By April 1, Milosevic had been arrested on 
charges of domestic corruption, and by April 4 the Tribunal had issued a statement 
61 J Steele, `Kostunica Put Under UN Pressure Over Milosevic', Guardian, January 25 2001, available 
online, http: //www. guardian. co. uk/international 
/story/0,3604,427117,00. html. accessed 15.08.02. 
62 Statement to the Press bi Carle Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, The Hague, December 20 2000, FH/P. I. 
S. /550-e. 
63 Steele, J., `Kostunica Snubs Call to Seize Milosevic', The Guardian, January 
24 2001, available online, 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/international /story/0,3604,427117,00. 
html. accessed 15.08.02. 
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calling for Milosevic's extradition. " However, the untried nature of the procedure was 
evident in the round of negotiations that proved necessary to bring Milosevic to trial. It 
was US support and the pressure brought to bear by a proposed donor's conference. 65 
Thus the economic and diplomatic strain Yugoslavia was placed under was 
considerable. They capitulated and extradited Milosevic on June 28 2001, just 24 hours 
before the opening of the international donor's conference. " It is illustrative to compare 
this case with that of a notable case of non-prosecution, that of Saddam Hussein. 
Saddam Hussein 
Although the proposals to make Saddam Hussein criminally liable for violations of 
humanitarian law had failed to produce action by any international body, it had prepared 
the ground to try perpetrators active in later conflicts and prosecution is still a prospect 
for Saddam Hussein. The position over Iraq is indicative of a real reluctance to carry 
individual responsibility to its logical conclusion, demonstrated in the Gulf Conflict. 
With the egregious crimes of the Iraqi Regime under Saddam Hussein, the international 
community was presented with a clear-cut and, certainly from the legal sense 
unproblematic, case of both war crimes against Kuwait, and genocide against its own 
population. These crimes were ordered by a small number of men and the allegations 
64 The ICTY President And Prosecutor Insist On The International Obligation Of The Federal Republic 
Of Yugoslavia To Promptly Transfer Slobodan Milosevic To The Hague, The Hague, 4 April 2001, 
SB/P. I. S. /584e 
65 `Prosecutor Upbeat on Milosevic Trial', BBC News, May 11 2001, available online, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/! /hi/world/Europe/1324354. stm, accessed 03.04.03 
66 `Milosevic Extradited', BBC News, available online 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/! /hi/world/Europe/1324354. stm 
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were supported by a large mass of documentary evidence ." In addition, Iraq was a 
defeated belligerent, thus the way should have been clear for application of the full 
force of individual criminal responsibility. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it 
seemed the international community held some enthusiasm for individual 
prosecutions. " Security Council Resolution 674 makes numerous references to current 
international law naming no less than six treaty violations. Pointedly, it also refers to 
individual responsibility for grave breaches under the Geneva Convention. 69 The month 
before, the idea of an international criminal court had been mooted by Margaret 
Thatcher and George Bush, and a year later, after the massacre of Kurdish Iraqis, the 
matter was raised with more urgency by Hans Genscher in a meeting of the (then) 12 
member states of the European Community. 70 As a result, a letter to the Secretary- 
General was drafted and sent on April, 16 1991, requesting that he: 
examine the question of the personal responsibility of the 
Iraqi leaders in the tragedy that is unfolding, in particular 
on the basis of the Convention against genocide, and the 
possibility of trying them before an international court. " 
67 James Scheffer, US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, named 12 men at a conference of the 
Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights, Sept 18,2000, as wanted to stand trial for `war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide'. They were, Saddam Hussein, All Hassan al-Majid, 
Uday, Quasay 
Saddam Hussein, Hamza, Taha Ramadan, Barzan al-Tikriti, Watban al-Tikriti, Sabawi al-Tikriti, Izzat al- 
Douli, Tariq Aziz and Aziz Salih Noman. Scheffer described `millions of pages of Iraqi documentation. 
', 
a substantial part of which have been handed to the Iraqi research and Documentation 
Project to be posted 
online. Scheffer, D., `Saddam Hussein: War Crimes and Crimes against the 
Iraqi People. ' Available 
http: //www. totse. com/files/FA006/Kurdcrm. htm, accessed 24.10.00. 
68 Y. Dinstein, and M. Tabory, (eds), War Crimes in International Lai', The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 
1996, P. 16. 
69 Security Council Resolution 674 (1990) of 29th October 1990, S/RES/674 1990 - Oct 29, available 
online: http: //www. United Nations. org/Does/Scres/1990/674e. pdf, accessed 
24.10.00. 
70 ICTY, The Path to The Hague: Documents on the Origins of the ICTY. Available online, 
http: //www. UnitedNations. org/icty/publication/path. htm#a, accessed 13.08.00, p. 3 
71 Text of a letter from Mr Poos, President-in-Office of the 
Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reproduced 
in full in, ICTY, The Path to 
the Hague: Documents on the Origins of the 
ICTY. Available online, http: //www. United 
Nations. org/icty/publication/path. 
htm#a, accessed 13.08.00, p. 5. 
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Although in an address to the European Council by Jacques Santer (the acting President 
at that time) he stated that the United Nations Secretary- General had responded "with 
interest" to the letter, 72 neither the United Nations Secretary general nor other United 
Nations bodies eventually followed through on the proposal. Indeed, there was a 
remarkable silence on the issue, despite the fact that the resolution at the end of the 
conflict, Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3 1991, is one of the longest ever 
passed. 73 It deals in detail with the cease-fire and the dismantling of Iraq capacity for 
chemical warfare, yet it makes no mention of personal responsibility for war crimes. 74 
However, the security council did pursue the issue of reparations, demanding that Iraq: 
accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage or injury 
arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a 
result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. 75 
This firmly links the reparations with violations of the laws of war, thus it seems clear 
that the security council chose on this occasion to abandon the innovation of individual 
criminal responsibility, in favour of a relatively unproblematic reliance upon state 
responsibility without penal sanctions. Further evidence for this position can be seen 
within the international community's emphasis upon economic sanctions. 
72 Plenary Session of the European Council, speech of Mr Santer, President-in-Office of the Council, 
17 
April 1991. Available online: http: //www. UnitedNations. org/icty/publication/path. htm#a, accessed 
13.08.00 
73 A. Roberts, `The Laws of War in the Gulf Conflict, International Security, Vol. 18: 3, Winter, 
1993/94, pp. 134-181, p 174. 
74 Security Council Resolution 687,1991, S/Res/687 1991 
75 Security Council Resolution 686,1991, S/Res/687 1991, Para 2 
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The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq were also linked to violations of the laws of 
war. They were first imposed on 6 August 1990, in response to the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The Security Council declared this to be illegal 
and imposed comprehensive sanctions under SC res 66 1. " All exports from Iraq and 
Kuwait were banned, similarly, the sale of weaponry to those countries, also, all funds 
were to be denied to Iraq. " According to Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter: 
The Security Council may decide what measures involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed [... ] These may 
include the complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. " 
These powers were intended to allow for mandatory imposition but in practice the 
Security Council had settled for the call for the relatively ineffective voluntary sanctions 
until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Here, for the first time sanctions were used against an 
aggressor as a coercive weapon on the grounds of `threat to international peace'. 79 From 
the outset Iraq seemed extremely vulnerable to such measures, its one product, oil, was 
relatively easy to track and interdict and Iraq imported between 60-70% of its basic food 
requirements. 8° For the sanctions to be lifted, Iraq had to meet a comprehensive list of 
conditions including weapons inspection and restriction, withdrawal from Kuwait, and 
an undertaking not to commit or support acts of international terrorism. However, 
it did 
76 Security Council Resolution 661. 
77 E. Herring, Sanctions on Iraq, unpublished paper, p. 8. 
78 Department of Public Information, Charter of the United Nations and 
Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, New York: United Nations, 
1994. 
79 N. D. White, `Collective Sanctions: An Alternative to Military Coercion', International 
Relations, Vol. 
XII: No. 3, Dec 1994, pp. 75-91. 
80 D. Bethlehem, (ed), The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions and their Economic 
Consequences, Cambridge: 
Grotius, 1991 cited in White, ibid. 
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not include provisions for the prosecution of those committing war crimes or grave 
breaches in the course of the conflict as the Dayton Agreement had done. Instead, its 
purpose was to secure compliance by Iraq to the demands of the international 
community, so in this sense they were not `punitive' in the true sense of responsibility 
assignation. 
Reparations 
However, there was one area in which the sanctions regime dealt with a form of moral 
assignation, the issue of reparations. Iraq was required to pay compensation `for any 
direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural 
resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations' incurred during 
its illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 8' Here there is a clear focus towards 
collective treatment of Iraqi citizens, rather than the assignation of individual criminal 
responsibility. 
Reparations focus not on punishment or deterrence but on the victims of such crimes. 
Yet for reparations to make moral sense, they must be distributed to victims, but they 
must also come from those responsible for the injury. Even, Michael Scharf, a defender 
of reparations as a policy option, doubts that this could have occurred in Iraq. He points 
out that reparations address the goals of: 
81 Sec Res 687,3 April 1991. 
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restoring, rehabilitating and reconstructing, but in a way 
that frustrates the goals of preventing and deterring. This 
curious contradiction occurs because although a collective 
entity called Iraq is to pay the damages, there is a perverse 
lack of logic in who is actually making the payment. 82 
Unlike Scharf, I argue that this problem is not confined to Iraq, but is inevitable when 
collective entities are seen as morally liable for criminal offences. The inconsistency 
endemic to war crimes prosecutions was also evident when we consider that several 
junior Iraqi officers who happened to be captured in Kuwait were prosecuted in Kuwait 
for lesser offences. The measures demanded of the Iraqi state were compensatory in 
character rather than criminal and therefore reflected a view of inter-state interaction 
which regards states as monolithic and represents a reversal in terms of affirming 
international moral consensus. Where the concepts of individual responsibility collide 
with the tradition priorities of inter-state interaction, then individual responsibility is 
clearly insufficiently developed to prevail. 
Sanctions 
Although the sanctions regime succeeded in its immediate objectives, it has failed in its 
longer term ambitions. The aim of sanctions was expressly stated not to be to starve the 
Iraqi people into submission, but initially to weaken Iraq's hold on Kuwait, and then to 
force compliance with its international obligations to disarm and compensate its 
victims. 83 However, the sanctions regime was simultaneously absolutely effective, in 
that it devastated the Iraqi economy, but ineffective, in that it seemed the pressure of 
that devastation fell principally upon the Iraqi people rather than the regime itself. This 
82 M. P. Scharf, `The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court', Duke 
Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, Vol. 6: 1 l, pp167-186, p. 
183. 
83 White, Op Cit. n. 79. 
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led to growing international sympathy84 for the Iraqi people and condemnation of the 
sanctions regime. 85 Although sanctions are widely viewed as the preferred alternative to 
force, their application in Iraq has raised question marks over their ability to achieve 
desired results and their compatibility with the laws of war. " The indiscriminate nature 
of the effects of sanctions have been raised as a cause for concern. 87 But if the decision 
to use sanctions is indicative of a traditional approach to conflict which collectivises 
individuals within states, (as opposed to individualising the responsibility for aspects of 
the conflict), the condemnation of the sanctions regime is also illustrative, in that it 
demonstrates a growing discomfiture with collectivised blame. As we have seen in 
chapter five, moral behaviour in warfare is discriminated behaviour, how well the 
distinction is drawn between combatants and non-combatants is the `moral benchmark' 
of modem warfare. An indication that this principle is in play here is the tendency to 
criticise the sanctions regime in terms of its impact upon children, women and the sick, 
even though this is not necessarily relevant in post-conflict Iraq. 88 Whereas in warfare 
these groups are delineated as non-combatants, and therefore less appropriate as military 
targets, this distinction loses its force in a post-conflict scenario. This suggests that the 
distinction is less a military one and more a moral one. These groups are not perceived 
as less dangerous than other groups, the rationale behind their protection in conflict 
84 In the UK alone there are many groups campaigning against the sanctions regime, these include 
Campaign against Sanctions on Iraq, Campaign Against War and Sanctions on Iraq, Emergency 
Committee on Iraq, Gulf Crisis Group, Iraqi People First, Manchester Coalition Against Sanctions and 
War on Iraq, Sussex campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq and Voices in the Wilderness 
UK. 
85 G. Bahgat, `Beyond Sanctions: US Policy Toward Iraq', International Relations, Vol. XIII, No. 4, 
April 1997, pp. 57-68. 
86 Roberts, Op Cit. n. 73. 
87 Ibid. 
88 For example R. Fisk, `Innocent Victims Made to 
Suffer for the Sins of Saddam', The Independent, 
March 7 1998. D. Halliday, [Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, 1997-98] `On Resignation', 
Middle East 
International, available http: //www. cam. ac. uk/societies/casi/briefing/pamp-ed1. 
html, accessed 07.08.02. 
S. Jenkins, `Waging Peace', The Times, Aug 5 1998. and J. Dreze, and H. Gazdar, 
`Hunger and Poverty in 
Iraq 1991', World Development, Vol. 20: No. 7,1992, pp. 921-945. G. Alagiah, 
`Starvation- The West's 
Weapon of Mass Destruction Against Iraq', 
The Independent on Sandar, Feb 28 1999. 
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scenarios, but rather, less guilty. Halliday's comment was a typical one when he 
claimed that `We are in the process of destroying an entire society. Its as simple and 
terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral. "' The strength of the criticisms of the 
sanctions regime are an indication of a new regard for individual moral culpability. 
Individual Prosecutions 
This view is also supported by the observation that there have been many calls for the 
prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his deputy, Ali Hassan Al-Majid. The special 
rapporteur for Iraq has continually reiterated the responsibility of those at the `highest 
level of government': 
There can be no doubt as to the State of Iraq's 
responsibility for the systematic violation of human rights 
in Iraq. Similarly, there can be no doubt as to the special 
and individual responsibility of senior members of the Iraqi 
Government for serious human rights violations over many 
years. "' 
He has also named Saddam Hussein and his deputy for crimes against peace, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity occurring during both peacetime and during war 
9' In 
particular, the Anfal Campaign against the Iraqi Kurds was noted as a clearly criminal 
89 D. Halliday, [former UN Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq] in, The 
Independent, October 15,1998. available online, http: //cam. ac. uk/societies/casi/briefing/pamp_ed1. 
html, 
accessed 07.08.02 
90 M. Van der Stoel, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Economic and 
Social Council: UN, 
1995, Para 66. E/CN. 4/1995/56 
91 M. Van der Stoel, Report on the Situation ofHwnan Rights in Iraq, Economic and 
Social Council: UN. 
1994, Para 189. E/CN. 4/1994/58 
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act that was subject to individual criminal responsibility. 92 The reports allowed 
responsibility to both state and individuals, as well as defining clearly criminal acts 
which are subject to universal jurisdiction and linking those acts to the fine legal 
grounding of armed conflict. Thus, there was evidently the legal scope to assign 
individual responsibility should the Security Council so choose. The US Senate, March 
13 1998, passed a resolution calling for a UN war crimes tribunal to try Saddam 
Hussein. Former President George Bush once compared Saddam to Hitler. Madeleine 
Albright has expressed interest in moving against Saddam in the international legal 
arena. " However, none of these moves to indict has gone further than symbolism or 
rhetoric. Due, it has been suggested, to the possibility that any push to indict and 
convict Saddam Hussein would face opposition from United Nations Security Council 
members Russia and China. 94 
That there could be problems with individual prosecutions is beyond doubt. It would 
have been difficult to arrest Saddam Hussein, even under conditions of total occupation, 
which the coalition forces were anxious to avoid. 95 After the end of the hostilities it 
would have been awkward to call for his arrest whilst simultaneously negotiating cease- 
fire agreements with his regime. Furthermore outside powers were reluctant to press for 
trials if local powers would not support them. 96 In addition, as head of state such an 
92 M. Van der Stoel, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Economic and Social Council: UN, 
1994, Para 189. E/CN. 4/1994/58 
93 `U. S. Senate calls for war crimes trial for Saddam Hussein', available online 
http: //www. lworldcommunication. or/worldnews. htm#Rebels%20With%20a%2ONew%20Q accessed 
05.05.02 
94 `U. S. Senate calls for war crimes trial for Saddam Hussein', available online 
http: //www. lworldcommunication. or/worldnews. htm#Rebels%20With%20a%20New%20Q accessed 
05.05.02 
95 C. Richards, `CIA Chief Tells Why Saddam Survived, ' The Independent, Jan 
9,1993. 
96 Roberts, Op Cit. n. 73. 
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intervention would have represented a serious erosion of Iraq's sovereignty. These 
difficulties are representative of the difficulties that inevitably attend prosecutions of 
organs of state. As I have asserted, the boundaries between state and individual are 
insufficiently fixed to allow prosecutions for system criminality where there is little or 
no practical distinction between offender and state. However, these conditions were also 
present in the case of Milosevic, as we have seen. Yet an indictment against Milosevic 
was made regardless of the early practical difficulties of bringing him in person to trial. 
Conclusion 
The constitution of the ICTY and the ICTR have represented a significant strengthening 
of the application of the principle of individual responsibility. However, this advance is 
by no means as unambiguous or entrenched as might first be thought. Significantly, in 
Iraq, another case of armed conflict in which atrocities had been committed against 
civilian populations, and also a conflict which had been internationalised by security 
council involvement, there has been no such move to apply individual responsibility . 
Instead, the situation has been `collectivised' by the use of sanctions, an element of 
which included provision for reparations. This is significant in terms of this thesis in 
that it indicates an approach to Iraqi offences which treats them as civil in character, 
rather than criminal. This indicates a traditional state-to-state view of international 
interaction, rather than the more universalist notion of the world comprised of 
represented, and criminally liable, individuals. A civil approach to offences 
does not 
indicate a real regard for a potential international polity. It is only the criminalisation of 
offences as crimes against humanity which implies a global 
body politic against which 
the crime has been committed. Reviewing the action with respect to 
Iraq, and 
considering how standard a mode of 
interaction took place, the embeddedness of its 
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tradition and the weight of history and common practice upon which it rests, the 
achievements and implications of the ICTY and ICTR are all the more striking. For the 
first time since Nuremberg the principle of individual criminal responsibility has been 
made concrete, yet the gap between the legally possible and the politically feasible 
remains and the principle remains in tension with the traditions and practice of common 
state-to-state interaction. However, the tribunals have opened a new phase in the 
treatment of gross abuses and as we shall see in chapter 8, the willingness and potential 
to prosecute those at the apex of responsibility has been expressed in a variety of novel 
legal and political forms. 
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PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL 
Chapter 8 
The Future of Responsibility Assignation 
The progress towards individual criminal responsibility and the moral development it 
represents is not confined exclusively to violations of the laws of war. Many pieces of 
international legislation, such as the Convention on Torture, 1984, whilst they may have 
originated in the laws of war, have long since lost their connection with armed conflict. 
Perhaps the most salient feature of the developments post-ICTY has been the new 
willingness to recognise principles of justice in concrete legal action in circumstances 
discrete from armed conflict. These have included the extradition of Pinochet, the issue 
of warrants against Abdulaye Ndombasi and Ariel Sharon by Belgium, and the pursuit 
of Osama bin Laden. In addition, a variety of domestic remedies have been used by 
states internally for prosecutions including truth commissions and amnesties revealing a 
different orientation to justice. Set against the background of urgency created by the 
beginning of the trial of Milosevic, the first trial of a former head of state, and the 
frustrated attempts to apprehend Radovan Karadic, it might seem that the moral 
consensus around prosecution for system criminality is beyond question. These rapid 
developments at the turn of the 20th century are dramatic enough to be characterised by 
Rodley as the genie being released from the bottle. 
' However closer examination of 
these developments reveal some deep-rooted difficulties with the attempts to 
accommodate these prosecutions, given the structural conditions under which the 
international community operates. 
N. S. Rodley, `Breaking the Cycle of Impunity for Gross Violations of Human 
Rights: The Pinochet 
Case in Perspective', Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol.: 69, pp. 
11-26. p. 25. 
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This thesis argues that the introduction of individual criminal liability, for crimes which 
are large enough in scope to require the resources of the state in their commission, 
expresses a nascent international society. This is because the victim is not in the 
essential sense an individual, aggregate of individuals or even nation or ethnic group, 
the victim is, conceptually, a polity in the case of criminal offences. As Arendt observed 
in her commentary on the Eichmann trial: 
Just as a murderer is prosecuted because he has violated 
the law of the community, and not because he has 
deprived the smith family of ... its breadwinner, so these 
modem state-employed mass murderers must be 
prosecuted because they violated the order of mankind, 
and not because they killed millions of people. 2 
In the same way as in domestic law, complaints by one individual against another are 
civil in character, whilst violations of the criminal code are violations against the 
community in which they occur. For this reason victims do not choose whether criminal 
proceedings take place or not, the `victim' is the law-making community itself. In 
addition, as we saw in chapter 4, only individuals can bear criminal guilt. As it is 
logically incoherent to distribute criminal guilt across a collective, actions against states 
are civil in character. Thus, the failure to apply individual criminal responsibility is a 
failure to assign responsibility of any meaningful kind. In these cases, there is an 
effective denial of an international polity. 
3 
This chapter will show that the legislation has developed in two strands one promoting 
the criminal trial of individuals, in tandem with, and often overlapping, the traditional 
foundation of international interaction, the legal obligations of states to one another in 
2 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, New York: Penguin 
Books, 1994, 
p. 244. 
3 In addition, Eichmann's trial on 12 counts 
including four for committing `crimes against the Jewish 
people' was also an effective 
denial of the claims embodied in the charge of `crimes against humanity'. 
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an anarchic system rather than a polity. This will demonstrate that although the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, and therefore the expression of a nascent 
international polity seems prevalent, it is by no means as well developed as it may 
appear. Some of the most abiding principles of international law run contrary to this 
development, such as the principles of sovereign immunity, non-intervention and indeed 
a legal tradition which regards states as `large individuals' or the monolithic bearers of 
individual legal personality. To designate something `criminal' implies a minimum 
level of moral consensus whereas a system which delivers full and effective criminal 
liability requires a full consensus. This issue is especially evident in the treatment of 
`system criminality', necessarily committed with the resources of the state. When we 
look at the pattern of prosecutions (and failure to prosecute), international moral 
consensus is still relatively weak when set against the principles of sovereign immunity 
and non-intervention. 
National Courts and Extradition 
Pinochet 
One of the most striking of these developments was the case brought against Auguste 
Pinochet by Spain. The decision by the House of Lords on March 24,1999 that 
Pinochet was not immune from being extradited to Spain for prosecution for offences 
committed as head of state of Chile, had, as Rodley describes, `an element of especial 
political and juridical novelty'. 
4 This novelty centres around the decision that Pinochet's 
status as head of state at the time of the offences, did not preclude prosecution. 
This is 
important within the framework of this argument in that it demonstrates the tensions 
4Rodley, Op Cit. n. 1, p. 11. 
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inherent in the application of the principle of individual criminal responsibility for 
system criminality. The Law lords opinions usefully summarised the various arguments 
surrounding the issues of assigning responsibility and highlighted the clash between the 
principles of sovereign immunity and individual responsibility. 
On 17 October 1998 whilst undergoing medical treatment at a London clinic Pinochet 
was placed under formal arrest. The charges were eventually to include conspiracy to 
murder and to torture, and actual torture and hostage taking. 5 A Spanish judge, 
Balthasar Garzon ordered the initial international arrest warrant that led to the British 
warrant for Pinochet's extradition on behalf of the Spanish judiciary. A series of legal 
challenges eventually resulted in the case reaching the House of Lords for what was to 
be the first hearing of three. 6 The final decision was reached in Pinochet 3. The criminal 
responsibility of Pinochet was quickly established, the terms of the Convention on 
Torture unambiguously provided for responsibility at the highest level 
7 Pinochet could 
avoid extradition only by invoking immunity from prosecution. The notion of state or 
sovereign immunity is an important one in international law relating as it does, not to 
the individual but to the state. 8 Here the individual is regarded as `the embodiment of 
the state itself. 9 The State Immunity Act is a legal expression of the Acts of State 
doctrine10 and forms a fundamental principle of international interaction. It is crucial in 
5 Ibid., p. 18. 
6 Known as Pinochet 1, Pinochet 2 and Pinochet 3. The ruling of Pinochet I which held that state 
immunity did not apply in relation to these offences was challenged by a further appeal. This asked 
for a 
reversal of the decision on the grounds that one of the judges was affiliated to Amnesty 
International 
which had been an `intervenor' in the case. The judgment of Pinochet 
1 was set aside on the grounds that 
even the appearance of bias should be avoided. Accordingly, a new 
hearing took place (Pinochet 3) 
handing down a decision in March 24 1999. 
7 Article 1(1) `inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. ' 
8 ILM No3, p. 236. and Rodley. 
9 Opinion of Lord Millett 
10 H. Kelsen, `Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in International 
Law', Jel0sh 
Yearbook of International Latin, Vol. 22,1948. 
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the warrants issued by Belgium against Abdulaye Ndombasi and Ariel Sharon which we 
will shortly examine, and demonstrates the limits of the application of the principle of 
individual responsibility. The strength of this principle is reflected in the fact that all of 
the law lords agreed that a serving head of state enjoys immunity. This is reflected in 
the position expressed by a member of the FCO who underlined the fact that the British 
government in common with others could not contemplate so extreme an action as 
prosecution of a current head of state. ' 1 Lord Goff described sovereign immunity as a 
key general norm of international law whose centrality to the international system was 
of higher priority than the repression of crimes under international law, even when that 
law prescribed universal jurisdiction. ' 2 
However, Pinochet, as a former head of state, could be held for prosecution. Yet the 
outcome was uncertain, given that the prosecution related to acts carried out whilst 
Pinochet was in office. 13 This was despite the as yet, unrevised, 1978 Sovereign 
Immunity Act which extends legal immunity to former, as well as current, heads of 
state: 
14 
Lawyers acting for Pinochet, seized on the fact that he 
had been the Chilean head of state during the time the 
alleged crimes were committed..... By doing so, they 
forced British judges, first in the Divisional Court and 
then in the House of Lords, to choose between two very 
different views of international law. 15 
The first view was the traditional one, which upheld the view of states as the only 
relevant actors in the international law, the second was a view of international law as 
11 Interview with A., McDermott, Senior Research Officer, Global Issues Research Group, 
FCO, 24 
January 2001. 
12 Rodley ILM 606-607,1999. 
13 At this stage, Milosevic had not yet been indicted by the ICTY. 
14 State Immunity Act 1978, Section 20. 
220 
both applicable to, but more importantly, accessible to, individuals. The Pinochet case is 
an important one in that it posed the two competing views of international law in the 
starkest possible terms. 16 
The eventual judgment revealed scope for further extension of the principle in that it 
was held that there was no immunity in Pinochet's case. The strongest reasoning 
behind this, expressed by Lord Millett, was that with regards to torture: 
The official governmental nature of the act, which forms 
the basis of the immunity, is an essential ingredient of 
the offence. No rational system of criminal justice can 
allow an immunity which is co-extensive with the 
offence. " 
This is an effective argument in favour of allowing prosecutions, highlighting precisely 
the point of collision in the relationship between individual and state in cases of system 
criminality. It offers scope for eventual extension of the principle of individual criminal 
liability, for if it were to more generally supersede sovereign immunity; it could be 
regarded as signalling a firm moral consensus around the issue of system criminality. 
At the very least the Pinochet case represents a small advance in the growth of a 
fledgling international moral consensus, supported and expressed by a legal framework. 
The justiciability of these offences represents a new development in that it replaces 
raison d'etat as the ultimate conditioning factor in the consequences for leaders of gross 
human rights violations. This can be seen in the British response to Chilean attempts at 
a politically negotiated settlement to the affair, a Downing Street spokesman said that 
15 Byers, M., `In Pursuit of Pinochet', From LRB Vol. 21, No 2,21 January 1999, Oxford University 
press, available online, http: //www. lrb. co. uk/v21/n02/byer2102. 
htm accessed 01.07.02, 
16 Ibid. 
17 Rodley ILM 651,1999 
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"There is no deal, it is a judicial decision, not a political one, " 18 Although the US 
placed a great deal of political pressure upon the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, who 
faced a quasi-judicial decision on whether to allow the extradition to proceed, " 10 
Bindman, the solicitor who acted in concert with Amnesty International to push forward 
Pinochet's prosecution, confirmed that in this case he felt the governmental response 
was legal in its character. 20 How deeply this principle is held is a moot point, but there 
is no doubt that it was the increasingly legalistic parameters of the international 
response to system criminality that allowed the government to treat this case in this 
manner. In essence, this was a successful challenge to a state and claims of state 
sovereignty laid down by a court, although opportunistic and unsteady, ultimately it 
must represent the beginnings of a new primacy of international justice. 
Belgium 
However, the precedent set by the Pinochet case is by no means firmly entrenched. This 
can be seen by the contradictory position of Belgium after the ICJ decision on its arrest 
warrant of 11 Apr 2000 for Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium, charged with Grave 
breaches of the Geneva conventions, crimes against humanity and incitement to racial 
hatred. Belgium had enacted domestic legislation, the war crimes law 1993, which 
enables anyone to bring a war crimes case against any world leader and sought to try 
Ndombasi, in a Belgian court for allegedly urging the slaughter of minority Tutsi's in 
1998.21 The International Court of Justice, ICJ, handed down the decision on 6 March 
2002, that Ndombasi enjoyed immunity as he was the then incumbent foreign minister 
18 A. Grice, `Straw Faces Huge Pinochet Revolt', The Independent, Nov 30,1998. 
19 G. Hawthorn, `Pinochet: The Politics', International Affairs, Vol. 75: No. 2,1999, pp. 253-258. 
20 Interview with Geoffrey Bindman, Solicitor in Pinochet Case, Bindman and 
Co., London, July 2 2002, 
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f 22 23 or the Congo. The decision was founded on customary international law rather than 
legal instruments which were ambiguous in relation to immunity. Several important 
points were made in the judgment in relation to this thesis. 24 Firstly, immunity is 
designed to facilitate officials in the performance of their duty therefore detention on 
any charge for an offence of any kind interferes in such a manner. Secondly, in response 
to Belgium's argument that war crimes and crimes against humanity were exceptions to 
this rule because of their character, the court investigated the customary application of 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility by states. It concluded that there was 
no evidence that these crimes were customarily treated differently. On the evidence of 
recent cases including the Pinochet ruling, the court concluded that there were no 
exceptions to the rule of immunity (this is likely to refer to the unanimous opinion of 
the Law Lords that there were no grounds for detaining a current head of state) and that 
this immunity applied in the same way to diplomatic ministers. In addition, the decision 
highlights ways in which incumbent ministers may be prosecuted, the state itself may 
choose to prosecute the accused or the state may waive immunity. Finally, the court 
drew the distinction between impunity and immunity. The criminal character of the act 
does not change, only its legal consequences for the individual. 
25 Herein lies the tension 
between individual and state in system crime, where the crime can only be committed 
21 `March 6,2002- Belgian court delays decision on Sharon war crimes investigation' Wiesenthal Centre, 
http: //www. Accessed Mar 8 2002. 
22 Ndombasi has since lost office which may significantly impact upon the likelihood of his being 
prosecuted in future. However, at the time of the issue of the international arrest warrant 
by Belgium, he 
was a current foreign minister. 
23 In its Judgment, which is final, without appeal and binding for the Parties, the Court 
found, by thirteen 
votes to three, `that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of 
11 April 2000, and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the 
Kingdom 
of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
in that they failed to respect the immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law' and, by ten votes to six, 
`that the 
Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 
11April 2000 and 
so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated'. 
Findings on Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000. (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 14 February 2002, ICJ. 
24 Press statement of Judge Gilbert Guillaume, 
President of the International Court of Justice, 14 February 
2002. http: //www. Accessed March 8 2002. 
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with the resources of the state by an actor who legally personifies the state, the 
traditional principles upon which international order is founded specifically preclude 
prosecution. At the apex of responsibility for system criminality, the principle of 
individual responsibility clashes directly with the principle of sovereignty. Where these 
principles clash, the traditional principle of sovereignty holds sway. The principle of 
individual responsibility, and therefore the implication of universal morality, is by no 
means as well developed as it might first appear. 
This decision has implications for the future of prosecutions by Belgium. There are 
some 40 similar claims now before Belgium courts which have now been thrown into 
question. These include criminal proceedings against Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, 
Cuban President Fidel Castro, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Ivory Coast President 
Laurent Gbagbo and ex-President Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran among others. The most 
notable pf these pending cases is the indictment of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon 
for indirect responsibility for the massacres at Sabra and Chatilla. 26 The ruling due from 
the Belgian court on the case was delayed on Mar 6 2002, to give the court more time to 
consider the legal implications of the ruling on the warrant for Ndombasi in the light of 
the decision on immunity. The lawyers for the 23 survivors of a 1982 massacre in two 
Palestinian refugee camps asked the court to hold off on any decision until they 
introduce new arguments in light of the International Court of Justice ruling. 
27 
Verhaeghe, prosecuting lawyer, argued to the court that the International Convention on 
Genocide 1948, which Israel signed, supersedes all other international law in the Sharon 
case. That would allow the investigation into Sharon's alleged role 
in the killings of 
25 Ibid. 
26 For the factual background to the massacres including the General Assembly and 
Security Council Res, 
see Chapter 3. 
27 `March 6,2002- Belgian court delays decision on Sharon war crimes 
investigation' Wiesenthal Centre, 
http: //www. Accessed Mar 8 2002. 
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Palestinian refugees to continue, he said. `The convention expressly states that there is 
no immunity for those who commit acts of genocide, ' adding that the United Nations 
declared the massacre at Sabra and Chatilla as an act of genocide. 28 The new hearing is 
scheduled for May 15 2002.2`' Arguments about the nature of genocide as a crime 
against an international moral order now have the potential to be explored, for 
arguments about the scope of jurisdiction in cases of genocide may well address the 
moral priority of prosecuting such crimes as well as the technical issues in jurisdiction. 
The Belgium v. Congo, ICJ, ruling illustrated another important point with regard to the 
likelihood of prosecution in its confirmation of the ability of states to waive immunity 
or effect prosecutions domestically. If high-ranking criminal officials cannot be clearly 
delineated from the state, prosecutions will be domestic and focus on individual crimes, 
disregarding the pattern in which they occur or the evidence of system criminality. This 
distinction between the individual and their state must be effected by the state itself as 
well as by other states. Moral responsibility for system criminality will be assigned only 
when it can be focussed on a few individuals whose actions can, in some sense, be 
demonstrated as both narrowly intentional and deviant as well as not being organs-of- 
the-state. Accordingly, examination of some of the forms domestic prosecutions by 
states take is illuminating. Courts Martial, truth commissions and amnesties are all 
responses of a kind to system criminality, yet these mechanisms can differ as much in 
their objectives as their operation. 
29 In fact, a General Assembly resolution simply 
described the massacre as `genocide', (there was no 
criminal investigation) but no further action was either mooted or 
taken. See Ch 3. 
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Truth Commissions 
An alternative to an international criminal system is the operation of domestic truth 
commissions. These could be characterised as serving the purposes of reconciliation 
rather than justice. These are seen by their supporters as a preferred option to 
international prosecution on the grounds that they neither violate the sovereignty of the 
states involved nor do they impact on a potentially fragile transition period in unstable 
states. 30 Hayner describes four defining characteristics of truth commissions. Firstly, 
they focus on the past, secondly their objective is to paint an overall picture of human 
rights abuses across a period of time, also they are temporary with a limited mandate, 
and finally, they are vested with authority, by way of their sponsor, that allows 
investigative function. 31 Truth commissions have become increasingly popular, between 
1974 and 1991, nine commissions had been established, all by the president or 
parliament of the country, but six were established between March 1992 and late 1993 
alone. Of these six, four were untraditional models, sponsored by the UN, opposition 
party or NGO's. 32 This illustrates the most outstanding feature of truth commissions; 
they are context specific. This impacts upon their success rates and the small number of 
cases makes it difficult to establish general principles concerning the extent of their 
contribution. What seems clear is that there is no reason why truth commissions should 
not be complementary to international prosecutions. Although they are often presented 
29 `March 6,2002- Belgian court delays decision on Sharon war crimes investigation' Wiesenthal 
Centre, 
http: //www. Accessed Mar 8 2002. 
30 J. R. Bolton, `The Global Prosecutors', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78: No. 1, pp. 157-164. 
31 P. Hayner, `Fifteen Truth Commissions- 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study', 
Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 16: No. 4,1994, pp. 597-655. 
32 Ibid. 
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as alternatives to international trials, the principles upon which they are based are not in 
fact oppositional to criminal proceedings. However, truth commissions are not judicial 
bodies and as such, they do not indicate progress towards international polity in the way 
that the criminalisation of `immorality' and the assignment of individual responsibility 
does. 
A difficulty with truth commissions is the potential, when investigations are located 
domestically, for the perpetrators of abuse to avoid responsibility for their actions by 
providing for amnesty or simply ignoring the findings. In this way the context 
sensitivity of truth commissions can be a drawback rather than the advantage it is 
presumed to be, truth commissions can be a technique for subverting both justice and 
reconciliation. A case in point is that of Chile. The Chilean president Patricio Aylwin 
created the Truth and reconciliation Commission (or Rettig Commission) by executive 
decree only a month after taking office in 1990, in response to public demands to 
expose the truth about the brutal Pinochet regime. 33 The mandate of the Rettig 
commission was restricted due to the political realities of the `pacted transition' of 
power between Pinochet's regime and the opposition. In the early 1980's, the 
population had begun to press for democratisation through increasingly vocal human 
rights organisations. In 1988 Pinochet , 
offered to hold a plebiscite on whether he should 
remain president and opposition parties eventually decided to participate on the grounds 
that it was the only opportunity for ending military rule. This difficult decision implied 
acceptance of Pinochet's self-legitimising 1980 constitution and the 1978 self-amnesty 
law. 34 Thus after losing the plebiscite Pinochet remained as commander-in-chief of the 
army, he also controlled the senate and had appointed almost all of the 
Supreme Court 
33 M. Ensalaco, `Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and 
Assessment', Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16: No. 4.1994, pp. 656-675. 
34 C. Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, London: Yale University 
Press, 1996, p. 37. 
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justices. 35 The armed forces made it clear to the new president that a military uprising 
would ensue should indictments or prosecutions become an issue for the armed forces. 36 
Thus unlike other truth commissions such as those in South African and El Salvador, 
the Rettig Commission did not function as part of a broader concerted effort to 
transform society, but in lieu of such a transformation. 37 The Rettig Commission was 
successful in terms of its own limited and essentially timid mandate but the later 
extradition of Pinochet demonstrated a far higher level of expectation for responsibility 
assignation. 
However, where truth commissions have functioned successfully they have been 
accepted as a valid means for strengthening newly democratic institutions. Although 
concerns have been raised that the extradition of Pinochet violated Chile's sovereign 
right to exercise prosecutorial discretion, 38 it is clear that such discretion was imposed 
on Chile rather than chosen. Where truth commissions are widely perceived as 
legitimate, as was the case with those established in South Africa, 
39 no further 
international proceedings have ever been launched against the amnesties offered to 
individuals in return for detailed testimony about their crimes. Roth argues, contra 
Kissinger, that `no prosecutor has challenged this arrangement, [the South African truth 
commissions] and no government would likely countenance such a challenge'. 
40 The 
principle of complementarity embedded in the statute of the ICC, which we will 
35 Ibid. 
36 D. Pion-Berlin, `To Prosecute or Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern 
Cone', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16,1993, pp. 105-130. 
37 Ensalaco, Op Cit. n. 33. 
38 H. A. Kissinger, `The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80: No. 4,2001, pp. 
86- 
96 
39 There have been three commissions 1. Commission Of Enquiry into Complaints By 
Former African 
National Congress Prisoners And Detainees (also known as the Skweyiya Commission) 
2. Commission 
Of Enquiry Into Certain Allegations Of Cruelty And Human Rights Abuses Against 
Detainees By ANC 
Members (also known as the Motsuenyane Commission) 3. Commission of 
Truth and Justice 
40 K. Roth, `The Case for Universal Jurisdiction', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80: No. 
5,2001, pp. 150-153. 
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examine in more detail below, should serve as sufficient protection for governments 
which choose reconciliation rather than prosecution. It seems that for the near future 
international prosecutions will only be considered where truth commissions manifestly 
fail either to aid reconciliation or to serve justice. 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The idea of an international criminal court was first put on the international agenda by 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, and was also implied by the Genocide convention 
which described the potential for an `international penal tribunal' . 
41 The International 
law Commission (ILC) started working on a draft Statute for a Permanent Court but 
although there has been a Draft Statute for an ICC since 1951', 42 the momentum for 
such a court was lost with the political and ideological confrontations of the Cold War. 
43 
In 1989 Trinidad and Tobago, on behalf of six Caribbean states, proposed the re- 
activation of ILC work on the issue. This was motivated by particular concern for cross- 
border drug trafficking. 44 The General Assembly took immediate action asking the ILC 
to renew its work on the draft statute, and by 1994, the ILC had presented a revised 
draft with recommendations for a diplomatic conference. This suggestion was met with 
some resistance and an ad hoc committee was established to consider the major 
substantive and administrative issues arising from the ILC draft. 
5 By Dec 1995,46 the 
41 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, Article 
6. 
42 R. K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International law, London: Stevens and Son, 1960, p. 
47. 
43 V. Popvski, `The International Criminal Court: A Synthesis of Retributive and Restorative 
Justice', 
International Relations, Vol. XV: No. 3, Dec 2000, pp. 1-15. 
44 Ibid. 
4' GA Res 49/73 of Dec 9 1994. 
46 GA Res 50/46 of Dec 11 1995. 
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General Assembly decided to establish a preparatory committee to consider a new and 
less radical draft statute drawn up by the ILC 47 
The Preparatory Committee made significant contributions that confirmed and 
accelerated the growth of international humanitarian law. The original impetus for the 
court, cross-border criminality and the enormous jurisdiction it implied, had been 
abandoned to concentrate on humanitarian law and the new era of individual criminal 
responsibility ushered in by the ICTY/ICTR. By April 1998, the Preparatory Committee 
completed its drafting of a `widely acceptable, consolidated draft text' for submission to 
an international conference. 48 The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court was finally 
held in Rome from June 15 to July 17 1998 to `finalise and adopt a convention on the 
establishment of an international criminal court'. 49 
In general, the Rome Statute of the ICC continues the trends manifest in the 
ICTY/ICTR. It has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and the crime of aggression. 
50 Most interestingly, its jurisdiction reflects 
precisely the tension this thesis examines. It applies only to individuals, rather than 
organisations or states. In addition, official capacity will not be grounds for immunity: 
Official capacity as Head of State or government [.... ] 
shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this statute, nor shall it ... constitute 
a grounds for reduction of sentence. 
5' 
47 Popvski, Op Cit. n. 43. 
48 `Establishment of an International Criminal Court', available online, accessed on 
23.11.00, 
http: //www. un. org/law/icc/general/overview. htm 
49 Ibid. 
50 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 5, section 1, 
A/CONF. 183/9 
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So it might seem that it fully represents the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility. However, in terms of an indication towards an international moral polity, 
it is less convincing. This can be seen with a closer look at the court's mechanisms for 
implementation. Through these we can see that the political control is still located 
firmly within the state. Whilst the ICTY had primacy over national courts, at the ICC 
the reverse is the case. Also, the statute only applies to the states which are signatory to 
the agreement. `Where either the state on whose territory the crime occurred or the state 
whose nationals are suspects has ratified the court's statute or has given its consent'. 52 
The orientation is toward a society of states rather than an international moral order. 
This sits uneasily with the criminalisation of offences such as crimes against humanity 
and genocide. However, cases may also be referred by the prosecutor or by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII powers. Ironically, the Security Council may be the 
direction from which advances towards establishing an international moral order are 
most likely. It is likely that the Security Council would refer a case to the court were the 
offence so extreme that there was a consensus around prosecution regardless of whether 
the state was signatory or not. There is certainly the legal potential, and with the ICTY 
and ICTR the legal precedent, for egregious offences to be characterised as threats to 
international peace and security, always providing there is the political will to do so. 
These are precisely the conditions which would . 
demonstrate the existence of an 
international moral consensus. 
The treaty was finally ratified on April 12 2002 after the signing of the last three of the 
sixty states necessary to bring the treaty into force. However, 
despite the initial 
enthusiasm of the US it refused to ratify the treaty on the grounds that all cases should 
51 Ibid. 
52 FCO, `The International Criminal Court'. Focus International, available online, accessed 
26.10.99. 
http: //files. fco. gov. uk/info/briefs/ 1597. pdf 
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be referred from the Security Council, thus allowing the US to veto any cases against it. 
The fact that the US failed to carry this point is clearly indicative of the growth of some 
form of international moral community. Another significant point is the ratification 
level for the ICC, set at sixty, this is one of the highest thresholds for any treaty, it 
equals the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and is only exceeded by the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention, (with 65). 53 The rationale for such a high threshold was 
to secure widespread acceptance and legitimacy for the court rather than a speedy entry 
into force. 54 However, the ratification was accomplished remarkably quickly, another 
indication that there is a growing international consensus around criminal prosecution 
for the most extreme system criminality. 
The US objections to the jurisdiction of the court are illustrative of the wider debate 
about the potentials and pitfalls of international justice. Kissinger's defence of the US 
position neatly encapsulates this debate. 55 Kissinger argues firstly that the canon of 
international humanitarian law is more a statement of common standards than 
substantively envisaged penal practice, and that the new practice of pursuing heads of 
state through national courts, as in the Pinochet case) is potentially a political weapon. 
On this view, international law is not law in the true sense of the term, but, lacking in 
coercive enforcement and undemocratic (in that it is not constituted by an accountable 
and representative body). 56Yet there are specific legal duties to prosecute 
laid out in 
both the Convention on Torture and for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, to 
which many states have signed. 
57 In effect, signatories are simply ceding this duty to a 
53 A. Roberts, and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd Ed, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 668. 
sa Ibid. 
55 Kissinger, Op Cit. n. 38, and Roth, Op Cit. n. 40. 
56 Bolton, Op Cit. n. 30. 
57 Roth, Op Cit. n. 40. 
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common court. Bolton also criticises universal jurisdiction for imposing a rigid model 
of justice on complex political circumstances. Yet, he does not deny that criminalisation 
is appropriate in some cases58 and it is this that is the key principle in demonstrating a 
commonly shared moral position. That this common position is unestablished is 
demonstrated in the opportunistic, partial and uneven application of the law. Even so, to 
criminalise an offence is to assert the existence of a moral community, however 
undeveloped, against which the offence is committed. 
This especially demonstrated by the inclusion of several instances when even offences 
outside an armed conflict can be prosecuted. For both genocide and crimes against 
humanity there needs to be, `a widespread and systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack'. 59 Britain was instrumental in the 
inclusion of internal conflict, whereas for the US it was a serious obstacle to 
ratification. 60 
Anti-terrorism Measures 
By contrast another development in the application of individual criminal responsibility 
has taken a different direction and consequently presents us with the opportunity to 
consider the political rather than purely legal issues that surround the principle. The 
actions and rhetoric of the international coalition in conflict with Afghanistan 
following 
the terrorist attack upon the US, Sept 11 2001, when aerial attacks levelled the World 
Trade Centre's twin towers and damaged the Pentagon represents such a development. 
58 Bolton, Op Cit. n. 30. 
59 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7, section 
1, A/CONF. 183/9 
60 I Black, `Battle for War Crimes Court', The Guardian, 25.02.99. Also 
in FCO, `The International 
Criminal Court', Focus International, available online, accessed 26.10.99. 
http. Hfiles. fco. gov. uk/info/briefs/ 1597. pdf 
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This conflict presents a clear opportunity to discuss the nature of moral responsibility 
given that it simultaneously extends the principle of individual responsibility to its 
ultimate degree, yet also has the potential to undermine its legal credibility. This thesis 
conceptualises the action in Afghanistan as representative of the performative 
contradictions encountered in application of the principle of individual responsibility 
within a framework of inter-state interaction. That it represents in some manner the 
acceleration of the principle of individual criminal responsibility is demonstrated by the 
immediate and focused assignation of responsibility to Osama bin Laden. That it 
represents the potential to undermine the juridical nature of the assignation of 
responsibility is illustrated by the observation that whilst the respective governments of 
both the US and the UK have firmly linked the terrorism to an individual, Osama bin 
Laden, 6' the resulting retaliation was directed against a state by a coalition of states. I 
argue that the focus upon the state even when the target of the action is an individual is 
a result of the prevailing structural conditions within the international system. This 
conflict marks both the acceleration of the principle of individual responsibility at the 
same time as it demonstrates that inadequacies of the international system. It represents 
its zenith in that bin Laden is perhaps the first individual to have achieved true 
recognition as `hostel omnium', enemy of all, whilst amply illustrating the point that 
states operate in an environment that favours the traditional structure of state-to-state 
interaction. Armatta, of the Coalition for International Justice, argues that rather than 
reinforcing the principle of individual responsibility, the action against Bin Laden 
has in 
6! In the US as early as 11 Sept 2001, Colin Powell described 
himself as `absolutely convinced' that bin 
Laden and the al-Qaeda network were responsible 
for the attacks. Washington CNN, Powell says US Can 
Link bin Laden, Al-Qaeda to Attack, available Internet. 
hqp: //www. cnn. community/200I/US/09/23/gen. america-under. attack 
Accessed 04.11.01 
In the UK, Tony Blair in his speech following the launch of the attacks on 
Afghanistan on 7 Oct 2001, 
stated that `there is no doubt in my mind 
[... ] that these attacks were carried out by the al-Qaeda network, 
headed by Osama bin Laden', reprinted in full at 
http //www cnn community/2001 /WORLD/europe/ 
10/07/gen. blairspeechaccessed 04.11.01 
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fact served only to criminalise an entire cultural group. 62 On this view, the action 
against him represents not an advance in the application of individual responsibility, but 
instead progress towards increasing collectivism in moral blame. This view might be 
reinforced by the `side-effects' of post 9.11 action. For instance, Britain's derogation 
from Article 48 of the Human Rights Act, withdrawing the usual civil and political 
rights from resident foreign nationals, is a clear indication of the assignment of 
collective blame. 
Conclusion 
The examples we have looked at here are expressive of the main tension encountered in 
applying individual criminal responsibility, the tension between universal jurisdiction 
and state sovereignty. The willingness of the international community to enforce new 
standards of individual criminal responsibility seems to have been much increased since 
the constitution of the ICTY/ICTR. However, the current model of inter-state relations 
may not be able to sustain a full realisation of the principle. The traditional diplomatic 
structures that enable states to function and communicate, continually constrain the 
limits and potential for making individuals criminally liable for their actions whilst in 
office. 
The Pinochet case demonstrated a clear extension of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility when set against the classic doctrine of sovereign immunity. On this 
occasion, the challenge was successful, but the difficulties encountered 
by Belgium in 
its attempts to apply universal jurisdiction through its own national courts are currently 
62 Interview with Judith Armatta, Hague Division of the Coalition for International 
Justice, The Hague, 9 
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foundering. This is due to the reluctance of the ICJ to violate the traditional structure of 
international diplomacy. In the same way, we see the principle of individual 
responsibility pushed forward but nevertheless constrained within the constitution of the 
ICC. Much of the frustration experienced by the human rights lobby might be dissipated 
by the realisation of how fundamental the changes they seek might be for the traditional 
structure of state interaction. Individual criminal responsibility implies and requires far 
more than the prosecutions thus far might seem to indicate. Change thus far has been 
driven by egregious examples of gross criminality. It might seem that change of this 
magnitude can only be inspired by criminality of an equal magnitude. 
The ICC also exhibits the tensions between individual responsibility and sovereignty. It 
underscores the moral right of states and their citizens to justice against offenders and 
thereby logically indicates a moral order that transcends state borders. At the same time, 
it achieves this by paying homage to a traditional state structure that reinforces 
sovereign autonomy. By applying only to signatory states, the ICC implicitly denies the 
existence of a transcending moral order. Further to this, the doctrine of 
complementarity ensures that domestic systems of justice are prior to those of the 
international court, provided they function effectively. Truth commissions are seen as a 
non-threatening alternative to prosecutions given that they leave state sovereignty 
intact. 
However, as non judicial bodies they do not necessarily impact upon the course of 
international justice. In addition, the increasing number of such commissions indicates a 
concern to address past abuses rather than deny them, and as such, they contribute to a 
new climate of openness characterised by a regard for the truth and a concern 
for human 
rights. 
April 2002. 
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Although discrete from international criminal law, the secular notion of universal 
human rights is supported by such developments. The statute of the ICC has jurisdiction 
over some crimes even when not committed around the nexus of armed conflict, a 
development which contributes to the blurring of the lines between war crimes, related 
to inter-state interactions, and human rights abuses committed by government over its 
own citizens. For this reason it is possible to conclude that the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility is set to be strengthened in the future although to what extent the 
principle can entrench is limited by the current structures of international law and, more 
importantly, by the traditional structures of inter-state interaction. The novelty of the 
change in approach to responsibility assignation is indicative of a whole change in 
political orientation as yet in its infancy. As Hawthorn observes: 
Like all far-reaching political change, this has started in 
opportunism, will be partial and paradoxical, and in 
having to accommodate to the existing international 
politics, is certain to be incomplete. 63 
63 Hawthorn, Op Cit. n. 19. 
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Conclusion 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility for system criminality is a principle 
that has gained in scope and recognition since the Nuremberg Tribunal. The new 
willingness to endorse the principle is evident in the proliferation of techniques for 
dealing with system crime, including national courts which claim universal jurisdiction, 
truth commissions, courts martial, commissions of enquiry and domestic criminal trials 
as well as international prosecutions. This thesis has focused on international criminal 
trials as being of exceptional importance. It is the original proposition of this work that 
international prosecutions are the only application of criminal responsibility that imply 
an international polity, because they are the only prosecutions that imply some form of 
moral consensus. 
Yet the pattern of this principle's application has been marked by both expansion and 
covert restraint. The restraint of the principle emanates from the traditional structure, 
focus and protocols of the international system itself. Ad Takayanagi, a defence lawyer 
at the Tokyo tribunal argued: 
Duties and responsibilities are placed on states and 
nations and not on individuals, this immunity is both a 
legal principle and a practical necessity'. 
' 
It is this, coupled with the relative youth of the principle, which explains the apparent 
inconsistencies and opportunism of its application. This has become clear through the 
course of this thesis by means of an analysis of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility viewed in opposition to the application of collective responsibility. 
This 
distinctive approach is marked by analysis of international interaction as occurring 
1 R. H. Minnear, Victor's Justice, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1971, p. 
45. 
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within a moral framework rather than focusing on the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility as just an event occurring within a political framework. This new focus 
has shed light upon the development, condition and potentials for an international polity 
based upon shared moral values. This thesis addresses the notion of international 
society, where inter-state relations are characterised by common norms and values2, 
rather than world society, which analyses the common norms and values of individuals 
across the system3. Yet the focus upon the individual has evident implications for the 
discussion of world society exemplified by Dietrich Jung4, in that it identifies a trend 
towards universalism. 
However, further to this, a key insight of this thesis has been that it is only within the 
act of prosecution that real evidence for moral agreement is found. Theoretical attempts 
to ground a notion of universal morality have ultimately proved inconclusive as have 
empirical attempts to demonstrate cross-cultural moral beliefs. Whilst a common 
approach has been a deep textual analysis of the legislation, examining its language, 
scope and coverage, this approach has fundamental limitations. Although it can provide 
valuable insights as to the potential for moral consensus, it cannot securely show that 
such consensus really exists. It is only within the realm of retribution that a moral order 
is implied. 
2 R. Little, `The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations, European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 6: No. 3,2000, pp. 395-422. 
j B. Buzan, `From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory 
Meet the English School'. International Organisation, Vol. 47: No. 3,1993, pp. 
327-352. 
4 D. Jung, `The Political Sociology of World Society', Euuropean Journal of International Relations, 
Vol. 
7: No. 4,2000. pp. 443-474. 
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Assignation of Responsibility 
The importance of the assignment of individual criminal responsibility as opposed to 
collective responsibility is located within the very nature of responsibility assignation. 
To assign criminal responsibility, that is responsibility which entails penal sanctions, the 
conditions for full responsibility must be satisfied. This means that for an entity to bear 
criminal guilt, the requirements of autonomy, agency and intention must be met. By 
viewing responsibility assignation under these strict conditions it is apparent that 
collectives cannot satisfy the criteria for criminal guilt. Were this not the case then the 
trend towards assigning collective responsibility would not be in tension with the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility. This thesis has shown that the 
criminalisation of offences, can only truly be realised by the assignment of individual 
responsibility and that this implies shared moral values in a way that simply assigning 
blame does not. 
Yet, it is equally apparent that the traditional manner of viewing states, which are the 
ultimate collective entities, regards them as monolithic bearers of legal personality. This 
tendency to regard states as large individuals has a direct bearing on how we picture 
state interaction. The inability to assign criminal responsibility to collectives with any 
coherence means that responsibility assignation has a very different outcome when 
applied to states. The traditional response to breaches of international 
law by states is 
based upon compensation rather than retribution. For example, the ICJ awarded 
compensation to the UK against Albania with respect to the minefield 
laid in the Corfu 
Channel case on humanitarian grounds. 
5 As such, it has the character of civil law rather 
than criminal law. This thesis has shown that, traditionally, responses to atrocities 
have 
s G. Guillaume in, N. H. Wirajuda and F Delon, The Fourth Informal ASEM 
Seminar on Hunan Rights, 
Singpore: Asia Europe Foundation, 2001. p. 39. 
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been collective in their application. They included measures such as reparations and 
sanctions and were designed to focus on state-to-state relationships. This type of 
response to states in delict of their international obligations was epitomized by 
reparations in the sum of five million dollars in gold marks, awarded against Germany 
according to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919.6 As we saw in chapter three, 
although the treaty also provided for the prosecution of 800 war criminals including 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, the few prosecutions which occurred at Leipzig were ineffective and 
more indicative of disarray than consensus.? This is a function of the structural 
conditions under which states interact. Sovereign equality is an essential feature of the 
international landscape and, as such, it conditions and generates diplomatic protocols. 
These are more than simply customs; they allow international interaction to proceed. 8 
Thus, the application of individual criminal responsibility challenges the historic modes 
of state interaction and the most elemental norms of the international system. 
Thus although the Nuremberg Tribunal did not represent an unproblematic application 
of individual criminal responsibility, given the structural context in which it occurred, it 
was a startling challenge to tradition. This thesis has contextualised this development to 
demonstrate both the depth of its challenge and the limitations of its practical 
incarnation. Nevertheless, it contributed enormously to the expansion of the principle of 
individual responsibility for system crime and founded the development of an entire 
body of law aimed at addressing gross atrocities. Yet the consensus that the 
prosecutions of major Nazi criminals implies is both restricted and confined, a fact 
6 W. L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History- of Nazi Genmami, London: Book Club 
Associates, 1978, p. 58. 
7 J. B. Keenan and B. F. Brown, Crimes against International Law, Washington 
D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1950 
' This was a point reinforced by Arthur Witteween of the 
ICJ in interview and it is born out by recent ICJ 
decisions such as Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, 
Findings on Arrest fFarrant of II April 
2000. ICJ Reports, 14 February 2002. 
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amply demonstrated by the dearth of prosecutions until the constitution of the 
ICTY/ICTR. 
Undoubtedly the political conditions of the Cold War impacted upon the capacity of the 
international community to take action in cases of gross abuse, but there were also 
occasions when there were opportunities to take action against offending individuals 
which were simply not taken. For instance, at the Paris Agreement relating to Cambodia 
human rights issues were addressed and the idea of prosecutions was mooted. 9 
Individuals were even taken into custody but no prosecutions resulted. By viewing this 
through the lens of moral responsibility it is clear that, at the time, there was simply not 
a strong enough international consensus around the issue of prosecutions to criminalise 
the events in Cambodia. This was because the character of the abuses committed 
diverged in several respects from those committed in Nazi Germany. It is political 
willingness to drive forward the issue of prosecution that is the primary factor in the 
justiciability of system crime. Crucially this willingness is founded on a consensus 
triggered in only the most narrow of circumstances. 
One of these circumstances was the situation in former Yugoslavia. Consensus was 
triggered here because the character of the abuses perpetrated was resonant with those 
addressed at the Nuremberg Tribunal. The emotional quality of the atrocities was 
characterised by the dispassionate and bureaucratised targeting of an ethnic group. This 
displayed a similar purity of intent to that addressed by the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
therefore generated the necessary consensus to motivate the assignment of individual 
criminal responsibility. Yet this principle, although it has been expanded by the 
9 T. Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report No. 9, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995. 
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constitution of the ICTR, is by no means fully entrenched. In fact, the more natural 
focus for responsibility assignation is still the nation-state. This is seen by the 
collectivisation of blame represented in the application of sanctions to Iraq following 
the Gulf War, 1991. The contrast between the treatment of Slobodan Milosevi and 
Saddam Hussein illustrates the tensions between collective and individual responses to 
abuse. Although the more coherent approach to Iraq's breaches of the laws of war and 
the treatment of its own ethnic minorities would be to indict Saddam Hussein, instead 
there has been a collectivised response to Iraq's actions. The application of sanctions, 
though they are promulgated as compensatory requirements, is more readily perceived 
as illegitimately punitive. This demonstrates both the expansion and covert restraint of 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. It has made gains in that non- 
discriminatory or collective retribution is perceived as incoherent and immoral, but it is 
covertly restrained by an international system that more readily focuses on the 
collective, or nation-state. 
That the principle is gaining ground, however, can be seen in the proliferation of 
alternative manifestations of individual responsibility. These include the willingness of 
some governments, such as Belgium and Spain, to pursue individual prosecutions 
through their domestic courts and the prosecution of individuals through domestic 
criminal proceedings. For instance, the former members of the Dergue who have been 
prosecuted in the Ethiopian courts. 
1° Yet although the principle is gaining currency, the 
structural conditions under which states operate prevent its full realisation. As chapter 
eight showed, even the ICC has some of these limitations inherent in its form and 
10 J. Ryle, `An African Nuremberg', The New Yorker, 2 Oct 1995. pp. 50-6 1, and 
P. Hayner, `Fifteen 
Truth Commissions- 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study', Hunun Rights 
Qrar-terhi, Vol. 16: No. 4, 
1994, pp. 597-655. 
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structure. '' A full realisation of the principle of individual criminal responsibility should 
have no geographical limitations, given that, theoretically at least, as its name indicates, 
system crime is a crime against all of humanity. But this vision of universal jurisdiction 
is tempered by the treaty based form of the court. It applies only to signatory states 
which actually cede their own prosecutorial authority to the court. Given that states have 
always exercised the right to prosecute individuals for war crimes if committed against 
their nationals or on their territory it is not such a great evolution in the prosecution of 
system crime as it might appear. Ultimately it is subject to, and conditioned by, the 
traditional norms of state interaction. 
Potential for Further Research 
Yet having established this, the opportunity for further research is presented - 
particularly on the nature of the criminal events which are likely to lead to prosecution. 
How and when individual responsibility is assigned and the precise moral character of 
the events likely to be considered actionable has a crucial bearing on assessing the 
nature, extent and likely potential for international moral consensus. An issue of 
particular interest is the impact of the domestic political structure of states, in which 
offending behaviour is found, on responsibility assignation. The starting point for such 
research would be the observation that individuals in an elitist political structure are far 
more easily designated responsible than those in democratic regimes where authority is 
balanced and divided. The assertion that democratic regimes are complicit in fewer 
atrocities' 2 is certainly one that bears further research given such events as the Nato 
11V. Popvski, `The International Criminal Court: A Synthesis of Retributive and Restorative Justice', 
International Relations, Vol. XV: No. 3, Dec 2000, pp. 1-15. 
ý- A. D. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism vs. Relativism, London: SAGL. 1990. 
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bombing in Kosovo. It may be that individual responsibility for such events is simply 
more difficult to assign in democratic political systems. Conversely, in authoritarian 
regimes where power is more narrowly concentrated, it may be far easier to isolate 
responsible individuals. The variety of detail and the fine nuances of power distribution 
in domestic political structures make this a complex and extensive research task, but 
one that may well shed light on the pattern of war crimes prosecution. 
This may well also provide a further explanation for some of the tendencies to 
collectivisation in moral blame that this thesis has identified. Where criminal activities 
occur through the machinery of the state, the tendency is often to revert to the traditional 
collective approach to such activities. It may well prove to be that where an offender 
cannot easily be distinguished from their collective the response is to collectivise the 
blame by focusing on the state itself as we have seen in relation to Vietnam where the 
Russell Tribunal accused the US rather than individuals, as discussed in chapter 6.13 
This reversion to traditional modes of approaching atrocities is manifested in the 
treatment of atrocities as political rather than moral events. This is evident when there 
is an avoidance of the assertion of the rights of an international polity either by 
characterising the events as crimes against a national polity, through internal 
prosecutions for violations of the laws of war, or by temporarily `decriminalising' the 
event and treating it as a civil offence by applying traditional collective remedies such 
as sanctions or diplomatic representations to governments. 
13 B. Russell, War Crimes in Vietnam, London: Allen & Unwin, 1967. 
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The Current Status of Justiciability 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is gaining ground and this is 
manifested in a new willingness by the international community to address the issues of 
system crime. However, the principle is far from firmly entrenched, it is activated in 
only the most narrow of circumstances and it is based on a consensus that is narrow and 
limited. But more fundamentally it contradicts the most abiding traditions of the 
international system. A full realisation of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility would challenge the entire foundations of international interaction and 
would require a massive re-orientation not only in international law, but also in the 
perceptions and attitudes of the actors within it. Whilst this principle resides in tension 
with, and in contradiction to, the structural conditions of state interaction, its application 
will be fragmented, inconsistent and opportunistic. Yet, where it exists, limited as it is, 
it must imply universal moral values, and from that an international polity, however 
tenuous and undeveloped it may be at present. 
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